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This dissertation investigates whether consumers’ cross-border shopping due to interstate 
commodity tax differentials influence counties’ economic activity and states’ strategic 
competition in multiple tax policies. 
First, I examine how own and the nearest neighboring states’ commodity tax rates affect 
counties’ retail activity. Particularly, in contrast to many previous studies, I examine 
whether the distance to the state border influences the responsiveness of counties’ retail 
activity to sales and excise taxes of own and the nearest neighboring states. Since the 
costs of avoiding state commodity taxes are presumably lower along borders, the impacts 
of state commodity taxes on retail activity may be different for counties closer and further 
away from the state border.  Considering retail establishments and employment of 
industries that are most likely to be affected by consumers’ cross-border shopping 
activity, I find that that the impacts of domestic and the nearest neighboring states’ sales 
and excise tax rates on counties’ retail establishments and employment depend on the 
distance to the state border. However, contrary to what would be expected, the impacts 
tend not to be very robust. 
Second, I investigate whether consumers’ cross-border shopping to low commodity taxed 
states influence state governments to engage in strategic competition in multiple tax 
policies. Previous works on fiscal competition document that state governments engage 
in commodity tax competition to gain cross-border shoppers. Specifically, the empirical 
research find that changes in neighboring states’ one commodity tax rate influence 
changes in a home state’s same commodity tax rates. However, these studies do not 
address whether changes in neighboring states’ one commodity tax rate also induce the 
home state to adjust other taxes, either other commodity taxes or possible income taxes. 
Using a panel of the United States’ state-level data for the period 1977−2002, I estimate 
the reaction functions not for a single tax rate but multiple rates. In this framework, I find 
that states react to neighbors’ lower tax rates on one tax base by changing rates on either 
the same tax base or/and other tax bases, thereby suggesting that states engage in 
strategic competition in multiple tax rates to meet their revenue goals. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In the United States, there are wide variations in commodity tax rates among 
states. Hence, we can expect at least some consumers to take advantages of lower after-
tax retail prices by purchasing goods in low commodity taxed neighboring states. This 
phenomenon of cross-border shopping, however, if widespread, can place significant 
negative impacts on retail activities of high-taxed regions, such as retail sales, retail 
employment and retail establishments of goods subject to commodity tax rates. 
Moreover, it can place limits on states’ ability to increase their commodity tax rates to 
raise revenues, which in turn can lead states to engage in tax competition in several tax 
bases to meet their state revenue goals. Therefore, this dissertation consists of two 
chapters (chapter 2 and chapter 3) that separately examine each of these issues that arise 
from cross-border shopping for goods subject to state commodity tax rates. 
The second chapter, “Distance to the Border: The Impact of Own and 
Neighboring States’ Sales and Excise Tax Rates on County Retail Activity”, examines 
whether sales and excise tax rates of own and nearest neighboring states have more 
influences on retail activity of counties closer to the state border than of counties further 
away from the state border. This study extends previous research that look at the impacts 
of interstate commodity tax differentials on retail activity of jurisdictions in two ways. 
First, unlike many previous studies that investigate the impacts of state commodity tax or 
price differences on retail activity aggregated to state level, this study investigates how 
sales or excise tax rates of own and the nearest neighboring states affect retail activity 
aggregated to county level. As the time and transportation costs to travel for cross-border 
shopping activities are potentially lower in counties closer to the state border than in 
counties further away from the state border, one can expect the distance to the state 
border to impact the responsiveness of counties’ retail activities to sales and excise tax 
rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state. 
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Second, in contrast to many previous studies that focuses on the impacts of states’ 
sales or excise tax differentials on retail sales of a jurisdiction, this chapter looks at the 
effects of own and the nearest neighboring states’ sales and excise tax rates on counties’ 
establishments and employment of five retail industries that are most likely to be affected 
by consumers’ cross-border shopping activities. These retail industries include grocery 
stores, gasoline stations, furniture stores, clothing stores and alcohol stores. The intuition 
here is that if interstate tax differentials encourage consumers to engage in cross-border 
shopping, thereby reducing retail sales of counties of high-taxed states, then this 
decreased in retail sales can also induce fewer numbers of retail establishments and 
employment of counties of high-taxed states. Using a county-level panel data of the forty-
eight contiguous states over the period 1998 to 2007, I find that domestic and the nearest 
neighboring states’ sales and excise tax rates, in many cases, have significant impacts on 
counties’ retail establishments and employment. I also find that the distance to the state 
border influences the impacts of own state’s and the nearest neighboring state’s sales and 
excise tax rates on counties’ retail establishments and employment, however, the 
influence does not appear to be very robust.  
The third chapter, “The Battle of Taxes: Strategic Interaction in Multiple Tax 
Policies among States,” investigates whether state governments engage in tax 
competition in multiple tax instruments to maintain a balanced budget. Previous studies 
have addressed how state governments engage in excise tax competition to gain cross-
border shoppers. For example, Kanbur and Keen (1993) present a simple theoretical 
model suggesting that competition in excise taxes will be more prevalent among states 
that have a greater share of their population on the border.  Devereux et al. (2007), 
examining U.S. state excise taxes on cigarettes, provide evidence supporting the 
conjectures of Kanbur and Keen (1993). Specifically, they find that state cigarette tax 
rates respond positively to neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates, and cigarette taxes are 
lower among states in which the greater share of consumers is on borders. However, 
these studies do not address whether changes in neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates 
also induce a home state to adjust other taxes, either other commodity taxes or possible 
income taxes, to maintain its revenue requirements. For instance, it is possible that if a 
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“race to the bottom” occurs in cigarette tax rates among state governments to preserve or 
gain cigarette tax base, the home state may respond to neighboring states’ lower cigarette 
tax rates by not only decreasing its cigarette tax rates but also changing rates on other tax 
bases such as individual income taxes to maintain its state revenue goals.  
Thus, this third chapter extends the previous studies on tax competition by 
expanding the focus from a tax on specific base, usually an excise tax, to a much broader 
construction of the tax base to include other taxes including individual income and 
general sales taxes. Specifically, using a panel of the United States’ state-level data for 
the period 1977-2002, I estimate the reaction functions not for a single tax rate but 
multiple rates. In this framework, I examine whether state rates on one tax base respond 
to changes in neighboring states’ rates on the same tax base or/and another tax base. The 
results from this analysis show that strategic competition among state governments may 
occur within the same tax base or across different tax bases. For example, a home state 
cigarette tax rates not only show a positive response to changes in neighboring states’ 
cigarette tax rates, but also show a negative response to changes in neighboring states’ 
sales tax rates. Similarly, while the home state gas tax rates are positively influenced by 
changes in neighboring states’ gas tax rates and sales tax rates, they are negatively 
affected by neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates and individual income tax rates. The 
sales and income tax rates of the home state are not affected by neighboring states’ sales 
and income tax rates, respectively. However, the home state responds to lower income 
tax rates of neighboring states by increasing its sales tax rates. In the same way, the home 
state reacts to lower gas tax rates of neighboring states by increasing its income tax rates, 
thereby confirming my prediction that if strategic competition among states in one tax 
rate, such as in gas tax rates, leads to a “race to the bottom”, home state would respond to 
neighboring states’ lower gas tax rates by not only decreasing its gas tax rates but also 
increasing its rates on less mobile tax bases such as an individual income tax base to meet 
its state revenue goals. Furthermore, my results in general show that if we ignore strategic 
competition in multiple tax rates, we would be underestimating the overall degree of 
strategic interaction in tax rates among state governments.  
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Chapter 2 
Distance to the Border: The Impact of Own and Neighboring States’ Sales and 
Excise Tax Rates on County Retail Activity 
2.1 Introduction 
On March 1, 2009, Arkansas increased its cigarette tax rates from fifty-nine cents 
to $1.15 per twenty-pack. However, rather than enforcing a statewide increase in 
cigarette tax rates by $1.15 per twenty-pack, they introduced a lower tax rate for areas 
that near a state border. In particular, for towns that bordered Arkansas’s neighboring 
states with low cigarette tax rates, they imposed cigarette tax rates equal to that of the low 
cigarette taxed neighboring state plus three cents (Robyn, 2009). Arkansas’ tax policy is 
one of the first to address the potential cross-border shopping problems that may arise 
with different commodity tax rates in neighboring states.  
Most previous studies, with some exceptions, have found that cross-border 
shopping caused by interstate sales or excise tax differentials have negative effects on 
economic activity of high-taxed states. However, they have not addressed whether sales 
or excise tax rates of own and neighboring states have more impacts on economic activity 
of counties closer to the state border than on economic activity of counties further away 
from the state border for all the forty-eight contiguous states of the US. As the time and 
transportation costs of engaging in border shopping are presumably lower in counties 
along the border of high taxed states than in counties further away from the border of 
high taxed states, the adverse impacts of cross-border shopping due to interstate sales and 
excise tax differentials on economic activity can be expected to be more apparent in 
counties near the border of high taxed states than in counties far away from the border of 
high taxed states. 
In addition, most previous studies have usually looked at the impacts of interstate 
sales or excise tax differentials on states’ economic activities such as retail sales of 
goods. However, it is equally possible that interstate sales or excise tax differentials also 
have impacts on other economic activities such as the establishments and employment of 
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retail industries of states. For example, in the spring of 2002, when Kansas increased its 
cigarette tax rates, cigarette sales from Kansas migrated to low cigarette taxed states, 
causing some tobacco merchants in Kansas to either shut or relocate their stores to 
another state (Wagner, 2005). Similarly, the Price Waterhouse report, prepared for the 
conservative American Legislative Exchange Council, determined that during 1987 to 
1991, when Connecticut had New England’s highest combined sales and excise tax rates 
on cigarettes, it lost 2,261 jobs as residents crossed borders into Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island to avoid paying higher cigarette tax per-pack1. Hence, cross-border 
shopping due to differentials in sales and excise tax rates of states can be expected to 
have adverse effects on retail establishments and employment of high-taxed states, 
particularly counties near the border of high-taxed states. 
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether the distance to the state 
border influences the impacts of own and the nearest neighboring states’ sales and excise 
tax rates on a county’s total number of establishments and employment for five retail 
industries: liquor stores, clothing stores, furniture stores, gasoline stations, and grocery 
stores. These five retail industries are among those most likely to be affected by cross-
border shopping behaviors of consumers. For example, goods sold by clothing stores and 
furniture stores are expensive goods, and as the potential savings by border shopping to 
low tax states may be large for these goods, we expect the number of establishments and 
employment of clothing stores and furniture stores to be negatively affected by counties’ 
own state sales tax rates and positively affected by the nearest neighboring state’s sales 
tax rates. In addition, we also expect the number of establishments and employment of 
gasoline stations, liquor stores, and grocery stores to be negatively (positively) affected 
by counties’ own state’s (nearest neighboring state’s) sales and excise tax rates. Most 
consumers spend more money in grocery stores, gasoline stations and liquor stores and 
shop them more often than any other type of stores. If consumers bear less costs to 
purchase grocery, gasoline and alcohol in nearby low sales or excise taxed states, then 
this would create negative impacts on the total number of establishments and 
                                                            
1 "Report: State policy taxes Maine economy" Sun Journal, August 6, 1992. 
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employment of grocery stores, gasoline stations and liquor stores of high taxed states’ 
areas. 
Using a county-level panel data of the forty-eight contiguous states over the 
period 1998 to 2007, I estimate how responsive counties’ retail establishments and 
employment are to domestic and the nearest neighboring states’ sales and excise tax rates, 
and relate the responsiveness to the county’s distance to the state border. In particular, 
first, I estimate how retail establishments and employment of counties respond to sales 
and excise tax rates of own and the nearest neighboring states. Second, I estimate how the 
impacts of sales and excise tax rates of own and the nearest neighboring states on 
counties’ retail establishments and employment vary linearly to the distance to the state 
border. Third, I estimate whether the effects of sales and excise tax rates of own and the 
nearest neighboring states on a county’s retail establishments and employment vary 
discontinuously to the distance to the state border.    
The results from these estimations suggest that sales tax rates and excise tax rates 
of own and the nearest neighboring states, in many cases, have significant influences on 
counties’ retail establishments and employment. While considering how the distance to 
the state border influences the impacts of own and the nearest neighboring states’ sales 
and excise tax rates on a county’s retail establishments and employment, I find that sales 
or excise tax rates of own and the nearest neighboring states have more expected effects 
on retail establishments and employment of counties closer to the state border than of 
counties further away from the state border, however, the effects are not robust across all 
specifications. In this way, the results of this chapter are inconclusive regarding whether 
the impacts of own and the nearest neighboring states’ sales and excise tax rates on retail 
establishments and employment of counties vary with the distance to the state border. 
In the next section, I provide a brief review of the literature on the economic 
impacts of jurisdictions’ commodity tax or price differences with emphasis on studies 
that have incorporated US data to examine the impacts of jurisdictions’ commodity tax or 
price differences on retail sales, establishment or employment. Section 2.3 describes data, 
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Section 2.4 consists of empirical specifications, Section 2.5 presents the estimation 
results, and Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Most previous studies have examined the effects of sales or excise tax 
differentials on economic activity aggregated to the state level. Coats (1995), Fleenor 
(1998), Saba et al. (1995) and Yurekli and Zhang (2000) estimated the impact of cigarette 
tax differentials on states’ cigarette sales. Beard et al. (1997) and Fleenor (1999) looked 
at the effects of alcohol tax differentials on states’ alcohol sales. The majority of these 
studies find that sales or excise tax differentials have negative impacts on high 
commodity taxed states’ sales of goods. However, these studies do not show whether the 
effects of interstate sales or excise tax rate differentials on retail activities such as sales, 
establishment or employment differ between counties closer and further away from the 
border of states. 
There are few studies that have examined the impacts of interstate commodity tax 
differentials on retail activity aggregated to a county level. Mikesell (1971) compared 
sales for various classes of goods in border and interior counties of Illinois. He found that 
total sales were lower in border counties than in interior counties of Illinois and suggested 
that sales tax differentials between Illinois and its adjacent states were the reasons for 
such findings. Fox (1986) focused on counties along the Tennessee state border and 
found evidence that the sales tax differentials had significant negative impacts on retail 
sales and employment. Walsh and Jones (1988) and Tosun and Skidmore (2007) focused 
on West Virginia’s counties and found evidence that state sales tax differentials had 
significant effects on sales of food in border counties but not on sales of food in interior 
counties. However, these studies have not examined how the impact of neighboring 
states’ sales and excise tax rates on retail establishments and employment may vary with 
distance from the border, the focus of my work.  
There are also studies that have used consumer-level data to examine the 
relationship between border shopping and commodity price differences of US states. 
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Using micro-data on cigarette consumption in the US over the period 1992–2002, for 
example, Lovenheim (2008) developed and estimated a demand model that incorporated 
an individual’s decision to purchase cigarettes across a lower-price border. He found 
evidence that consumers nearby lower-price states engaged in extensive cross-border 
shopping for cigarettes, estimating that between thirteen and twenty-five percent of 
consumers purchased cigarettes in lower-price states. Furthermore, using micro-data on 
cigarette consumption of U.S. smokers for February, June, and November 2003, Chiou 
and Muehlegger (2008) estimated that an individual would be willing to travel 2.7 miles 
to save one dollar on a pack of cigarettes. Yet, these studies do not estimate the impacts 
of commodity tax differences on counties’ retail establishments and employment. 
A small number of studies have looked at whether border-area retail industries 
respond to tax or price differences between jurisdictions by changing the number of retail 
establishments or/and employment. Campbell and Lepham (2004) examined whether 
price differentials caused by changes in real exchange rates between the US’s and 
Canada’s currencies affected the number of establishments and their average employment 
of four retail industries of the US. Using a county-level panel data of ten contiguous 
states of the US that border Canada over the period 1977 to 1996, they found evidence 
that when the price of goods in the US were lower to those in Canada due to a real 
exchange rate depreciation, the number of retail establishments of gasoline stations, food 
stores, and eating places increased in border counties but not in interior counties of the 
US. Similarly, the average employment of drinking places increased in only border 
counties of the US when price of goods fell lower to those in Canada due to the real 
exchange rate depreciation. In this way, this study indicates that exchange rate-driven 
price differentials between US and Canada have more impacts on retail establishments 
and employment of border counties relative to interior counties of the US. Nevertheless, 
it has not looked at if tax-driven price differentials between US states have more effects 
on retail establishments and employment of border counties relative to interior counties 
of the forty-eight contiguous states of the US. 
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Manuszak and Moul (2009) examined whether gasoline and cigarette tax 
differences in adjacent regions affected the concentration of retail gasoline capacity of 
northern Illinois and Indiana. Using cross-sectional data from 2001, they found that the 
concentration of retail gasoline capacity varied with respect to the tax border, lower in the 
border of a high taxed region and higher in the border of a low taxed region. Moreover, 
they estimate that Chicago, the jurisdiction with the highest taxes, would miss 
approximately forty percent of the capacity that would exist were taxes equalized. 
However, this study does not investigate how adjacent regions’ gasoline and cigarette tax 
differences affect regions’ employment on gasoline stations. Moreover, it does not look at 
whether adjacent regions’ sales tax differences influence the number of establishment and 
employment of regions’ other retail industries such as grocery stores and liquor stores. 
In this way, previous studies have used state-level data of all forty-eight 
contiguous states or county-level data of one or few states to examine the impact of tax or 
price differences between jurisdictions on either retail sales, retail establishment, or retail 
employment of a jurisdiction. Yet, none of the studies have used county-level panel data 
of the forty-eight contiguous states to analyze whether sales and excise tax rates of own 
state and the nearest neighboring state have more impacts on the total number of retail 
establishments and employment of counties closer to the state border than of counties 
further away from the state border2.  
2.3 Data 
To perform this analysis, I use a county-level panel data of the forty-eight 
contiguous states over the period 1998 to 20073. These data include the total number of 
establishments and employees of liquor stores, clothing stores, furniture stores, gasoline 
stations, and grocery stores were taken from the U.S. Census Bureau, County Business 
Patterns (CBP). In the CBP, liquor stores were comprised of the beer, wine and liquor 
                                                            
2 Studies that consider European countries to study the effects of commodity tax or price differences 
between jurisdictions on economic activity include: Banfi et al. (2005), Asplund et al. (2007), and Leal et 
al. (2009). The results obtained from these studies, in general, confirm that commodity tax or price 
differences between jurisdictions have negative impacts on sales of goods in high-taxed jurisdictions. 
3 Definition of counties is referred from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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stores. Clothing stores represented not only men, women, and children clothing stores, 
but also clothing accessories stores that sold products such as hats, jewelry, gloves, 
handbags, and shoes. The furniture stores represented furniture and home furnishing 
stores such as floor covering stores and window treatment stores. The gasoline stations 
consisted of gasoline stations with and without convenience stores. The grocery stores 
referred to supermarkets and convenience stores.  
Data on effective tax rates rather than statutory tax rates were considered in this 
analysis as it was difficult to get statutory tax and standardize rates for taxes on alcohol 
and income. For instance, in the case of alcohol taxes, although all states levied excise 
taxes on beer, some states levied ad valorem mark up and/or excise taxes for distilled 
spirits and wine. It was unclear as how to compare ad valorem mark up on distilled spirits 
(or wine) in some states with excise taxes in other remaining states. In the case of income 
tax rates, since several states imposed different range of income tax rates for various 
individual income brackets, it was difficult to find a common comparable measure of 
statutory income tax rates among states. Therefore, for all taxes, state effective tax rates 
were determined by dividing state total tax collections in a tax category by personal 
income. State total tax collections data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
while state total income data were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA).  
Data on whether the state has sales tax holidays were drawn from the Tax Policy 
Center – Urban Institute and Brookings Institution. Data on food tax exemptions were 
also collected from the Tax Policy Center – Urban Institute and Brookings Institution. 
However, there were missing data on state food tax exemptions for certain period in this 
data source. The missing data were then obtained from the various editions of the 
American Bar Association Sales and Use Tax Deskbook.  
The distance from a county to the state border affects retail sales was obtained 
from the website of Thomas J. Holmes, where distance is calculated from the centroid of 
the county (Holmes, 2008). Using these data, I determined a county’s distance to its 
nearest neighboring state (or nearest state border). County per capita income and total 
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population data were collected from the BEA. The percentage of elderly population, the 
percentage of young population, the percentage of black population, the percentage of 
other race population, and the percentage of male population between ages twenty and 
sixty-four years of counties were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics of the entire sample. During the period 
1998 to 2007, of all five retail industries, gasoline stations had the highest average 
number of establishments per 1,000 county residents. Over the same period, however, 
grocery stores had the largest average number of employees per 1,000 county residents. 
The average effective tax rates on own state are 2.12 percent for sales taxes, 0.11 percent 
for tobacco taxes, 0.44 percent for fuel taxes, and 0.05 percent for alcohol taxes during 
the years 1998 to 2007. 
 
Table 2.1—Descriptive Statistics, 1998−2007 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Establishment per 1,000 County Residents    
   Grocery Stores 30770 0.421 0.275 
   Gasoline Stations 30770 0.702 0.373 
   Clothing Stores 30770 0.344 0.378 
   Furniture Stores 30770 0.190 0.145 
   Alcohol Stores 30770 0.110 0.128 
Employment per 1,000 County Residents    
   Grocery Stores 17128 8.965 3.467 
   Gasoline Stations 28185 5.482 3.816 
   Clothing Stores 22943 2.920 3.377 
   Furniture Stores 20695 1.326 1.240 
   Alcohol Stores 16147 0.394 0.700 
Own State Tax Rates (% of Personal Income)    
   Sales Tax  30770 2.121 0.721 
   Tobacco Tax 30770 0.106 0.062 
   Fuel Tax 30770 0.439 0.129 
   Alcohol Tax 30770 0.053 0.030 
   Income Tax 30770 2.028 1.087 
   Property Tax 30770 0.126 0.290 
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Table 2.1 continued 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Nearest Neighboring State's Tax Rates (% of Personal 
Income) 
   
   Sales Tax  30770 2.126 0.753 
   Tobacco Tax 30770 0.106 0.061 
   Fuel Tax 30770 0.443 0.120 
   Alcohol Tax 30770 0.051 0.031 
   Income Tax 30770 2.073 0.998 
   Property Tax 30770 0.131 0.306 
Own Other Tax Dummies    
   Local Tax (=1 if a county’s state has local sales tax;  
           0 = other) 
30770 0.810 0.392 
   Food Tax Exempt (=1 if county’s food items are tax 
          exempt; 0 = other)      
30770 0.638 0.481 
   Sales Tax Holidays (=1 if county has sales tax  
           holidays; 0 = other) 
30770 0.258 0.437 
Nearest Neighboring State's Other Tax Dummies    
   Local Tax (=1 if the nearest neighboring state has 
           local sales tax; 0 = other) 
30770 0.806 0.396 
   Food Tax Exempt (=1 if the nearest neighboring   
           state allows food tax exemption; 0 = other) 
30770 0.552 0.497 
   Sales Tax Holidays (=1 if the nearest neighboring 
           state has sales tax holidays; 0 = other) 
30770 0.206 0.404 
Other Variables    
   Distance to the state border (miles) 30770 48.897 51.546 
   Per capita Income (thousand dollars) 30770 25.163 6.869 
   Male (Percentage of male population between 20 to 
              64 years old) 
30770 29.116 2.816 
   Black (Percentage of Black population) 30770 8.948 14.466 
   Other Race (Percentage of Other race population) 30770 2.573 6.436 
   Elderly (Percentage of population over 64 years) 30770 15 4.125 
   Young (Percentage of population 5-19 years old) 30770 21.139 2.552 
 
Table 2.2 compares the means for five retail industries’ establishments and 
employment per 1,000 county residents for (i) border counties, (ii) interior counties, (iii) 
high-sales taxed border counties, and (iv) low- sales taxed border counties of the forty-
eight contiguous states during the period 1998 to 2007.  It illustrates that in the case of 
retail establishment, the average numbers of grocery stores per 1,000 residents are 
slightly higher in border counties than in interior counties. Low sales-taxed border 
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counties have slightly greater average number of establishments of grocery stores per 
1,000 residents than high sales-taxed border counties. The average numbers of gasoline 
stations or liquor stores per 1,000 residents are higher in border counties relative to 
interior counties, however, there are no differences in average numbers of gasoline 
stations or liquor stores between high sales-taxed border counties and low-sales taxed 
border counties. There are no differences in average number of furniture stores and 
clothing stores per 1,000 residents between interior and border counties. On the contrary, 
low-sales taxed border counties have slightly higher average number of furniture stores 
and clothing stores per 1,000 residents than high-sales taxed border counties.  
Table 2.2 also shows that in the case of retail employment, the average number of 
employment of grocery stores per 1,000 residents is slightly higher in border counties 
than in interior counties. Besides, low sales-taxed border counties have little higher 
grocery stores’ employment per 1,000 residents than high sales-taxed border counties. 
The average number of employment of gasoline stations or liquor stores per 1,000 
residents are higher in border counties than in interior counties, however, gasoline 
stations and liquor stores of high-sales taxed border counties have slightly unexpected 
higher average number of employment per 1,000 residents than those of low-sales taxed 
border counties. The average number of employment per 1,000 residents in furniture 
stores is higher in interior counties than in border counties, but high-sales taxed border 
counties have a lower average number of employees in furniture stores than low-sales 
taxed border counties. The clothing stores have larger average number of employment 
per 1,000 residents in interior counties than in border counties. In addition, they also have 
slightly greater average number of employment per 1,000 residents in low-sales taxed 
border counties than in high-sales taxed border counties. 
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Table 2.2—Comparison of Means of Retail Establishments and Employment per 1,000 
County Residents 
 Interior  
counties 
Border  
counties 
High Sales-taxed 
 Border counties 
Low Sales-taxed 
Border counties 
Establishments per 1,000 
Residents 
   
  Grocery Stores 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.44 
  Gasoline Stations 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.72 
  Furniture Stores 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 
  Clothing Stores 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 
  Liquor Stores 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 
Employment per 1,000 Residents    
  Grocery Stores 8.95 8.99 8.88 9.09 
  Gasoline Stations 5.35 5.70 5.73 5.68 
  Furniture Stores 1.35 1.28 1.25 1.31 
  Clothing Stores 2.96 2.86 2.79 2.93 
  Liquor Stores 0.36 0.46 0.46 0.45 
 
2.4 Econometric Specification 
I begin my estimation by considering four specifications. First, I analyze how the 
total number of establishments and employees of five retail industries of counties are 
correlated to the tax rates of their own state and their nearest neighboring state. Second, I 
estimate a specification in which I measure the interaction effects not only between tax 
rates of a home county’s state and distance of the home county to the nearest state border, 
but also between tax rates of the home county’s nearest neighboring state and distance of 
the home county to this nearest neighboring state. Third, I perform a dynamic analysis of 
the second estimation by including the lagged value of a dependent variable as one of the 
regressors. Fourth, to control for possible spillover effects among counties’ retail 
establishments, I analyze a spatial analysis of the second specification by including the 
spatial lag variable. This fourth estimation is not performed for the number of employees 
of five retail industries. There are missing data on employment for some counties’ retail 
industries4, and hence, it is not possible to obtain full values for the spatial lag variable of 
                                                            
4 The CBP data source withholds employment data for any county-industry observation where the data 
might reveal confidential information about an individual producer. 
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employment (or the weighted average of neighboring counties’ total number of 
employees).  
2.4.1  Impact of State Tax Rates  
I estimate a fixed-effect model to examine the impacts of sales and excise tax 
rates of a home county’s state and nearest neighboring state on the total number of 
establishments and employment per 1,000 residents of five retail industries of the home 
county. The equation to be estimated is as follows:  
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where the i subscript refers to the local county. The j subscript refers to the state and the k 
subscript refers to the type of retail industry such that k equals grocery stores, gasoline 
stations, furniture stores, clothing stores, and liquor stores. The t subscript refers to the 
time. The r subscript refers to either retail establishments or employees. The outcome 
variable, Eijkt,r, means the total number of establishments (or employees) per 1,000 
residents of k retail industry of county i of state j at period t. The terms ST and NST 
represent sales tax rates of a county’s own state and nearest adjacent state, respectively. 
Some states have variation in sales tax rates across counties and/or within 
counties. For instance, there were thirty-three states that allowed their counties or cities to 
charge a local sales tax during 1998 to 2002. Similarly, the number of states that 
permitted additional local sales tax rates in their counties and cities were thirty-four 
during periods 2003 to 2007. However, data on actual rates on county-level local sales 
tax are not readily available for 3077 counties over a ten year period from 1998 to 2007. 
Thus, to control for the local sales tax rates of counties in equation (2.1), I create two 
dummy variables: the first dummy variable, referred as LT, indicates one if a county’s 
own state allows local sales tax rates, and zero otherwise; and the second dummy 
variable, NLT, indicates one if the county’s nearest neighboring state allows local sales 
tax rates, and zero otherwise.  
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 The terms MT and NMT represent excise tax rates of the county’s own state and 
nearest neighboring state. These excise taxes influence only specific retail industries such 
as liquor stores, gasoline stations and grocery stores. In particular, for liquor stores, MT 
and NMT refer to alcohol tax rates of a county’s own state and nearest adjacent state, 
respectively. For gasoline stations, while MT refers to fuel tax rates and tobacco tax rates 
of a home county’s state, NMT refers to a home county’s nearest adjacent state’s fuel tax 
rates and tobacco tax rates. For grocery stores, MT and NMT denote tobacco tax rates of 
home county’s state and the nearest adjacent state of home county, respectively.  
It is expected that the number of establishments and employees of a county’s five 
retail industries are inversely related to home county’s state’s sales and excise taxes and 
positively related to its nearest neighboring state’s sales and excise taxes. The higher the 
sales or excise taxes of a home county’s state, the higher the possibility of border 
shopping from the home county to the nearest low sales or excise taxed neighboring state. 
Thus, this cross-border shopping to low commodity taxed state is expected to have 
negative impacts on the total number of retail establishments and employment per 1,000 
residents of the home county. Correspondingly, the higher the commodity tax rates of a 
home county’s nearest neighboring state, the higher the possibility of border shopping to 
home county from the nearest neighboring state, and thus, this is expected to have 
positive effects on the total number of retail stores and employees of the home county. 
Meanwhile, other taxes such as individual income taxes and property taxes may 
also influence the number of retail establishments and retail employees of a county. For 
example, in counties that have higher income tax rates, retailers would need to offer 
higher wages to persuade employees to work for them. Similarly, in counties that have 
higher property tax rates, retailers may have to pay higher rent price for land and 
buildings. Since higher wages and rents increase the cost of doing retail business, the 
higher income tax rates and property tax rates of counties can generate negative 
incentives for retailers to establish their stores as well as demand more employees to 
work in retail stores. Thus, the term OT in equation (2.1) controls for individual income 
tax rates and property tax rates of own and nearest neighboring states. 
17 
 
The term Z consists of additional dummy variables that influence specific retail 
industries. In particular, for grocery stores, the term Z includes two dummy variables: the 
first dummy variable is equal to one if a home county allows food tax exemptions, and 
zero otherwise; and the second dummy variable equals one if the home county’s nearest 
neighboring state has food tax exemptions, and zero otherwise. The impacts of counties’ 
own food tax exemptions on their total number of grocery stores and employees are 
expected to be positive. Food tax exemptions lower the final price of groceries to 
consumers, and this is expected to increase consumers’ demand for grocery. Higher 
grocery demand may then induce positive impacts on the total number of establishments 
and employees of grocery stores per 1,000 residents of counties.  
For clothing stores, the term Z includes two dummy variables: the first dummy 
variable indicates one if a county’s state has sales tax holidays, and zero otherwise; and 
the second dummy variable indicates one if a county’s nearest neighboring state has sales 
tax holidays, and zero otherwise. During sales tax holidays, clothing items are exempted 
from sales tax rates5. Demand for clothing goods can increase in the absence of sales tax 
rates, which in turn may have some positive effects on the total number of establishments 
and employees of clothing stores per 1,000 residents of counties. 
All tax terms in equation (2.1) are one year lagged. There are two reasons for 
lagging the tax terms. First, it is used to control for possible endogeneity of tax variables. 
For example, the total number of retail establishments (employment) and sales tax rates 
of either home county’s state or nearest neighboring state may be jointly determined. If a 
lower number of retail establishments (employment) of counties encourages a state to 
change their tax rates in comparison to its neighboring state, then this means that the total 
number of retail establishments (employment) of counties affect the tax rates of home 
county’s state and the nearest neighboring state. Second, since retail firms require time to 
relocate and change employment levels, they are likely to make their employment and 
location decisions based on previous period’s taxes rather than current year taxes. 
                                                            
5 According to the Federation of Tax Administrators, most states typically exempt clothing items of priced 
$100 from sales tax rates during sales tax holidays (FTA, 2010). 
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The term X includes economic and demographic characteristics of a county that 
influence the total number of establishments and employees of retail industry k per 1,000 
residents, such as per capita income, the percentage of elderly population, the percentage 
of young population, the percentage of black population, the percentage of other race 
population, and the percentage of male population between ages twenty and sixty-four 
years. The county effects, µi, control for all unobserved county characteristics that remain 
constant over time, such as transportation routes. The time effects, λt, account for all 
factors that affect all counties in a given year. The error term εijtk,r is a mean zero, 
normally distributed random error. 
2.4.2  Impact of State Tax Rates Interacted with Distance  
As discussed in the introduction section, the impacts of sales and excise tax rates 
of own and nearest adjacent states on a county’s total number of establishments and 
employment of a retail industry may depend on the magnitude of the county’s distance to 
another state. Therefore, to account for this issue, I include interaction terms between tax 
variables and distance of a county to the nearest state border in equation (2.1)6. The 
equation to be estimated is then specified as follows:  
                                                            
6 Another possible way to account for this factor is by interacting tax variables with a border dummy 
variable that equals one if a county lies on the border with another state, and zero otherwise. However, for 
this analysis, I consider distance of a county to the state border to be a better measure than a border dummy 
variable. Some counties may not lie on the border with another state, but their distance to another state may 
be small for consumers to engage in cross-border shopping. These counties can mostly be seen in states that 
belong to the eastern parts of the US, such as Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky. At the same time, 
some counties may lie on the border with another state, but the distance that consumers need to travel for 
cross-border shopping is so big that it discourages them to participate in cross-border shopping. These 
counties can mostly be found in states such as Arizona, Nevada, and Utah. Thus, it is the distance of the 
county to the state border, and not whether a county lies on the border, should mostly affect consumers’ 
decisions to do cross-border shopping, which in turn then should reflect the number of retail establishments 
and employment of a county. 
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   (2.2)  
where the term D refers to the distance of a county to the state border, and the remaining 
variables are same as in equation (2.1). It is expected that the impacts of sales or excise 
tax rates of a county’s own state and nearest neighboring state on the total number of 
retail establishments (employees) of the county to decrease in the distance of the county 
to the state border. That is, for all tax variables, I expect the coefficients on the home 
county’s state sales or excise tax rates interacted with distance to be positive and the 
coefficients of the home county’s nearest neighboring state sales or excise tax rates 
interacted with distance to be negative. 
2.4.3 Dynamic Analysis 
The number of retail establishments (employment) of a county’s previous year 
may affect its current period’s number of retail establishments (employment). Hence, to 
allow the total number of retail establishments (employment) per 1,000 residents to 
dynamically adjust to past number of retail establishments (employment) per 1,000 
residents, I include a lagged dependent variable in equation (2.2): 
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(2.3) 
where θ is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable that accounts for dynamics. 
The fixed-effect method will produce biased estimates as the lagged dependent variable 
and county fixed effects are probably correlated. To solve this issue, first I obtain the 
first-differenced of all variables except year-fixed variables in equation (2.3). The 
resulting equation becomes: 
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The above equation is then estimated using the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator, which is 
a General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator correcting for endogeneity by including 
the lags of dependent variable. That is, I instrument the lagged dependent variable by 
using the dynamic instruments (Eijk,t-2,r,….,Eijk,0,r) suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991).    
2.4.4 Spatial Lag Analysis 
There may be spillover effects between counties. For example, changes in the 
number of retail establishments in one county may affect the number of same retail 
establishments in another county. To account for this possible spatial relationship 
between counties, I include the spatial lag term in equation (2.2): 
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The term wih is the weight assigned to county h by county i. That means, wih = 1/ni if 
county i and h are contiguous, and zero if they are not, where ni represents the total 
number of contiguous counties. The spatial weight is row normalized so that


hi
ihw 1. 
Since the total number of establishments of retail industry k per 1,000 residents in 
neighboring counties is endogenous in the above equation, the equation is estimated by 
using the weighted average of neighboring counties’ per capita income as an instrument 
for neighboring counties’ total number of retail establishments per 1,000 residents. The 
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weight used for this instrument is the same as that used in the average neighboring 
counties’ retail establishment.  
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Establishment Results 
Tables 2.3 to 2.7 report results for the total number of establishments per 1,000 
county residents of each five retail industries I consider. In each table, the first column 
displays results from equation (2.1). The second and third columns present results from 
estimating equation (2.2) with and without county fixed effects. The fourth and fifth 
columns display results from estimating equations (2.4) and (2.5), respectively. 
For most of the five retail industries, I find that the sales and excise tax rates of 
domestic and the nearest neighboring states have significant impacts on retail 
establishments of counties. While considering whether the impacts of domestic and the 
nearest neighboring states’ sales and excise tax rates on counties’ retail establishments 
depend on the distance of a county to the state border, I find that the significances of the 
coefficients of  domestic and the nearest neighboring state sales (excise) tax rates and 
sales (excise) tax rates interacted with distance of a county to the state border are 
sensitive to an exclusion of fixed effects and inclusion of either the lagged dependent 
variable or the spatial lag variable. For instance, when fixed effects are excluded to 
estimate equation (2.2), the tax terms are highly significant and larger in magnitudes. 
Often times, I find that sales or excise tax terms that are insignificant in other 
specifications are significant when equation (2.2) is estimated without county fixed 
effects. This probably indicates that tax rates are stable over time in many states and thus, 
they are accounted for in county fixed effects. Nonetheless, since results from estimating 
equation (2.2) without county fixed effects are biased as they do not account for county 
unobserved heterogeneity, in the following result section by industry, the impact of sales 
and excise tax terms on establishments of a retail industry will be considered robust if the 
impacts of these taxes are significant in specifications that account for both county fixed 
effects and year fixed effects.  
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2.5.1.1  Grocery Stores’ Establishment Results 
Table 2.3 presents results for the total number of establishments of grocery stores. 
The first column shows that sales tax rates of own state have expected negative effects on 
counties’ total number of establishments of grocery stores per 1,000 residents. Similarly, 
the nearest neighboring state’s tobacco tax rates also have expected positive impacts on 
counties’ total number of establishments of grocery stores per 1,000 residents. In 
contrast, the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates and own state’s tobacco tax rates 
have no significant impacts on counties’ total number of establishments of grocery stores 
per 1,000 residents.  
The second column shows that the coefficients on own state’s sales tax rates and 
own state’s sales tax rates interacted with distance are jointly significant, thereby 
suggesting that sales tax rates of own state have more negative effects on the total 
number of grocery stores per 1,000 residents of counties that are closer to the state 
border. Similarly, the joint significance of the coefficients on tobacco tax rates of the 
nearest neighboring state and its interaction term indicates that the nearest neighboring 
state’s tobacco tax rates have more positive effects on the total number of establishments 
of grocery stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border.  
The third column reports that when fixed effects are not accounted in the model of 
the second column, the coefficients on own state tobacco tax rates and the nearest 
neighboring state sales tax rates, which are insignificant in the first and second columns, 
have significant effects on the total number of grocery stores per 1,000 residents of 
counties. Moreover, signs of some of the coefficients are changed in this column. For 
example, the coefficients on the nearest neighboring state’s tobacco tax rates interacted 
with distance and own state’s sales tax rates interacted with distance have opposite signs 
to those observed in the second column.  
The fourth column reveals that when counties’ past year’s total number of 
establishments of grocery stores is accounted for in the model of the second column, the 
coefficients on own state’s sales tax rates and its interaction term still have significant 
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negative effects on the total number of establishments of grocery stores per 1,000 
residents of counties closer to the state border. In particular, a rise in own state sales tax 
rates by one percent is expected to decrease grocery store establishments by 0.04 units 
per 1,000 county residents in the short run and 0.11 units per 1,000 county residents in 
the long run. Besides, although the coefficients on own state’s tobacco tax rates and its 
interaction term have same signs as in the second column, they are not jointly significant 
in the fourth column.  
The fifth column indicates that when the average numbers of grocery stores’ 
establishments in neighboring counties are accounted for in the model of the second 
column, only the coefficients on own state sales tax rates and its interaction term are 
statistically significant. Alike in the second column, the nearest neighboring state tobacco 
tax rates have more positive effects on the total numbers of establishments of grocery 
stores of counties closer to the state border, however, the effect is not statistically 
significant.  
To sum up, I find that while sales tax rates of own state have negative effects on 
counties’ total number of establishments of grocery stores per 1,000 county residents, the 
nearest neighboring states’ tobacco tax rates have expected positive effects on counties’ 
total number of establishments of grocery stores per 1,000 county residents. Considering 
how distance to the state border influences the impacts of own and the nearest 
neighboring states’ sales or excise tax rates on the total number of establishments of 
grocery stores per 1,000 residents of a county, I find that sales tax rates of own state have 
robust negative effects on the total number of establishments of grocery stores per 1,000 
residents of counties closer to the state border. The nearest neighboring state’s tobacco 
tax rate has a positive effect on the total number of establishments of grocery stores of 
counties closer to the state border, however, the effect is not statistically significant 
across different specifications. Similarly, although the coefficient on local sales tax of 
own state has an expected negative sign, it is not statistically significant across different 
specifications. Food tax exemption has an expected positive effect on the total 
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establishments of grocery stores per 1,000 county residents, but it is never statistically 
significant.  
Table 2.3—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Establishments 
of Grocery Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Grocery Storest-1    0.642 
(9.60)*** 
 
Neighboring County  
Grocery Stores 
    0.013 
(0.96) 
Sales Tax -0.029 
(3.39)*** 
-0.037 
(3.88)***a 
-0.025 
(6.88)***a 
-0.039 
(2.55)**a 
-0.036 
(3.74)***a
Sales Tax × Distance  0.0001 
(0.85)a 
-0.0001 
(1.62)a 
0.00002 
(0.08)a 
0.0003 
(1.29)a 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.003 
(0.51) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.016 
(4.90)***a 
0.003 
(0.18) 
0.016 
(0.89) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 0.00003 
(0.33) 
0.00008 
(1.93)*a 
0.0002 
(0.74) 
-0.00004 
(0.33) 
Tobacco Tax 0.012 
(0.44) 
0.062 
(1.81)* 
-0.152 
(3.61)***a 
-0.013 
(0.25) 
0.07 
(1.70)* 
Tobacco Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.001 
(1.51) 
0.001 
(1.45)a 
-0.001 
(0.76) 
-0.0002 
(0.20) 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
0.127 
(5.33)*** 
0.146 
(4.58)***a
0.032 
(0.89)a 
0.045 
(0.98) 
0.108 
(1.94)* 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.0004 
(0.73)a 
0.001 
(1.18)a 
-0.0004 
(0.53) 
-0.001 
(0.85) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.055 
(6.79)*** 
-0.054 
(6.66)*** 
-0.056 
(14.43)***
-0.022 
(1.22) 
-0.034 
(1.51) 
Neighboring State 
 Local Sales Tax  
0.012 
(1.58) 
0.013 
(1.70)* 
-0.022 
(7.25)*** 
-0.006 
(0.48) 
0.041 
(1.34) 
Food Tax Exemption  0.008 
(0.97) 
0.008 
(1.06) 
0.003 
(0.96) 
0.023 
(1.52) 
0.021 
(1.40) 
Neighboring State 
Food Tax Exemption 
-0.008 
(1.31) 
-0.009 
(1.35) 
-0.014 
(4.22)*** 
0.00002 
(0) 
0.002 
(0.14) 
County fixed effects  Y Y N Y Y 
Year fixed effects  Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Joint significance at a 5% significance level of a tax term and tax term interacted with a 
distance variable is indicated by the superscript letter “a”. Detailed estimates and 
additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A1 in Appendix. 
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2.5.1.2 Gasoline Stations’ Establishment Results 
Table 2.4 provides results for the total number of establishments of gasoline 
stations per 1,000 residents of counties. The first column reports that the total numbers of 
establishments of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents of counties are negatively affected 
by own state’s fuel tax rates, tobacco tax rates, and the nearest neighboring state’s 
tobacco tax rates. It also shows that total numbers of establishments of gasoline stations 
per 1,000 residents of counties are positively affected by own state’s sales tax rates. 
The second column shows that the coefficients on own state fuel tax rates and 
own state fuel tax rates interacted with distance are jointly significant, thereby inferring 
that fuel tax rates of own state have lower unexpected negative effects on the total 
number of establishments of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the 
state border. The coefficients on tobacco tax rates of the nearest neighboring state and its 
interaction term are also jointly significant, and they suggest that the nearest neighboring 
state’s tobacco tax rates have lower negative influences on the total number of gasoline 
stations per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border. In contrast, the joint 
significance of the coefficients on sales tax rates of own state and its interaction term 
suggests that sales tax rates of own state have more expected negative impacts on the 
total number of establishments of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents of counties nearer 
to the state border. The third column shows that when unobserved county heterogeneity is 
not accounted in the model of the second column, the coefficients of sales or excise tax 
terms are highly significant.  
The fourth column reveals that previous year’s total number of gasoline stations 
of counties have positive impacts on current year’s total number of gasoline stations of 
counties. However, none of the commodity tax terms and their interaction terms are 
jointly significant. These results, therefore, suggest that there are no major shocks in sales 
and excise tax rates of many states over the ten-year time period considered here. 
The fifth column shows that when the spatial lag variable is included in the model 
of the second column, the coefficients of sales or excise tax terms that are jointly 
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significant in the second column are still jointly significant, and they also have same 
signs as those in the second column. These coefficients include own state’s fuel tax 
variables, nearest neighboring state’s tobacco tax variables and own state’s sales tax 
variables. Moreover, unlike in the second column, it indicates that there is a joint 
significance of coefficients of own state’s tobacco tax rates and its interaction term, 
thereby indicating that the total numbers of establishments of gasoline stations per 1,000 
residents of counties closer to the state border are more negatively affected by own state’s 
tobacco tax rates. 
To sum up, I find that the total number of establishments of gasoline stations per 
1,000 residents of counties are significantly affected by own state’s fuel tax rates, tobacco 
tax rates, sales tax rates, and the nearest neighboring state’s tobacco tax rates. Moreover, 
I also find that own state’s fuel tax rates, sales tax rates and nearest neighboring state’s 
tobacco tax rates have more effects on the total number of gasoline stations per 1,000 
residents of counties closer to the state border. However, these impacts are found 
insignificant in the fourth column that accounts for the lagged dependent variable in the 
model of the second column. Thus, there is no robust evidence to indicate that the 
impacts of own state’s fuel tax rates, sales tax rates and nearest neighboring state’s 
tobacco tax rates on a county’s total number of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents vary 
with the distance to the state border. Similarly, regarding local sales tax variables, 
although the coefficient on the local sales tax of domestic state is found positive, it is not 
found significant in all specifications.  
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Table 2.4—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Establishments 
of Gasoline Stations per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gasoline Stationst-1    0.527 
(10.39)*** 
 
Neighboring County  
Gasoline Stations 
    -0.004 
(1.70)* 
Fuel Tax -0.113 
(4.00)***
-0.078 
(2.00)**a 
0.259 
(10.93)***a
-0.122 
(0.98) 
-0.096 
(2.30)**a 
Fuel Tax × Distance  -0.001 
(1.22)a 
-0.001 
(3.76)***a 
0.0004 
(0.13) 
-0.001 
(1.42)a 
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax 
0.008 
(0.28) 
0.022 
(0.61) 
0.16 
(5.78)***a 
-0.072 
(0.48) 
0.02 
(0.53) 
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax × Distance 
 -0.0003 
(0.57) 
0.003 
(6.59)***a 
0.001 
(0.39) 
-0.0002 
(0.33) 
Tobacco Tax -0.065 
(1.94)* 
-0.094 
(1.99)** 
-1.079 
(21.57)***a
1.622 
(0.83) 
-0.136 
(2.65)***a
Tobacco Tax × 
Distance 
 0.0005 
(0.66) 
0.008 
(11.01)***a
-0.02 
(0.80) 
0.001 
(1.23)a 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
-0.216 
(6.42)***
-0.205 
(4.63)***a
-0.116 
(2.27)**a 
-1.115 
(0.60) 
-0.24 
(4.97)***a
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.0003 
(0.45)a 
-0.001 
(0.86)a 
0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.0003 
(0.49)a 
Sales Tax 0.025 
(2.89)***
-0.009 
(0.84) a 
-0.001 
(0.19) a 
0.033 
(0.83) 
-0.006 
(0.50)a 
Sales Tax × Distance  0.001 
(4.23)***a
-0.0004 
(6.50)***a 
-0.0002 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(3.73)***a
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.008 
(0.96) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
-0.012 
(2.24)**a 
-0.025 
(0.93) 
0.006 
(0.67) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 0.00005 
(0.41) 
-0.0003 
(4.35)***a 
0.0004 
(0.59) 
0.00004 
(0.31) 
Local Sales Tax   0.04 
(4.31)***
0.038 
(4.03)*** 
0.041 
(9.28)*** 
0.038 
(1.25) 
0.046 
(3.73)*** 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.011 
(1.24) 
-0.012 
(1.32) 
0.052 
(12.82)*** 
0.021 
(0.49) 
-0.012 
(1.08) 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 24616 27693 
County fixed Y Y N Y Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: See Table 2.3 for additional notes on significances on signs of coefficients. 
Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A2 in 
Appendix. 
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2.5.1.3 Furniture Stores’ Establishment Results 
Table 2.5 presents results for the total number of establishments of furniture 
stores per 1,000 residents of counties. The first column shows that own state’s sales tax 
rates have expected negative impacts on the total number of establishments of furniture 
stores per 1,000 residents of counties. The nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates also 
have expected positive effects on the total number of establishments of furniture stores 
per 1,000 residents of counties. However, both the coefficients on own state’s sales tax 
rates and nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates are not statistically significant. 
The second column shows that own state’s sales tax rates have unexpected more 
positive effects on the total number of furniture stores per 1,000 residents of counties 
closer to the state border. The third column re-estimates the model as in the second 
column without fixed effects. Unlike in the second column, the coefficients on the nearest 
neighboring state sales tax rates and its interaction term are jointly significant in this 
column. The fourth column reports that with the addition of the lagged dependent 
variable to the model as in the second column, there is neither the joint significance of 
coefficients on own state’s sales tax rates and its interaction term nor the joint 
significance of the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates and its interaction term. The 
fifth column show results with the addition of the weighted average of neighboring 
counties’ total number of furniture stores per 1,000 residents to the model as in the 
second column. The average establishments of neighboring counties’ furniture stores 
have significant positive impacts on counties’ own total number of furniture stores per 
1,000 residents. However, alike in the fourth column, there is no joint significance of 
coefficients on either own state’s sales tax rate variables or the nearest neighboring 
state’s sales tax rate variables. 
To sum up, although sales tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state, 
respectively, have expected negative and positive effects on the total number of 
establishments of furniture stores per 1,000 residents of counties, the effects of these tax 
rates are not statistically significant. In addition, there is no statistically significant 
evidence that sales tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state have more 
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impacts on the total number of establishments of furniture stores per 1,000 residents of 
counties closer to the state border. The coefficients on local sales tax of own state and the 
nearest neighboring state occasionally have negative signs, however, they are not 
statistically significant across different specifications.  
Table 2.5—Impacts of Sales Tax Rates on the Total Number of Establishments of 
Furniture Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Furniture Storest-1    0.512 
(10.54)*** 
 
Neighboring County 
Furniture Stores 
    0.012 
(4.12)***
Sales Tax -0.004 
(1.49) 
0.005 
(1.22)a 
0.005 
(3.03)***a 
0.005 
(0.81) 
-0.001 
(0.16) 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.0002 
(3.71)***a
0.000006 
(0.28)a 
-0.00003 
(0.45) 
0.0001 
(1.09) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax 
0.001 
(0.31) 
0.002 
(0.47) 
0.013 
(8.40)***a 
0.008 
(1.01) 
0.005 
(1.43) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax × Distance 
 0.000006 
(0.21) 
0.000004 
(6.58)***a 
-0.00003 
(0.58) 
-0.00001 
(0.35) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.002 
(0.55) 
-0.001 
(0.31) 
0.013 
(6.15)*** 
-0.005 
(1.00) 
0.0005 
(0.10) 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
-0.005 
(1.72)* 
-0.004 
(1.48) 
0.015 
(6.94)*** 
-0.002 
(0.47) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 24616 27693 
County fixed Y Y N Y Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: See Table 2.3 for additional notes on significances on signs of coefficients. 
Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A3 in 
Appendix. 
 
2.5.1.4 Clothing Stores’ Establishment Results 
Table 2.6 shows results for the total number of establishments of clothing stores 
per 1,000 residents of counties. The first column reports that own state’s sales tax rates 
have unexpected positive effects on the total number of establishments of clothing stores 
per 1,000 residents of counties, however, the effect is not statistically significant. 
Similarly, although the coefficient on the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates have 
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expected positive effects on the total number of establishments of clothing stores per 
1,000 residents of counties, it is not statistically significant. 
The second column shows that own state’s sales tax rates have more unexpected 
positive impacts on the total number of establishments of clothing stores per 1,000 
residents of counties closer to the state border. In contrast, the nearest neighboring state’s 
sales tax rates have more expected positive effects on the total number of establishments 
of clothing stores closer to the state border. The third column reports that when fixed 
effects are excluded to the model as of the second column, the coefficients on own state’s 
sales tax rates and interaction term are still statistically significant. 
The fourth column shows that the lagged total number of establishments of 
clothing stores is positive and highly significant, but the coefficients of own state’s sales 
tax rate variables and the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax variables are statistically 
insignificant, thereby implying that sales tax rates in many states are stable over time 
during  this period. The fifth column reports that when the average number of 
establishments of clothing stores per 1,000 residents of neighboring counties are 
accounted for in the model as of the second column, the coefficients on the nearest 
neighboring state’s sales tax rates and its interaction term are still jointly significant. 
However, the coefficients on domestic state’s sales tax rates and its interaction term are 
jointly insignificant. 
To sum up, sales tax rates of the nearest neighboring state have a positive effect 
on the total number of establishments of clothing stores per 1,000 residents of counties, 
however, the effect is not statistically significant. Similarly, the nearest neighboring 
state’s sales tax rates seem to have positive effects on the total number of establishments 
of clothing stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border, however, this 
effect is found insignificant when accounting for counties’ past year’s total number of 
establishments of clothing stores of counties. In addition, own state’s sales tax rates do 
not have robust positive impacts on the total number of establishments of clothing stores 
per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border. Considering other taxes such as 
local sales tax and sales tax holidays, while the coefficients on local sales taxes of own 
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state as well as the nearest neighboring state are found positive and significant, the 
coefficients on sales tax holidays of own and the nearest neighboring states are found 
negative and insignificant.  
Table 2.6—Impacts of Sales Tax Rates on the Total Number of Establishments of 
Clothing Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Clothing Storest-1    0.538 
(6.02)*** 
 
Neighboring County 
Clothing Stores 
    0.005 
(2.52)** 
Sales Tax 0.005 
(1.10) 
0.013 
(2.33)**a 
0.017 
(3.64)***a
0.006 
(0.50) 
0.012 
(1.88)* 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.0002 
(2.19)**a 
-0.0002 
(2.70)***a
0.00003 
(0.23) 
-
0.0000007 
(0.01) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax 
0.007 
(1.23) 
0.019 
(2.77)***a
0.017 
(4.37)***a
0.003 
(0.32) 
0.023 
(4.00)***a 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax × Distance 
 -0.0002 
(3.44)***a
0.00004 
(0.95)a 
0.00006 
(0.71) 
-0.0002 
(3.73)***a 
Local Sales Tax   0.015 
(2.48)** 
0.015 
(2.56)** 
0.013 
(2.11)** 
0.006 
(0.52) 
0.02 
(2.80)*** 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
0.026 
(6.28)***
0.027 
(6.52)*** 
0.048 
(8.17)*** 
0.001 
(0.24) 
0.029 
(4.30)*** 
Sales Tax Holidays -0.003 
(1.65)* 
-0.002 
(1.36) 
0.007 
(1.24) 
-0.003 
(1.16) 
-0.002 
(1.03) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax Holidays 
-0.0004 
(0.19) 
-0.001 
(0.31) 
0.006 
(1.01) 
-0.002 
(0.55) 
-0.002 
(0.91) 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 24616 27693 
County fixed Y Y N Y Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: See Table 2.3 for additional notes on significances on signs of coefficients. 
Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A4 in 
Appendix. 
 
2.5.1.5 Liquor Stores’ Establishment Results  
Table 2.7 reports results for the total number of establishment of liquor stores per 
1,000 residents of counties. The first column indicates that own state’s alcohol tax rates 
have significant positive impacts on the total numbers of establishments of liquor stores 
per 1,000 residents of counties. In contrast, the nearest neighboring state’s alcohol tax 
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rates have negative and insignificant effects on the total numbers of establishments of 
liquor stores per 1,000 residents of counties. The sales tax rates of own state have 
expected negative influences on the total numbers of establishments of liquor stores per 
1,000 residents of counties, but the impact is not statistically significant. Similarly, 
although the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates have expected positive effects on 
the total numbers of establishments of liquor stores per 1,000 residents of counties, the 
effect is not significant.  
The second column reveals that alcohol tax rates and sales tax rates of own state 
and the nearest neighboring state do not have more significant impacts on the total 
numbers of establishments of liquor stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the 
state border. The third column shows that when fixed effects are not accounted for in the 
model of second column, the coefficients on the nearest neighboring state’s alcohol tax 
variables, own state’s sales tax variables and the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax 
variables are statistically significant. However, the coefficients on some of these tax 
terms have unexpected signs. For instance, the coefficient on the neighboring state’s 
alcohol tax has an unexpected negative sign, thereby suggesting that an increase in the 
nearest neighboring state’s alcohol tax rates have negative effects on the total number of 
establishments of liquor stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border. 
The fourth column shows that the coefficient on the lagged total number of 
establishments per 1,000 residents of liquor stores of counties is highly significant, 
thereby suggesting that there is a positive autocorrelation in total establishments of liquor 
stores per 1,000 residents of counties. However, none of the sales and excise tax variables 
is statistically significant. Similarly, the fifth column indicates that when the average 
numbers of liquor stores per 1,000 residents of neighboring counties are accounted for in 
the model of the second column, the coefficients on sales and excise tax variables are 
statistically insignificant.  
To sum up, the total numbers of establishments of liquor stores per 1,000 county 
residents are positively affected by own state’s alcohol tax rates and negatively affected 
by own state’s sales tax rates. The nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates have 
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expected positive effects on the total number of establishments of liquor stores per 1,000 
county residents, however, the effect is not statistically significant. Similarly, there is no 
significant evidence that alcohol tax rates and sales tax rates of own state as well as the 
nearest neighboring state have more noteworthy impacts on the total number of 
establishments of liquor stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border. 
Moreover, the coefficients on local sales taxes of own and the nearest neighboring states 
do not have significant impacts on the total number of establishments of liquor stores per 
1,000 residents of counties. 
Table 2.7—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Establishments 
of Liquor Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Alcohol Storest-1    0.429 
(6.07)*** 
 
Neighboring County 
Alcohol Stores 
    -0.004 
(1.42) 
Alcohol Tax 0.122 
(2.48)** 
0.087 
(1.13) 
0.049 
(1.15) 
-0.104 
(0.87) 
0.165 
(1.41) 
Alcohol Tax × Distance  0.0004 
(0.49) 
-0.00003 
(0.05) 
-0.001 
(0.69) 
-0.001 
(0.46) 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax 
-0.105 
(1.63) 
-0.041 
(0.44) 
-0.278 
(7.04)***a 
-0.004 
(0.03) 
-0.039 
(0.39) 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax × Distance 
 -0.001 
(0.63) 
0.001 
(1.51)a 
-0.001 
(0.71) 
-0.001 
(0.78) 
Sales Tax -0.005 
(1.71)* 
-0.001 
(0.24) 
0.009 
(5.66)*** 
0.002 
(0.39) 
-0.001 
(0.33) 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.00007 
(1.26) 
-0.0002 
(9.51)*** 
-0.0001 
(1.65)* 
-0.0001 
(1.19) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax 
0.004 
(1.28) 
0.005 
(1.25) 
-0.004 
(2.93)*** 
0.005 
(0.66) 
0.006 
(1.77)* 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax × Distance 
 -0.00002 
(0.45) 
0.00005 
(3.11)*** 
-0.0001 
(1.30) 
-0.00002 
(0.56) 
Local Sales Tax   0.001 
(0.41) 
0.002 
(0.64) 
0.013 
(7.07)*** 
0.006 
(1.21) 
0.0004 
(0.08) 
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Table 2.7 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
-0.005 
(1.97)** 
-0.005 
(2.05)** 
0.012 
(6.86)*** 
0.006 
(1.10) 
-0.008 
(1.77)* 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 24616 27693 
County fixed Y Y N Y Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: See Table 2.3 for additional notes on significances on signs of coefficients. 
Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A5 in 
Appendix. 
2.5.1.6 Economic Impact of Tax Policy Changes 
Based on Tables 2.3 to 2.7, for most retail industries I consider, the distance to the 
state border has significant effects on the responsiveness of counties’ retail 
establishments to sales and excise tax rates of domestic and neighboring states. However, 
contrary to what would be expected, the effect is not robust across different specifications 
for all retail industries. Only for grocery stores, is there consistent evidence that sales tax 
rates of domestic state have more negative effects on the total number of establishments 
of grocery stores of counties closer to the state border. This being the case, I consider, for 
grocery stores the  impact of a one percent increase in the domestic state’s sales tax rates 
on the total number of grocery store establishments per 1,000 county residents. The 
results are shown in Table 2.8 The table illustrates that an increase in own state’s sales 
tax rates is estimated to decrease 0.04, 0.03 and 0.02 grocery store establishments per 
1,000 residents at 10 miles, 40 miles and 100 miles from the state border, respectively, 
results consistent with my expectations.  
Table 2.8―Estimated Effect on the Total Number of Grocery Store Establishments per 
1,000 County Residents, Following a One Percent Increase In Domestic State Sales Tax 
Distance 1% increase in Domestic State Sales Tax Rates 
10 miles -0.036 
40 miles -0.033 
100 miles -0.027 
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2.5.2 Employment Results 
Tables 2.9 to 2.12 present results for several specifications of the total number of 
employees per 1,000 residents of counties for each of the five retail industries. In each 
table: the first column reports results from estimating specification (2.1); the second 
column shows results from estimating specification (2.2); the third column reports results 
from re-estimating specification (2.2) without county fixed effects; and the last column 
presents results from estimating specification (2.4). 
As in the results for establishments, for all five retail industries’ total number of 
employees per 1,000 county residents, I find that the joint significances of coefficients on 
sales (or excise) tax rates and their interaction terms are sensitive to an exclusion of fixed 
effects and an inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. Without fixed effects, the 
coefficients on these tax terms are often large and statistically significant. In contrast, 
with an inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, the coefficients on these tax terms turn 
insignificant for most retail industries’ employment per 1,000 residents, thereby implying 
that there are less variation in sales and excise tax rates in many states over a ten-year 
time period considered in this analysis. Again, only in the case of grocery store industry, 
there is robust evidence across different specifications that the distance to the state border 
has significant effects on the responsiveness of counties’ grocery store employment to 
own state tobacco tax rates.  
2.5.2.1 Grocery Stores’ Employment Results 
Table 2.9 demonstrates results for the total number of employees of grocery stores 
per 1,000 residents of counties. The first column reports that the total numbers of 
employees of grocery stores per 1,000 residents of counties are not significantly 
influenced by sales tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state. In contrast, 
the total numbers of employees of grocery stores per 1,000 residents are negatively 
influenced by own state’s tobacco tax rates. 
 The second column shows that the coefficients on own state’s tobacco tax rates 
and its interaction term are jointly significant, thereby suggesting that own state’s tobacco 
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tax rates have more unexpected positive impacts on the total numbers of employees of 
grocery stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border.  
The third column shows that when county fixed effects are not accounted to the 
model of the second column, the coefficients on own state’s tobacco tax rates and its 
interaction term that are jointly significant in the second column are insignificant. In 
addition, some of the tax terms that are insignificant in the second column have 
significant effects on the total number of employees per 1,000 residents of grocery stores 
of counties. For instance, the coefficients on the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates 
and its interaction term are found to be jointly significant, thereby suggesting that an 
increase in the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates have more expected positive 
effects on the total number of employees of grocery stores per 1,000 residents of counties 
closer to the state border. 
 The fourth column shows that when previous year’s total number of employees 
of grocery stores is accounted for in the model of the second column, the coefficients on 
own state’s tobacco tax rates and its interaction term are still jointly significant. In 
particular, at mean value of distance to the state border, an increase in own state tobacco 
tax rates is estimated to decrease around one grocery store employee per 1,000 county 
residents in the short run and around two grocery store employees per 1,000 county 
residents in the long run. Moreover, unlike in the second column, it also reports that the 
sales tax rates of own state and nearest neighboring state have more significant impacts 
on the total number of employees of grocery stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer 
to the state border. 
To sum up, tobacco tax rates of own state has negative effects on the total number 
of employees of grocery stores per 1,000 residents of counties. However, when 
examining how the distance to the state border impacts the influence of own and the 
nearest neighboring state’s sales and excise tax rates on the total number of employees of 
grocery stores per 1,000 residents of counties, tobacco tax rates of own state are found to 
have more unexpected positive impacts on the total number of employees of grocery 
stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border. At the same time, there is 
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no robust evidence across all specifications that sales tax rates, local sales tax, and food 
tax exemptions of own state and the nearest neighboring state have more significant 
effects on the total number of employees of grocery stores per 1,000 residents of counties 
closer to the state border. 
Table 2.9—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Employees of 
Grocery Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grocery Store 
Employeest-1 
   0.464 
(10.10)*** 
Sales Tax 0.028 
(0.22) 
0.139 
(0.82) 
-0.358 
(6.40)***a 
0.259 
(0.99)a 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.003 
(1.30) 
0.004 
(5.73)***a 
-0.007 
(2.60)***a 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
-0.09 
(0.84) 
0.058 
(0.40) 
0.124 
(2.40)**a 
0.336 
(1.30)a 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 -0.002 
(1.34) 
-0.005 
(8.11)***a 
0.002 
(0.96)a 
Tobacco Tax -0.851 
(1.84)* 
1.523 
(2.30)**a 
0.186 
(0.27) 
1.059 
(1.16)a 
Tobacco Tax × Distance  -0.053 
(4.38)***a 
0.015 
(1.38) 
-0.045 
(2.91)***a 
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax 
-0.508 
(1.15) 
-0.387 
(0.63) 
2.517 
(3.66)***a 
-0.195 
(0.23) 
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax × Distance 
 -0.003 
(0.32) 
-0.034 
(3.05)***a 
0.003 
(0.27) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.056 
(0.32) 
0.014 
(0.08) 
-0.043 
(0.64) 
1.478 
(4.14)*** 
Neighboring State Local 
Sales Tax  
-0.553 
(2.92)*** 
-0.498 
(2.63)*** 
0.09 
(1.41) 
0.473 
(2.11)** 
Food Tax Exemption  -0.203 
(1.32) 
-0.205 
(1.34) 
0.753 
(12.53)*** 
-0.051 
(0.20) 
Neighboring State  
Food Tax Exemption 
0.119 
(1.22) 
0.026 
(0.25) 
0.372 
(6.29)*** 
0.123 
(0.77) 
Observations 15440 15440 15440 9886 
County fixed Y Y N Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y 
Notes: See Table 2.3 for additional notes on significances on signs of coefficients. 
Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A6 in 
Appendix. 
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2.5.2.2 Gasoline Stations’ Employment Results 
Table 2.10 reports results for the total number of employees of gasoline stations 
per 1,000 residents of counties. The first column shows that the total numbers of 
employees of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents of counties are negatively affected by 
tobacco tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state. The second column 
reveals that the total number of employees of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents of 
counties closer to the state border are less negatively affected by an increase in tobacco 
tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state. In contrast, the total numbers of 
employees of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border 
are more negatively affected by an increase in sales tax rates of own state. 
The third column shows that when county heterogeneity is not accounted to the 
model as in the second column, many tax terms have significant effects on the total 
number of employees of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents of counties. For example, 
unlike in the second column, fuel tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state 
have less positive effects on the total number of gasoline stations’ employees per 1,000 
residents of counties closer to the state border.  
The fourth column illustrates that when previous year’s gasoline stations’ 
employees per 1,000 residents of counties are included in the model of the second 
column, the nearest neighboring state’s fuel tax rates have more unexpected negative 
impacts on the total number of employees of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents of 
counties closer to the state border. Then for counties within fifteen miles from the state 
border, an increase in the nearest neighboring state fuel tax rates is expected to reduce a 
county’s gasoline station employees by around eight people per 1,000 residents in the 
short run and by about nine people per 1,000 residents after the full lagged adjustment 
occurs. In contrast, the coefficients on own state’s tobacco tax rates and its interaction 
term that are found to be jointly significant specification (2) are found insignificant here. 
To sum up, tobacco tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state have 
negative effects on the total number of employees of gasoline stations per 1,000 county 
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residents. On the contrary, there is no consistent evidence that fuel tax rates, tobacco tax 
rates and sales tax rates of own state or the nearest neighboring state have more effects on 
the total number of employees of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents of counties closer 
to the state border. Besides, counties whose own state have local sales tax rates have 
higher unexpected total number of gasoline station employees per 1,000 residents than 
counties whose own and the nearest neighboring states do not have local sales tax rates.  
Table 2.10—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Employees of 
Gasoline Stations per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gasoline Station Employeest-1    0.133 
(1.19) 
Fuel Tax 0.182 
(0.61) 
0.255 
(0.66) 
2.695 
(9.52)***a 
-4.453 
(1.03)  
Fuel Tax × Distance  -0.005 
(0.67) 
0.003 
(0.62)a 
0.033 
(0.33) 
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax 
-0.183 
(0.68) 
-0.063 
(0.18) 
2.062 
(6.85)***a 
-9.62 
(2.23)**a 
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax × Distance 
 -0.003 
(0.47) 
0.005 
(0.94)a 
0.1 
(1.39)a 
Tobacco Tax -0.793 
(2.64)*** 
-0.112 
(0.27)a 
-7.577 
(12.87)***a 
53.959 
(1.02) 
Tobacco Tax × Distance  -0.015 
(2.68)***a 
0.073 
(8.38)***a 
-1.476 
(1.31) 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
-1.26 
(4.12)*** 
-0.83 
(2.10)**a 
0.171 
(0.30) 
103.148 
(1.71)* 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax × Distance 
 -0.011 
(1.75)*a 
-0.016 
(1.58) 
-0.906 
(1.09) 
Sales Tax -0.071 
(0.78) 
-0.313 
(2.49)**a 
-0.057 
(0.95)a 
-0.857 
(1.02) 
Sales Tax × Distance  0.005 
(2.81)***a 
-0.002 
(2.25)**a 
-0.002 
(0.08) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
-0.022 
(0.24) 
-0.018 
(0.16) 
-0.008 
(0.12)a 
-0.602 
(0.76) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 0.00002 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(3.05)***a 
0.021 
(0.82) 
Local Sales Tax   0.578 
(4.30)*** 
0.562 
(4.16)*** 
0.109 
(2.12)** 
2.304 
(1.83)* 
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Table 2.10 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.007 
(0.07) 
-0.003 
(0.03) 
0.281 
(6.43)*** 
1.871 
(1.89)* 
Observations 25357 25357 25357 21508 
County fixed Y Y N Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y 
Notes: See Table 2.3 for additional notes on significances on signs of coefficients. 
Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A7 in 
Appendix. 
 
 
2.5.2.3 Furniture Stores’ Employment Results 
Table 2.11 displays results for the total number of furniture stores’ employees per 
1,000 residents of counties. The first column indicates that the total number of employees 
of furniture stores per 1,000 residents of counties respond negatively to the nearest 
neighboring state’s sales tax rates. The second column shows that there is joint 
significance of coefficients on the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates and its 
interaction term, thereby suggesting that the neighboring state’s sales tax rates have 
unexpected more negative effects on the total number of employees of furniture stores 
per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border. 
 The third column shows that when fixed effects are not accounted to the model as 
in the second column, the coefficients on own state’s sales tax rates and its interaction 
term, which are insignificant in the second column, are statistically significant, and they 
suggest that sales tax rates of own state have more expected negative effects on the total 
number of employees of furniture stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state 
border. Furthermore, the coefficients on the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rate and 
its interaction term have different signs from those in the second column, and they 
indicate that sales tax rates of the nearest neighboring state have more expected positive 
effects on the total number of employees of furniture stores per 1,000 residents of 
counties closer to the state border. The fourth column reports that previous year’s total 
numbers of employees of furniture stores of counties have positive and significant effects 
on current year’s total numbers of employees of furniture stores of counties. However, 
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the coefficients on own state’s sales tax rates and its interaction term as well as the 
nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates and its interaction term are found insignificant.  
To sum up, the nearest neighboring states’ sales tax rates have negative effects on 
the total number of employees of furniture stores per 1,000 county residents. In contrast, 
there is no robust evidence that sales tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring 
state have more impacts on the total number of employees of furniture stores per 1,000 
residents of counties closer to the state border. In addition, there is no clear evidence that 
local sales tax of own state or the nearest neighboring state have significant impacts on 
the total number of employees of furniture stores per 1,000 residents of counties. 
Table 2.11—Impacts of Sales Tax Rates on the Total Number of Employees of  
 Furniture Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Furniture Store Employeest-1    0.526 
(8.51)*** 
Sales Tax 0.02 
(0.88) 
0.05 
(1.56) 
-0.039 
(2.54)**a 
0.025 
(0.50) 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.001 
(1.48) 
0.001 
(4.68)***a 
0.00002 
(0.03) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
-0.082 
(3.46)*** 
-0.096 
(2.77)***a 
0.079 
(5.89)***a 
-0.034 
(0.67) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 0.0002 
(0.73)a 
-0.001 
(7.92)***a 
-0.0001 
(0.35) 
Local Sales Tax   0.082 
(2.61)*** 
0.088 
(2.76)*** 
0.099 
(5.01)*** 
-0.012 
(0.27) 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.048 
(1.67)* 
-0.041 
(1.42) 
0.08 
(3.84)*** 
-0.118 
(1.96)* 
Observations 18589 18589 18589 13637 
County fixed Y Y N Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y 
Notes: See Table 2.3 for additional notes on significances on signs of coefficients. 
Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A8 in 
Appendix. 
 
2.5.2.4 Clothing Stores’ Employment Results 
Table 2.12 presents results from estimating several specifications for the total 
number of employees of clothing stores per 1,000 residents of counties. The first column 
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reveals that the coefficient on the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates have the 
expected positive impacts on the total number of employees of clothing stores per 1,000 
residents of counties. The coefficient on own state’s sales tax rates also have expected 
negative effects on the total number of employees of clothing stores per 1,000 residents 
of counties, however, the coefficient on own state’s sales tax rates is not statistically 
significant. 
 The second column shows that there is a joint significance of the coefficients on 
the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates and its interaction term, thereby indicating 
that an increase in the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates have more expected 
positive effects on the total number of employees of clothing stores per 1,000 residents of 
counties closer to the state border.  
The third column indicates that when county fixed effects are excluded to the 
model as in the second column, the coefficients on the nearest neighboring state’s sales 
tax rates and its interaction term are still significant jointly. However, the sign on the 
coefficient of the interaction term has a positive sign, thereby suggesting that an increase 
in the nearest neighboring sales tax rates has less positive effects on the total number of 
employees of clothing stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border. 
Besides, the coefficients on own state’s sales tax rates and its interaction term, which are 
insignificant in the second column, have more significant positive impacts on the total 
number of employees of clothing stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state 
border. The fourth column indicates that when previous year’s total number of employees 
of clothing stores per 1,000 residents of counties are accounted for in the model of the 
second column, the coefficients on the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates and its 
interaction term are jointly insignificant.  
To sum up, the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates have expected positive 
effects on the total number of employees of clothing stores per 1,000 county residents. 
The nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates also have more positive effects on the total 
number of employees of clothing stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state 
border, but the coefficients on the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates and its 
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interaction term with distance to the state border are not jointly significant across all 
specifications. Moreover, there is robust evidence that counties that have sales tax 
holidays have fewer unexpected total numbers of clothing stores’ employees per 1,000 
residents than counties that do not have sales tax holidays in their own areas as well as 
the nearest neighboring state.  
Table 2.12—Impacts of Sales Tax Rates on the Total Number of Employees of Clothing 
Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Clothing Store Employeest-1    0.063 
(0.86) 
Sales Tax -0.015 
(0.37) 
0.046 
(0.72) 
0.102 
(2.33)**a 
0.155 
(1.76)* 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.001 
(1.11) 
-0.0003 
(0.51)a 
-0.003 
(1.75)* 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.121 
(3.13)*** 
0.174 
(2.94)***a 
0.12 
(3.32)***a 
0.125 
(1.80)* 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 -0.001 
(0.73)a 
0.001 
(1.49)a 
-0.001 
(0.59) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.05 
(0.59) 
-0.049 
(0.59) 
-0.041 
(0.78) 
-0.05 
(0.81) 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.035 
(0.76) 
-0.024 
(0.52) 
0.184 
(3.43)*** 
-0.027 
(0.18) 
Sales Tax Holidays -0.082 
(4.02)*** 
-0.074 
(3.53)*** 
0.275 
(4.62)*** 
-0.063 
(2.98)*** 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax Holidays 
-0.01 
(0.48) 
-0.011 
(0.51) 
0.192 
(3.12)*** 
0.005 
(0.24) 
Observations 20518 20518 20518 15885 
County fixed Y Y N Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y 
Notes: See Table 2.3 for additional notes on significances on signs of coefficients. 
Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A9 in 
Appendix. 
 
2.5.2.5 Liquor Stores’ Employment Results 
Table 2.13 reports results for the total number of employees of liquor stores per 
1,000 residents of counties. The first column reports that the total numbers of employees 
of liquor stores per 1,000 residents of counties are not significantly affected by alcohol 
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tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state. In contrast, the sales tax rates of 
own state have unexpected positive effects on the total number of employees of liquor 
stores per 1,000 residents of counties. The nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates have 
expected positive effects on the total number of employees of liquor stores per 1,000 
residents of counties, however, the coefficient on the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax 
rates is not statistically significant.  
The second column shows that alcohol tax rates and sales tax rates of own state 
and the nearest neighboring state  have more positive effects on the total number of 
employees of liquor stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border. 
However, the coefficients on alcohol tax rates of own state (or the nearest neighboring 
state) and its interaction term with distance to the state border are not jointly significant. 
Similarly, the coefficients on sales tax rates of own state (or the nearest neighboring 
state) and its interaction term with distance to the state border are jointly insignificant.   
The third column shows that when unobserved county heterogeneity is not 
controlled in specification (2.2), the coefficients on sales and alcohol tax terms of own 
and the nearest neighboring states are statistically significant. This probably suggests that 
sales and alcohol tax rates are constant over time for many states and thus, they are 
accounted by county-fixed effects in the second column. The fourth column shows that 
when the lagged dependent variable is accounted for in specification (2.2), the 
coefficients on own state’s alcohol tax rates and its interaction term are jointly 
significant, thereby implying that alcohol tax rates of own state have more expected 
negative effects on the total number of employees of liquor stores per 1,000 residents of 
counties closer to the state border. Then, at the distance of fifteen miles from the state 
border, an additional increase in own state alcohol tax rates decreases liquor store 
employees per 1,000 county residents by one in the short run and two in the long run. 
To sum up, sales tax rates of domestic state have positive effects on the total 
number of employees of liquor stores per 1,000 county residents. However, there is no 
robust evidence across different specifications that the total number of employees of 
liquor stores per 1,000 residents of counties closer to the state border show more 
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responses to alcohol tax rates and sales tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring 
state. Similarly, the coefficient on the local sales tax dummy variable of domestic state 
does not have significant positive effects on the total number of employees of liquor 
stores per 1,000 county residents across all specifications.  
Table 2.13—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Employees of 
Liquor Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Alcohol Store Employeest-1    0.22 
(1.17) 
Alcohol Tax -0.134 
(0.54) 
0.404 
(1.06) 
-2.774 
(9.98)***a 
-1.37 
(2.39)**a 
Alcohol Tax × Distance  -0.008 
(1.58) 
0.024 
(6.37)***a 
0.008 
(0.93)a 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax 
0.073 
(0.23) 
0.155 
(0.34) 
-1.866 
(7.24)***a 
-0.294 
(0.32) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax × Distance 
 -0.0002 
(0.05) 
0.004 
(0.85)a 
-0.017 
(1.54) 
Sales Tax 0.02 
(1.82)* 
0.033 
(1.77)* 
0.062 
(4.76)***a 
0.025 
(1.00) 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.0003 
(0.94) 
-0.0004 
(2.96)***a 
-0.0003 
(0.52) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.008 
(0.52) 
0.009 
(0.38) 
0.042 
(3.79)***a 
-0.041 
(1.08) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 -0.00003 
(0.16) 
-0.0003 
(2.67)***a 
0.00001 
(0.05) 
Local Sales Tax   0.017 
(1.55) 
0.022 
(1.88)* 
0.032 
(2.39)** 
0.078 
(2.19)** 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.006 
(0.78) 
-0.005 
(0.54) 
0.065 
(5.13)*** 
0.019 
(0.71) 
Observations 14560 14560 14560 10174 
County fixed Y Y N Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y 
Notes: See Table 2.3 for additional notes on significances on signs of coefficients. 
Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A10 in 
Appendix. 
2.5.2.6 Estimated Impact of Tax Increases 
Based on Tables 2.9 to 2.13, although sales and excise tax rates of domestic and 
the nearest neighboring state have significant influences on counties’ employment of 
most retail industries, there is no robust evidence across different specifications that 
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distance to the state border has significant effects on the impacts of sales and excise tax 
rates of domestic and neighboring states on counties’ employment for most retail 
industries I consider. Only for grocery stores, there is consistent evidence across 
equations (2.2) and (2.4) that tobacco tax rates of domestic state have unexpected more 
positive effects on the total number of grocery store employees of counties closer to the 
state border. Therefore, in this section, I perform the quantitative analysis to show how 
the impact of domestic state’s tobacco tax rates on the total number of grocery store 
employment per 1,000 county residents vary with the distance to the state border. In 
particular, Table 2.14 illustrates the effect of a hypothetical one percent increase in a 
county’s own state tobacco tax rates. The table shows that an increase in own state’s 
tobacco tax rates is estimated to increase one grocery store employee per 1,000 county 
residents at ten miles from the state border, but the effect gradually diminishes and 
become negative as one moves further from the border. In this way, as distance to the 
state border increases, domestic state tobacco tax rates have more unexpected negative 
influences on the total number of grocery store employment per 1,000 county residents.   
Table 2.14―Estimated Effect on the Total Number of Grocery Store Employment per 
1,000 County Residents, Following a One Percent Increase In Domestic State Tobacco 
Tax 
Distance 1% increase in Domestic State Tobacco Tax Rates 
10 miles 0.993 
40 miles -0.597 
100 miles -3.777 
 
2.5.3 Alternative specifications 
In this section I consider an alternative measure of a distance variable. In the 
above analysis, the impacts of sales or excise tax rates of own state and the nearest 
neighboring state on a county’s total numbers of retail establishment and employment per 
1,000 residents are considered to vary linearly to the county’s distance to the state border. 
However, in this section, I examine whether the impacts of own state’s and the nearest 
neighboring state’s sales or/and excise tax rates on the total numbers of retail 
establishment and employment per 1,000 residents of a county are influenced by the 
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discontinuous function of the county’s distance to the state border. In particular, the 
equations to be estimated are identical to equations (2.2), (2.4) and (2.5) except the 
distance variable (D) is replaced with a dummy variable D10 that indicates one for 
counties within ten miles of the state border7. Therefore, the equations to be estimated are 
then specified as follows:  
rijkttiijttijktijtij
tijktijktijk
tijktijtijtij
tijtijtijrijkt
XZDOTOT
DNMTNMTDMT
MTNLTLTDNST
NSTDSTSTE
,1,1,1,
1,1,1,
1,1,61,51,4
1,31,21,10,
)10(
)10()10(
)10(
)10(












  
(2.2a) 
rijkttijttijktijtij
tijktijktijk
tijktijtijtij
tijtijtijrtijkrrijkt
XZDOTOT
DNMTNMTDMT
MTNLTLTDNST
NSTDSTSTEE
,1,1,1,
1,1,1,
1,1,61,51,4
1,31,21,1,1,,
)10(
)10()10(
)10(
)10(












   
(2.4a) 
rijkttiijttijktij
tijtijktijktijk
tijktijtijtij
tijtijtij
hi
rhktihkrijkt
XZDOT
OTDNMTNMTDMT
MTNLTLTDNST
NSTDSTSTEwE
,1,1,
1,1,1,1,
1,1,61,51,4
1,31,21,1,0,
)10(
)10()10(
)10(
)10(














  
(2.5a) 
 
2.5.3.1 Retail Establishment Results 
Tables 2.15 to 2.17 report estimated signs and significances on coefficients from 
estimating equations (2.2a), (2.4a) and (2.5a) for the total number of establishments of 
                                                            
7 Ten mile distance to the state border is an arbitrary boundary in which cross-border shopping due to sales 
and excise tax differentials is expected to have noteworthy impacts on retail establishment and employment 
of counties. Considering different dummy variables such as D25 that equals one for counties within twenty-
five miles of the state border did not particularly produce different results from those obtained by using 
dummy variable D10. 
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five retail industries. Each column represents the total number of establishments of each 
retail industry per 1,000 residents of counties.  
Table 2.15 demonstrates estimated signs of coefficients and indicates their 
significances for equation (2.2a). The coefficient on own state’s sales tax rates interacted 
with D10 is statistically significant only for counties’ total number of establishments of 
gasoline stations, clothing stores and liquor stores per 1,000 residents, thereby suggesting 
that an increase in own state’s sales tax rates have different impacts on the total number 
of establishments of gasoline stations, clothing stores and liquor stores per 1,000 
residents for counties within and above ten miles from the state border. The coefficient 
on the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates interacted with D10 is statistically 
significant only for counties’ total number of establishments of grocery stores, furniture 
stores, and liquor stores per 1,000 residents. Holding all else same, on average, an 
increase in sales tax rates of the nearest neighboring state is expected to induce fewer 
total numbers of establishments of grocery stores and liquor stores per 1,000 residents in 
counties within ten miles from the state border than in counties above ten miles from the 
state border. On the contrary, an increase in the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates 
is expected, on average, to induce greater total number of establishments of furniture 
stores per 1,000 residents for counties within ten miles from the state border than for 
counties beyond ten miles from the state border. The coefficient on the nearest 
neighboring state’s fuel tax rates interacted with D10 is positive and significant in the 
case of gasoline stations, thus suggesting that one percent increase in fuel tax rates of the 
nearest neighboring state affects counties within ten miles from the state border to have 
more gasoline stations per 1,000 residents than counties beyond ten miles from the state 
border. Similarly, the coefficient on the nearest neighboring state’s alcohol tax rates 
interacted with D10 is positive and statistically significant in the case of liquor stores, 
thereby implying that changes in the total numbers of establishments of liquor stores per 
1,000 residents for each additional percent of the nearest neighboring state’s alcohol tax 
rates is different for counties within and above ten miles from the state border.  
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Table 2.15—Alternative Distance Static Specification: Establishments per 1,000 County 
Residents 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline 
Stations 
Furniture
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Sales Tax -0.029 
(3.01)*** 
0.033 
(3.57)*** 
-0.005 
(1.65)* 
0.007 
(1.62) 
-0.007 
(2.58)*** 
Sales Tax × D10 -0.011 
(0.52) 
-0.065 
(3.00)*** 
0.007 
(0.87) 
-0.02 
(1.95)* 
0.016 
(2.13)** 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax 
0.007 
(0.95) 
0.009 
(1.02) 
-0.0002 
(0.07) 
0.006 
(0.98) 
0.008 
(2.46)** 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax × D10 
-0.038 
(2.53)** 
-0.011 
(0.50) 
0.013 
(1.67)* 
0.006 
(0.44) 
-0.038 
(4.83)*** 
Tobacco Tax 0.009 
(0.29) 
-0.071 
(1.94)* 
   
Tobacco Tax × D10 0.012 
(0.22) 
0.042 
(0.56) 
   
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax 
0.134 
(5.07)*** 
-0.231 
(6.27)*** 
   
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax × D10 
-0.032 
(0.62) 
0.064 
(0.83) 
   
Fuel Tax  -0.113 
(3.72)*** 
   
Fuel Tax × D10  -0.005 
(0.08) 
   
Neighboring State 
Fuel Tax 
 -0.013 
(0.39) 
   
Neighboring State 
Fuel Tax × D10 
 0.14 
(2.04)** 
   
Alcohol Tax     0.141 
(2.84)*** 
Alcohol Tax × D10     -0.192 
(1.02) 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax 
    -0.171 
(2.38)** 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax × D10 
    0.361 
(2.48)** 
Local Sales Tax   -0.054 
(6.72)*** 
0.041 
(4.38)*** 
-0.002 
(0.61) 
0.015 
(2.47)** 
0.001 
(0.54) 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
0.012 
(1.57) 
-0.011 
(1.28) 
-0.005 
(1.66)* 
0.026 
(6.28)*** 
-0.005 
(2.00)** 
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Table 2.15 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline 
Stations 
Furniture
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Food Tax Exemption  0.008 
(1.03) 
    
Neighboring State 
Food Tax Exemption 
-0.008 
(1.26) 
    
Sales Tax Holidays     -0.003 
(1.74)* 
 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax Holidays 
   -0.003 
(0.18) 
 
Notes: Observations: 27693 counties. The regressions include county fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. *, **, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are 
reported in Table A11 in Appendix. 
 
Table 2.16 reports results from estimating equation (2.4a). The coefficient on the 
nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates interacted with D10 is sill negative and 
significant for total number of establishments of grocery stores per 1,000 county 
residents. However, most of the tax interaction terms that are significant in Table 2.15 are 
either insignificant or/and have different signs in this table. For example, while the 
coefficient on own state’s sales tax rates interacted with D10 has positive and 
insignificant effects on the total number of establishments of gasoline stations per 1,000 
county residents, the coefficients on own state’s sales tax rates interacted with D10 have 
insignificant negative and positive impacts on the total number of establishments of 
clothing and liquor stores per 1,000 county residents, respectively. Similarly, for gasoline 
stations, although the coefficient on the nearest neighboring state’s fuel tax rates 
interacted with D10 is still positive as in Table 2.15, it is statistically insignificant. 
Moreover, some of the tax interaction terms that are insignificant in Table 2.15 are 
significant in this table. For example, the coefficient on the nearest neighboring state’s 
tobacco tax rates interacted with D10 has positive and significant effects on the total 
number of establishments of gasoline stations per 1,000 county residents, thereby 
implying that an increase in the nearest neighboring state’s tobacco tax rates would lead 
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to higher number of gasoline stations in counties within ten miles from the state border 
than in counties above ten miles from the state border. 
Table 2.16—Alternative Distance Dynamic Specification: Establishments per 1,000 
County Residents 
 Dependent variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline 
Stations 
Furniture 
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Grocery Storest-1 0.643 
(9.58)*** 
    
Gasoline Stationst-1  0.523 
(11.99)*** 
   
Furniture Storest-1   0.512 
(10.56)*** 
  
Clothing Storest-1    0.537 
(6.03)*** 
 
 Alcohol Storest-1     0.429 
(6.07)*** 
Sales Tax -0.039 
(2.93)*** 
0.019 
(1.53) 
0.007 
(1.47) 
0.01 
(0.82) 
-0.007 
(1.53) 
Sales Tax × D10 0.005 
(0.17) 
0.061 
(1.15) 
-0.022 
(1.54) 
-0.014 
(1.06) 
0.019 
(1.48) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax 
0.019 
(1.38) 
0.008 
(0.69) 
0.007 
(1.06) 
0.009 
(1.02) 
0.0004 
(0.07) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax × D10 
-0.055 
(1.93)* 
-0.054 
(1.69)* 
-0.01 
(0.84) 
-0.025 
(1.77)* 
-0.014 
(1.31) 
Tobacco Tax -0.042 
(1.14) 
-0.02 
(0.49) 
   
Tobacco Tax × 
D10 
-0.054 
(0.68) 
-0.05 
(0.70) 
   
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax 
0.036 
(0.92) 
-0.076 
(1.81)* 
   
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax × 
D10 
-0.092 
(1.12) 
0.087 
(1.15) 
   
Fuel Tax  -0.07 
(1.44) 
   
Fuel Tax × D10  -0.102 
(1.16) 
   
Neighboring State 
Fuel Tax 
 -0.063 
(1.39) 
   
Neighboring State 
Fuel Tax × D10 
 0.198 
(1.57) 
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Table 2.16 continued 
 Dependent variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline 
Stations 
Furniture 
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax Holidays 
   -0.002 
(0.52) 
 
Alcohol Tax     -0.201 
(2.45)** 
Alcohol Tax × D10     0.393 
(1.34) 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax 
    -0.1 
(0.91) 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax × D10 
    0.248 
(1.03) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.022 
(1.26) 
0.05 
(3.16)*** 
-0.005 
(1.01) 
0.006 
(0.54) 
0.006 
(1.18) 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
-0.006 
(0.50) 
0.008 
(0.56) 
-0.003 
(0.50) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
0.006 
(1.09) 
Food Tax 
Exemption  
0.022 
(1.51) 
    
Neighboring State 
Food Tax 
Exemption 
0.0004 
(0.04) 
    
Sales Tax Holidays     -0.003 
(1.17) 
 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax Holidays 
   -0.002 
(0.52) 
 
Notes: Observations: 24616 counties. The regressions include county fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. *, **, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in 
Table A12 in Appendix. 
 
Table 2.17 reports results from estimating equation (2.5a). The coefficient on the 
nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates interacted with D10 is still negative and 
significant for the total number of establishments of grocery stores per 1,000 county 
residents. Similarly, the coefficients on most of the interaction terms of sales and excise 
taxes that were significant in Table 2.15 are still significant and have same signs in this 
table. For example, while the coefficients on own state’s sales tax rates interacted with 
D10 are still negative and significant for the total number of gasoline stations and 
clothing stores per 1,000 county residents, the coefficient on own state’s sales tax rates 
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interacted with D10 is positive and significant for the total number of liquor stores per 
1,000 county residents. In the same way, while the coefficient on the nearest neighboring 
state’s fuel tax rates interacted with D10 is positive and significant for the total number of 
gasoline stations per 1,000 county residents, the coefficient on the nearest neighboring 
state’s alcohol tax rates interacted with D10 is positive and significant for the total 
number of liquor stores per 1,000 county residents. 
Table 2.17—Alternative Distance Spatial Specification: Establishments per 1,000 County 
Residents 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline
Stations 
Furniture
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Neighboring County 
Grocery Stores 
0.013 
(1.12) 
    
Neighboring County 
Gasoline Stations 
 -0.005 
(1.81)* 
   
Neighboring County 
Furniture Stores 
  0.011 
(4.13)***
  
Neighboring County 
Clothing Stores 
   0.004 
(2.55)** 
 
Neighboring County 
Alcohol Stores 
    -0.004 
(1.50) 
Sales Tax -0.021 
(2.08)** 
0.033 
(4.04)*** 
0.003 
(0.82) 
0.013 
(2.50)** 
-0.009 
(2.73)***
Sales Tax × D10 -0.013 
(0.65) 
-0.06 
(2.76)*** 
0.004 
(0.52) 
-0.022 
(1.74)* 
0.018 
(2.25)** 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.018 
(1.52) 
0.012 
(1.62) 
0.003 
(1.07) 
0.006 
(1.56) 
0.009 
(3.27)***
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × D10 
-0.04 
(1.97)** 
-0.011 
(0.48) 
0.015 
(1.64) 
0.007 
(0.54) 
-0.039 
(4.73)***
Tobacco Tax 0.073 
(1.12) 
-0.093 
(2.55)** 
   
Tobacco Tax × D10 -0.085 
(0.76) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
   
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
0.099 
(2.25)** 
-0.267 
(6.70)*** 
   
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax × D10 
-0.057 
(0.78) 
0.056 
(0.72) 
   
Fuel Tax  -0.138 
(4.04)*** 
   
Fuel Tax × D10  0.026 
(0.34) 
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Table 2.17 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline
Stations 
Furniture
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax 
 -0.006 
(0.19) 
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax × D10 
 0.128 
(1.77)* 
   
Alcohol Tax     0.151 
(2.01)** 
Alcohol Tax × D10     -0.215 
(0.91) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax 
    -0.175 
(2.11)** 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax × D10 
    0.381 
(1.97)** 
Local Sales Tax   -0.032 
(1.40) 
0.049 
(4.02)*** 
0.0004 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(2.82)*** 
-0.0003 
(0.08) 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
0.041 
(1.48) 
-0.012 
(1.04) 
0.002 
(0.47) 
0.029 
(4.31)*** 
-0.008 
(1.80)* 
Food Tax Exemption  0.019 
(1.57) 
    
Neighboring State  
Food Tax Exemption 
0.001 
(0.05) 
    
Sales Tax Holidays     -0.002 
(0.99) 
 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax Holidays 
   -0.002 
(1.02) 
 
Notes: Observations: 27693 counties. The regressions include county fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. *, **, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Detailed estimates and additional explanatory variables are 
reported in Table A13 in Appendix. 
 
To summarize, Tables 2.15 to 2.17 show that the nearest neighboring state’s sales 
tax rates have negative effects on the total number of establishments of grocery stores per 
1,000 residents for counties within ten miles from the state border. However, for the total 
number of establishments per 1,000 county residents of other four retail industries, the 
coefficients on interaction terms of sales tax rates, fuel tax rates, tobacco tax rates or 
alcohol tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state are not consistently 
significant across different specifications. Therefore, except in the case of grocery stores, 
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there is no clear evidence to suggest that the sales or excise tax rates of own state and the 
nearest neighboring state have different effects on the total number of establishments per 
1,000 residents of four retail industries for counties within and beyond ten miles from the 
state border. 
2.5.3.2 Retail Employment Results 
Tables 2.18 to 2.19 show estimated signs and significances on coefficients from 
estimating equations (2.2a) and (2.4a) for the total number of employees of five retail 
industries. Each column of this table represents the total number of employees of each 
retail industry per 1,000 residents of counties.  
Table 2.18 reports estimated signs on coefficients and indicate their significances 
from estimating equation (2.2a) for each retail industry’s total number of employees per 
1,000 residents of counties. The coefficient on own state’s sales tax rates interacted with 
D10 is negative and insignificant for all five retail industries’ total number of employees 
per 1,000 residents, thus suggesting that changes in any five retail industry’s employment 
per 1,000 residents for each additional sales tax rates of own state is not different for 
counties within and above ten miles from the state border. The coefficient on the nearest 
neighboring state’s sales tax rates interacted with D10 is significant for the total number 
of employees per 1,000 residents of grocery stores and liquor stores of counties. In 
particular, an increase in the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates induces higher 
number of employees of grocery stores per 1,000 residents in counties within ten miles 
from the state border than in counties beyond ten miles from the state border. In contrast, 
an increase in the nearest neighboring state’s sales tax rates induces fewer number of 
employees of liquor stores per 1,000 residents in counties within ten miles from the state 
border than in counties beyond ten miles from the state border. 
The coefficient on tobacco tax rates of own state interacted with D10 is 
statistically significant for the total number of employees of grocery stores, thereby 
indicating that if tobacco tax rates of own state increase by one percent, grocery stores in 
counties within ten miles from the state border will have on average more grocery stores’ 
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employees per 1,000 residents than in counties beyond ten miles from the state border. 
Similarly, the negative sign on the coefficient of own state’s fuel tax rates interacted with 
D10 suggests that an increase in fuel tax rates of own state induces fewer numbers of 
employees of gasoline stations per 1,000 residents in counties within ten miles from the 
state border than in counties beyond ten miles from the state border. The alcohol tax rates 
of own and the nearest neighboring states do not have more impacts on the total number 
of employees per 1,000 residents of liquor stores in counties within ten miles from the 
state border than in counties beyond ten miles from the state border. 
Table 2.18—Alternative Distance Static Specification: Employment per 1,000 County 
Residents 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Store 
Gasoline 
Station 
Furniture 
Store 
Clothing 
Store 
Liquor 
Store 
Sales Tax 0.064 
(0.47) 
-0.047 
(0.50) 
0.031 
(1.22) 
0.008 
(0.18) 
0.024 
(1.99)** 
Sales Tax × D10 -0.244 
(0.73) 
-0.228 
(0.83) 
-0.097 
(1.60) 
-0.143 
(1.22) 
-0.044 
(1.41) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
-0.162 
(1.47) 
-0.029 
(0.30) 
-0.077 
(3.04)***
0.103 
(2.57)** 
0.019 
(1.18) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × D10 
0.756 
(2.08)** 
0.059 
(0.25) 
-0.08 
(1.14) 
0.151 
(0.96) 
-0.135 
(2.16)** 
Tobacco Tax -1.242 
(2.45)** 
-0.719 
(2.18)** 
   
Tobacco Tax × D10 2.317 
(2.14)** 
-0.176 
(0.26) 
   
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
-0.424 
(0.92) 
-1.254 
(3.77)***
   
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax × D10 
-0.743 
(0.66) 
-0.078 
(0.12) 
   
Fuel Tax  0.409 
(1.27) 
   
Fuel Tax × D10  -1.685 
(2.65)***
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax 
 -0.304 
(1.04) 
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax × D10 
 0.652 
(0.94) 
   
Alcohol Tax     -0.041 
(0.16) 
 
57 
 
Table 2.18 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Store 
Gasoline 
Station 
Furniture 
Store 
Clothing 
Store 
Liquor 
Store 
Alcohol Tax × D10     -0.946 
(1.11) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax 
    -0.014 
(0.04) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax × D10 
    0.018 
(0.02) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.069 
(0.40) 
0.573 
(4.25)***
0.084 
(2.68)***
-0.054 
(0.65) 
0.019 
(1.68)* 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.553 
(2.91)*** 
-0.009 
(0.10) 
-0.046 
(1.59) 
-0.035 
(0.76) 
-0.007 
(0.79) 
Food Tax Exemption  -0.207 
(1.35) 
    
Neighboring State  
Food Tax Exemption 
0.116 
(1.20) 
    
Sales Tax Holidays     -0.084 
(4.13)*** 
 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax Holidays 
   -0.01 
(0.47) 
 
Notes: The regressions include county fixed effects and year fixed effects. *, **, and ***, 
respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Detailed 
estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A14 in Appendix. 
 
Table 2.19 reports estimated signs and significances on coefficients from 
estimating equation (2.4a) for the total number of employees of each of five retail 
industries per 1,000 county residents. Unlike in Table 2.18, it shows that only in the case 
of gasoline station employees, the coefficient on the nearest neighboring state’s tobacco 
tax rates interacted with D10 is statistically significant, thus implying that an increase in 
tobacco tax rates of the nearest neighboring state induces higher number of employees of 
gasoline stations per 1,000 residents in counties within ten miles from the state border 
than in counties beyond ten miles from the state border. In addition, the coefficients on 
own state’s and the nearest neighboring state’s sales (or excise) tax rates interacted with 
D10 are insignificant for all other retail industries. Thus, there is no robust evidence that 
the impacts of sales or excise tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring state on 
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the total number of employees of four retail industries are different for counties within 
and above ten miles from the state border. 
Table 2.19—Alternative Distance Dynamic Specification: Employment per 1,000 County 
Residents 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Store 
Gasoline 
Station 
Furniture 
Store 
Clothing  
Store 
Liquor 
Store 
Grocery Store  
Employeest-1 
0.464 
(10.04)*** 
    
Gasoline Station 
Employeest-1 
 0.217 
(2.28)** 
   
Furniture Store  
Employeest-1 
  0.527 
(8.55)***
  
Clothing Store  
Employeest-1 
   0.065 
(0.93) 
 
Alcohol Store  
Employeest-1 
    0.219 
(1.14) 
Sales Tax -0.105 
(0.50) 
-0.0004 
(0) 
0.009 
(0.23) 
-0.02 
(0.30) 
0.023 
(1.44) 
Sales Tax × D10 0.187 
(0.34) 
-0.629 
(1.69)* 
0.126 
(1.20) 
0.127 
(0.98) 
-0.113 
(1.48) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.378 
(1.92)* 
0.138 
(1.13) 
-0.041 
(0.86) 
0.068 
(1.31) 
-0.019 
(0.68) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × D10 
0.275 
(0.41) 
-0.261 
(1.04) 
0.012 
(0.13) 
-0.016 
(0.13) 
-0.209 
(1.30) 
Tobacco Tax -0.664 
(0.93) 
0.494 
(1.33) 
   
Tobacco Tax × D10 0.059 
(0.04) 
-1.079 
(1.76)* 
   
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
-0.098 
(0.16) 
-0.597 
(1.57) 
   
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax × D10 
-0.646 
(0.39) 
1.212 
(2.01)** 
   
Fuel Tax  0.458 
(0.92) 
   
Fuel Tax × D10  -1.009 
(1.36) 
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax 
 -1.056 
(1.97)** 
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax × D10 
 1.039 
(1.23) 
   
Alcohol Tax     -1.179 
(2.32)** 
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Table 2.19 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Store 
Gasoline 
Station 
Furniture 
Store 
Clothing  
Store 
Liquor 
Store 
Alcohol Tax × D10     1.636 
(1.03) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax 
    -0.755 
(1.10) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax × D10 
    -2.927 
(1.42) 
Local Sales Tax   1.475 
(4.12)*** 
-0.469 
(1.35) 
-0.012 
(0.28) 
-0.049 
(0.81) 
0.08 
(2.26)** 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
0.487 
(2.18)** 
0.199 
(1.05) 
-0.118 
(1.94)* 
-0.024 
(0.16) 
0.018 
(0.68) 
Food Tax Exemption  -0.035 
(0.14) 
    
Neighboring State  
Food Tax Exemption 
0.143 
(0.90) 
    
Sales Tax Holidays     -0.071 
(3.61)*** 
 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax Holidays 
   0.005 
(0.21) 
 
Notes: The regressions include county fixed effects and year fixed effects.*, **, and ***, 
respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Detailed 
estimates and additional explanatory variables are reported in Table A15 in Appendix. 
 
To summarize, although Tables 2.18 and 2.19 show that sales tax rates and excise 
tax rates of own state and the nearest neighboring states have different impacts on some 
retail industries’ employment for counties within and above ten miles from the state 
border, the finding is not robust across different specifications. Therefore, there is no 
consistent evidence to suggest that sales and excise tax rates of own state and the nearest 
neighboring state have different impacts on the total number of employees per 1,000 
residents of retail industries for counties within and beyond ten miles from the state 
border.  
2.5.4 Limitation of Econometric Analysis  
This analysis fails to take into account for actual rates on counties’ own sales 
taxes. These rates are not taken into account because data needed to do so are not readily 
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available. As a result, in this analysis, although I have attempted to account for counties’ 
own or the nearest neighboring states’ sales tax rates by including local sales tax dummy 
variables that controls for whether a county’s own state or nearest neighboring state allow 
local sales tax rates, it is possible that local sales tax dummy variables may not have 
completely controlled for actual local sales tax rates of counties. For instance, a state may 
allow counties to have local sales tax rates, yet it is possible that a county may not have 
imposed any additional local sales tax rates. In such case, the omission of actual values of 
county sales tax rates may bias the results against counties that have no additional sales 
tax rates on purchases of goods.  
2.6 Conclusion  
Whether, and to what extent, sales and excise tax rates of own and the nearest 
neighboring states influence economic activity of counties closer to the state border merit 
serious considerations. Today, as state governments are introducing new tax policies to 
combat the potential adverse impacts of interstate sales and excise tax differentials on 
economic activity of areas closer to the state border, it is important to determine how the 
impacts of sales and excise tax rates of domestic and neighboring states on economic 
activity vary with the distance of a county to the state border. The current literature that 
focuses on the United States largely utilizes a state level data of the forty-eight 
contiguous states or a county level data of one or few states to analyze the impacts of 
interstate sales and excise tax differentials on economic activity such as retail sales of 
goods. However, in this chapter, I use a county-level panel data of all forty-eight 
contiguous states to examine whether retail industries of counties closer to the state 
border relative to retail industries of counties further away from the state border show 
more responses to the impacts of sales and excise tax rates of domestic and the nearest 
neighboring states by changing the number of retail establishments and employment. 
These retail industries include grocery stores, gasoline stations, furniture stores, clothing 
stores and liquor stores that are most likely to be affected by consumers’ cross-border 
shopping activity due to different sales and excise tax rates in adjacent states. 
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I start my analysis by estimating how sales and excise tax rates of domestic and 
the nearest neighboring states affect retail establishments and employment of counties.  
The results from these estimations indicate that sales and excise tax rates of own and 
nearest neighboring states, in most cases, have significant influences on retail 
establishments and employment of counties. Next, I estimate how the distance to the state 
border influences the responsiveness of a county’s retail establishments and employment 
to sales and excise tax rates of domestic and neighboring states. The results from these 
estimations find that the impacts of sales and excise tax rates of domestic and the nearest 
neighboring states on counties’ retail establishments and employment depend on the 
distance to the state border, however, the impacts tend not to be robust across different 
specifications.  
In this way, although this chapter suggests policy makers that own and the nearest 
neighboring states’ sales and excise tax rates influence counties’ establishments and 
employment of most retail industries, it is inconclusive regarding whether the distance to 
the state border plays a significant role on the responsiveness of counties’ retail 
establishments and employment to own and the nearest neighboring states’ sales and 
excise tax rates.  One possible reason for failing to obtain robust results may be because 
there are fewer variations in states’ sales and excise tax rates over the period 1998 to 
2007. For instance, during this ten-year period, states on average changed their sales tax 
rates around one time, while gas tax rates and tobacco tax rates around two times. Since 
the average frequency in which states have changed their sales and excise tax rates is 
relatively small over the period 1998 to 2007, the time period used in this analysis 
possibly does not have enough number of changes in state sales and excise tax rates to 
realize the robust effects of the distance to the state border on the responsiveness of 
counties’ retail establishments and employment to sales and excise tax rates of own and 
the nearest neighboring states. Therefore, one possible extension of this chapter might be 
to examine the same issue again by using a county-level panel data with different time 
periods, particularly a time period that captures higher frequency of changes in states’ 
sales and excise tax rates. 
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Another possible extension to this chapter might be to examine whether the 
finding of this study also holds for retail sales of counties. Since the cost of avoiding 
higher sales and excise tax rates are presumably easier and less costly for consumers than 
retailers, sales and excise tax rates of own and the nearest neighboring states have 
probably more marked and prompter effects on border counties’ retail sales than retail 
establishments and employment. Thus, if county-level panel data is available on retail 
sales for forty-eight contiguous states’ counties, the future study can investigate whether 
the impacts on counties’ retail sales from sales and excise tax rates of own and the nearest 
neighboring states vary with the distance to the state border. 
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Chapter 3  
The Battle of Taxes: Strategic Interaction in Multiple Tax Policies among States 
3.1 Introduction  
In the United States, excise taxes rates on cigarettes and gas vary significantly 
among the states. In 2002, for example, cigarette taxes ranged from a low of three cents 
per pack to a high of one dollar and fifty cents per pack. In the same year, gas taxes 
ranged from a low of four cents per gallon to a high of twenty-eight cents per gallon. 
Furthermore, states with low excise taxes often share a border with high excise tax states. 
Kentucky, which imposed a three cent tax on each pack of cigarettes, for instance, shares 
a border with Indiana which levied a similar tax of fifty-six cents in 2002. Similarly, 
Virginia, which taxed around eighteen cents per gallon of gas, shares a border with North 
Carolina that levied gas tax rates of twenty-four cents per gallon in 2002. As a result of 
these differences in excise tax rates among states, we expect responses from both 
consumers and state governments.  
First, we expect such tax differentials among states to encourage cross-border 
shopping. Specifically, we predict consumers of a high excise taxed state to cross the 
border and shop in a low excise taxed state to take advantages of lower after-tax retail 
prices in the low tax state. For example, on January 1, 2007, when the cigarette tax rate in 
South Dakota increased from fifty-three cents a pack to $1.53, making a carton cost at 
least $11.70 more than a carton in Iowa, thousands of South Dakotans crossed the border 
into Larchwood, Iowa to purchase cigarettes (Efrati, 2007). 
Second, we expect excise tax differentials among states to incite smuggling 
activities. Particularly, we expect individuals to purchase large quantities of goods such 
as cigarettes, which are light, compact and easily transportable, in low excise tax states 
and illegally transport them to resell in a high excise tax state. By doing so, individuals 
would try to make as much profits as possible from the excise tax differential that exists 
between two states on every smuggled good. For example, it is found that when an 
individual brings 120,000 cigarette packs in a semitrailer to Michigan, which is a high 
64 
 
cigarette taxed state, from North Carolina, which is a low cigarette taxed state, he is able 
to earn as much as $100,000 in avoided cigarette excise taxes (Fleenor, 1998). 
 Third, we expect state governments to consider cross-border shoppers when 
setting tax rates. The theoretical literature on tax competition, in particular Kanbur and 
Keen (1993), suggests that states will compete against one another to set lower 
commodity tax rates to gain cross-border shoppers. Similarly, the empirical analyses on 
excise tax competition provide additional evidence that states mutually undercut each 
other’s excise tax rates, and excise taxes are lower among states in which the greater 
share of population is on borders (Devereux et al., 2007).  
Fourth, we expect state governments to consider and react to potential negative 
influences of excise tax competition on excise tax revenues. In particular, if a “race to the 
bottom” occurs in excise tax rates as state governments attempt to gain cross-border 
shoppers, excise tax revenues will decrease due to lower excise tax rates. As states’ 
excise tax revenues decrease, we may expect the impact of this on the rest of the state’s 
budget and would want to know how state governments maintain their balanced budgets. 
For instance, do state governments decrease their public expenditure levels to maintain a 
balanced budget? Or do they rely more on other taxes when faced with more competition 
in excise taxes to meet their revenue goals? This paper empirically investigates the 
answer to the latter question. 
Besides cigarette and gas taxes, states use sales and individual income taxes to 
generate state revenues. In 2002, for instance, states on average collected about 33.48 
percent of their revenues from general sales tax rates and 34.66 percent from individual 
income tax rates (U.S. Census Bureau). Furthermore, Figure 1 shows the share of tax 
revenues collected from cigarette tax rates, gas tax rates, sales tax rates, and individual 
income tax rates in the forty-eight contiguous states over the period 1977 to 2002. While 
the average share of revenues collected from cigarette tax rates and gas tax rates have 
decreased, the average share of revenues generated from sales tax rates and individual 
income tax rates have increased over this period. This observed trend possibly suggests 
that state governments are relying less on cigarette and gas tax rates and more on sales 
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and individual income tax rates to meet their revenue goals. A natural question to ask 
then is whether states use sales and income taxes as substitute taxes for cigarette and gas 
taxes to meet state revenue goals. Moreover, how is each tax rate related to other tax rates 
across states? Thus, this paper intends to understand the degree of relationship between 
these four taxes across states.  
Figure 3.1: Share of State Tax Revenues, 1977−2002 
 
In general, when a state has several taxes to meet its revenue goals, rates on one 
tax base may increase, decrease, or remain unchanged in response to an increase in rates 
on another tax base. For instance, if income tax rates and cigarette tax rates are 
considered as substitute taxes within the same state, a state may increase its income tax 
rates in order to compensate for its lower cigarette tax rates. Moreover, if there is 
strategic competition in tax rates among states, changes in rates one tax of neighboring 
states may induce a home state to change the rates on the same tax base or/and change the 
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rates on another tax base. For instance, Kentucky may respond to Ohio’s lower cigarette 
tax rates by not only changing its cigarette tax rates but also changing its sales (income or 
gas) tax rates to maintain its revenue requirements. Most previous studies such as Rork 
(2003) and Devereux et al. (2007) have examined how changes in neighboring states’ 
rates on one tax base impact the home state’s rates on the same tax base. They have not 
addressed whether changes in neighboring states’ one tax rate also affect changes in the 
home state’s other tax rates. If neighboring states’ rates on one tax base influence the 
home state’s rates on the same tax base as well as other tax bases, then failing to account 
for such strategic interaction in multiple tax rates may cause misleading inferences about 
the degree or even the direction of responses to neighboring states’ tax policies. Thus, 
this study adds to and extends the growing empirical literature on fiscal competition by 
expanding the focus from a tax on a specific base, usually an excise tax, to a much 
broader construction of the tax base to include other taxes including income and general 
sales taxes, while also helping policy makers to better gauge the impact of tax 
competition with neighboring states on state revenues.  
Considering cigarette tax rates, gas tax rates, sales tax rates and individual income 
tax rates of the forty-eight contiguous states over the period 1977 to 2002, this paper 
estimates how rates on one tax base are influenced by neighboring states’ rates on the 
same tax base as well as other tax bases. Specifically, I analyze four sets of tax reaction 
functions. The first set of tax reaction functions examines how neighboring states’ tax 
rates affect the home state’s tax rates on the same base. The second set of tax reaction 
functions investigates whether rates on one tax base react to neighboring states’ rates on 
the same tax base even after controlling for rates on other tax bases of the home state. 
The third set of tax reaction functions examine whether one tax rate relates to 
neighboring states’ identical and other tax rates. Finally, the fourth set of tax reaction 
functions includes rates on other tax bases of the home state to analyze how its rates on 
one tax base relates to neighboring states’ rates on the same tax base and other tax bases.  
My empirical results show that strategic competition among state governments 
occurs within the same tax base and across different tax bases. For example, consistent 
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with Rork (2003), I find that a home state’s cigarette tax rates and gas tax rates respond 
positively to neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates and gas tax rates, respectively. In 
terms of strategic interaction across different tax bases, I find that while the home state 
cigarette tax rates react negatively to neighboring states’ sales tax rates, the home state 
sales and gas tax rates respond negatively to neighboring states’ income tax rates. 
Furthermore, the home state income tax rates react negatively to neighboring states’ gas 
tax rates, thereby confirming my prediction that if there is a race to the bottom in excise 
tax rates such as gas tax rates, states would counteract on lower gas tax rates of 
neighboring states by increasing their income tax rates. In this way, these results, in 
general, reveal that strategic competition among state governments is not confined to 
only identical tax rates.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 provides background literature, 
Section 3.3 explains the theoretical framework, Section 3.4 outlines empirical 
specifications, Section 3.5 describes data and variables used in the study, Section 3.6 
provides regression results, and Section 3.7 presents conclusions. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Related previous studies fall into three broad categories: theoretical studies of tax 
competition; empirical studies of cross-border shopping; and empirical studies of fiscal 
competition. 
3.2.1 Theoretical Literature on Tax Competition 
The theoretical literature on tax competition investigates the effect of tax 
competition among governments for mobile tax bases such as firms, capital, and 
shoppers. One of the earliest papers to discuss tax competition was by Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (1986). They analyze the impact of tax competition among regions for 
mobile capital. The basic model of their paper considers that each region’s supply of a 
public good is financed entirely by a tax on domestic capital (‘source based’). Capital is 
nationally fixed but moves among regions in response to tax-differentials, while land is 
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an immobile factor. The main insight of the model is that if a region’s government raises 
the tax rate on capital, then a capital outflow will be generated, and therefore, a positive 
externality is created. The region’s government fails to account for such positive 
externality because it is concerned only with the welfare of its own residents. Therefore, 
the end result is that the region sets its capital tax rates and public goods level at an 
inefficiently low level (see also, Wilson, 1999). 
Similarly, Mintz and Tulkens (1986) research the effect of commodity tax 
competition on regions’ commodity tax rates. In commodity tax competition, each 
jurisdiction finances its public goods expenditures by an origin-based tax on private 
goods consumption. The use of origin-based taxes means that each jurisdiction collects a 
uniform tax on only the output of domestic firms, regardless of where this output is 
ultimately consumed. As a result, the jurisdiction’s residents can escape the tax by 
incurring the transport costs necessary to do cross-border shopping in low tax 
jurisdictions. The primary result of the model is that tax competition leads to lower 
commodity taxes and under-provision of public goods. However, Mintz and Tulkens use 
a very general model, and hence, their analysis does not look at the effect of a region’s 
size on commodity tax competition, an element likely to be important when explaining 
cross-border shopping between US states. 
Kanbur and Keen (1993) formulate a commodity tax competition model that 
contains two regions of different population densities, with an open border between them. 
The governments in the two regions levy an origin-based tax on a single commodity to 
maximize their tax revenues. Consumers have an option to purchase the commodity 
either in their own region or across the border by incurring a certain transport cost per 
unit distance. Their model infers that in the non-cooperative outcome, the smaller region 
will set lower tax rates, which will increase its revenue collection (as a result of cross-
border shopping) while decreasing that of a larger region. Thus, in Nash equilibrium, the 
larger region levies the higher tax, and the smaller region features the higher tax revenue 
per capita.  
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Ohsawa (1999) extends Kanbur and Keen’s (1993) analysis by allowing 
commodity tax competition among more than two regions. His model suggests that 
geographical sizes and positions of regions create varying degrees of market power, 
which in turn produces differences in tax rates among regions in the Nash equilibrium. 
Moreover, his model also confirms the conjecture of Kanbur and Keen (1993) that the 
larger regions have higher tax rates than smaller regions in the Nash equilibrium.  
Similarly, Nielsen (2001) modifies Kanbur and Keen’s (1993) model by 
examining the effect of goods’ transportation costs and border inspection on commodity 
tax competition between two different regions. His model also supports the results of 
Kanbur and Keen (1999). In addition, his model suggests that both transportation costs of 
goods and border inspection increase commodity taxes of regions.  
In this way, all these studies predict the presence of tax competition between 
regions by assuming that regions have only single tax instrument such as commodity tax 
rates to generate revenues. However, in reality, regions have more than one tax 
instrument to generate revenues, and thus, these theoretical studies have not addressed 
how regions would engage in strategic competition in more than one tax instrument. 
3.2.2 Empirical Studies of Cross-Border Shopping 
Empirical studies of cross-border shopping investigate whether tax differentials 
leads consumers to alter their decisions regarding where to purchase goods. Fox (1986), 
Walsh and Jones (1988), and Tosun and Skidmore (2007) focus on state sales tax 
differentials of the United States. In particular, Fox (1986) examines the impact of state 
sales tax differentials on sales in counties on both sides of state borders in three 
Tennessee urban areas. He finds that a one percent difference in sales tax rates results in 
decreased sales ranging from one percent to four percent in high tax jurisdictions. Walsh 
et al. (1988) and Tosun and Skidmore (2007) finds that high sales tax differentials have 
negative impacts on food sales in border counties of West Virginia. However, these 
studies do not explain why sales tax differentials exist among states. 
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Numerous studies have also examined the impacts of interstate cigarette tax 
differentials on cigarette sales. Coats (1995) investigates whether state cigarette tax 
differentials induce cross-border sales of cigarettes in the forty-eight contiguous states 
and the District of Columbia during 1964–1986. He finds that high state cigarette tax 
differentials lead to significant increases in cross-border sales. Specifically, he finds that 
eighty percent of cigarette sales elasticity is due to cross-border sales. Fleenor (1998) 
uses a similar methodology as Coat’s analysis to examine the effect of cross-border 
shopping on cigarette sales in the US for the period 1980–94. However, Fleenor’s 
analysis examines not only the impacts of state cigarette tax differentials on cross-border 
sales of cigarettes, but also the effects of state cigarette tax differentials on interstate 
smuggling. He finds that 7.8 percent of final cigarette sales in the US are due to 
smuggling, while 3.6 percent are due to cross-border shopping. Other studies that find 
significant effects of cigarette tax differentials on border shopping for cigarettes are 
Baltagi and Levin (1992), Yurekli and Zhang (2000), and Lovenheim (2008). Yet, all 
these studies do not explain whether cross-border shopping or smuggling behaviors of 
individuals influence states to engage in cigarette tax competition. 
Few studies have analyzed the impact of fuel price differentials on jurisdictions’ 
fuel sales. For example, Rietveld et al. (2001) analyze the cross-border fuelling behavior 
of Dutch residents in the presence of fuel price differentials between the Netherlands and 
Germany in 1997. They find that a price difference of five Euro-cents per liter will lead 
about thirty percent of the Dutch car owners who are living at the border to fuel in 
Germany. Banfi et al. (2003), on the other hand, use panel data to examine the impact of 
gas price differentials on cross-border fuelling in Switzerland’s three regions that border 
Italy, Germany and France. They find that a ten percent decrease in the ratio of Swiss gas 
price to the price in the bordering country will increase gas demand of between 6.7 to 7.7 
percent in the Swiss border regions. Meanwhile, Leal et al. (2009) investigate whether an 
increase in diesel prices in certain Autonomous communities of Spain, as a result of the 
application of the regional tranche of the Hydrocarbon Retail Sales Tax (HRST), has an 
effect on cross border fuelling in neighboring communities. Using monthly panels of 
diesel prices from January 2001 to March 2007, they find that diesel price differentials 
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have a significant influence upon cross-border purchases of automotive diesel in 
Autonomous communities of Spain. Nonetheless, these studies do not examine whether 
jurisdictions compete for lower gas taxes to gain cross-border fuel shoppers. 
In this way, the above discussed articles confirm that tax (price) differentials 
among jurisdictions influence location of individuals’ purchase (or cross-border sales) of 
goods. However, these studies do not explain whether jurisdictions keep their tax rates 
competitive with surrounding jurisdictions so as to attract much of the cross-border 
shoppers that lie along their common border. 
3.2.3 Empirical Studies of Fiscal Competition 
Most empirical analyses of fiscal competition estimate spatial reaction functions 
to assess fiscal competition among governments. This spatial reaction function relates a 
region’s fiscal policy to other regions’ fiscal policies. When the reaction function has a 
non-zero slope, it indicates that fiscal decisions by one government are affected by fiscal 
decisions of others. One of the first authors to test fiscal competition among governments 
is Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993). They study strategic interaction in expenditure policies 
among state governments of the United States over the period 1970–1985. They find that 
states’ spending decisions are positively influenced by their neighbors’ spending 
decisions. However, their research does not address strategic interaction in states’ tax 
policy decisions. 
Meanwhile, there are numerous studies that look at strategic interaction in tax 
policies among regional governments. Some articles that analyze strategic interaction in 
capital tax rates are Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Buettner (2001), and Hernández- 
Murrillo (2003). Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), which focus on property tax 
competition among cities in the Boston metropolitan area, Buettner (2001), which 
considers business tax competition among German municipalities, and Hernández- 
Murrillo (2003), which studies capital income tax competition among the US state 
governments, find that capital tax rates of neighboring regions have positive effects on a 
region’s own capital tax rates. In addition, Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) and 
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Hayashi and Boadway (2001) investigate both horizontal and vertical capital tax 
competition among governments. Specifically, Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) focus 
on income tax rates of the US states and find that state income tax rates respond 
positively to federal income tax rates and neighboring states’ income tax rates. Hayashi 
and Boadway (2001) consider business tax rates of Canadian provinces and find that 
provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rates and positively to an 
increase in the tax rates of other provinces. However, all these studies focus on strategic 
interaction in single capital tax rate among regions, and thus they are unable to suggest if 
strategic interaction among regions occur beyond single capital tax rate. 
Empirical papers that look at strategic interaction in commodity tax rates include 
Rork (2003), Jacobs et al. (2007), and Devereux et al. (2007). Considering statutory tax 
rates of commodities in the US states, Rork (2003) finds that state taxes with mobile 
bases, such as motor fuel and tobacco respond positively to tax rates set in neighboring 
states, while state taxes with relatively immobile bases, such as sales tax, respond 
negatively to tax rates set in neighboring states. On the other hand, focusing on an 
average effective tax rate8 for commodities such as beer, cigarettes, distilled spirits, wine, 
and gas, Jacobs et al. (2007) find that state commodity tax rates are positively affected by 
neighboring states’ same commodity tax rates. Moreover, Devereux et al. (2007) analyze 
both the vertical and horizontal tax competitions for cigarettes and gas taxes in the US for 
the period 1977–1997. They find that the weighted average of neighboring states’ 
cigarette tax rates has a positive effect on a state’s cigarette tax rate, while the federal 
cigarette tax has no significant effect on a state’s cigarette tax. In the case of gas tax rates, 
they find that the weighted average of neighboring states’ gas tax rates has no significant 
effect on state gas tax; however, the federal gas tax has a small positive effect on state gas 
tax. In this way, all these studies test competition in single commodity tax rates between 
state governments, and thus the findings of these studies cannot be used to understand if 
state governments engage in strategic competition in multiple tax rates. 
                                                            
8 The authors define an average effective tax rate as the ratio of the sum of sales tax and excise tax revenues 
to total consumption expenditures. 
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Furthermore, some studies have taken a different route and tested for tax 
competition among governments by estimating tax base functions, which relate a 
jurisdiction’s tax base to its own tax rates and neighbors’ tax rates. Buettner (2003), for 
example, estimates tax base functions to test business tax competition among German 
municipalities. He finds that a municipality’s business tax base depends on its own 
business tax rates and the tax rates of the neighboring municipalities. Similarly, 
considering fourteen western European countries over the period 1982–2004, Riedl and 
Rocha-Akis (2007) find that corporate income tax bases respond to foreign countries’ 
corporate income tax rates. However, these studies again look at strategic interaction 
among jurisdictions in only one tax base, and thus they do not suggest whether one tax 
base of jurisdictions responds to neighbors’ other tax bases.  
There are three papers that have estimated spatial reaction functions to test if there 
is strategic interaction in multiple fiscal policies among jurisdictions. Fredriksson et al. 
(2004), for example, investigate whether strategic interactions occur among state 
governments for tax, expenditure, and environmental policies. In particular, they examine 
three reaction functions: in the domestic region, the optimal choice of tax, expenditure 
and environmental polices reacts to changes in each of these policies in the neighboring 
region, and vice versa. Based on the US state-level panel data over the period 1977 to 
1994, they find that a state’s policy responds to neighbors’ policies for the same type as 
well as other types of policies, thereby confirming the presence of own and cross policy 
interactions among state governments. However, this article does not look at the presence 
of own and cross effects of various tax rates among state governments.  
Van Parys and Verbeke (2007) investigate whether municipal governments 
interact strategically with each other across two tax policy instruments rather than only 
within one tax policy instrument. In particular, their analysis focuses on personal income 
and property tax rates and uses panel data from Belgian municipalities over the period 
1991–2004. They find that a municipal’s personal income (property) tax rates respond 
positively to not only personal income (property) tax rates of competing municipalities, 
but also to property (personal income) tax rates of competing municipalities. However, 
74 
 
this study does not assess strategic interactions within and across cigarette, gas, sales and 
income tax rate policies among state governments of the United States. 
Devereux et al. (2008) develop a theoretical model that shows that multinational 
firms choose their capital stock in response to an effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), and 
simultaneously choose the location of their profit in response to differences in statutory 
tax rates. Based on this model, they analyze whether governments of 12 OECD countries 
engage in two-dimensional tax competition: over statutory tax rates for mobile profit and 
over effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) for capital. Their empirical estimations include 
two tax-reaction functions: statutory rates (or EMTRs) of the home country react to 
changes in both statutory rates and EMTRs of the foreign country. Using panel data over 
the period 1982–1999, they find that statutory tax rates of the home country depend on 
statutory tax rates of foreign countries, but do not depend on EMTRs of foreign countries. 
In contrast, depending on the type of weights used to define foreign rival country, they 
find that EMTR of the home country depends on foreign countries’ statutory tax rates as 
well as EMTRs. In this way, although this study examines two-dimensional tax 
competition in capital tax rates of national-level governments, it has not analyzed four-
dimensional tax competition in cigarette, gas, sales and income tax rates of state-level 
governments. 
In summary, most previous studies have addressed strategic competition among 
jurisdictions by estimating how one fiscal policy responds to neighbors’ same fiscal 
policy. In addition, a small number of recent studies have examined whether jurisdictions 
engage in strategic competition in multiple fiscal policies. However, none of these studies 
have looked at strategic competition in multiple tax policies among state governments of 
the US. Therefore, considering cigarette tax rates, gas tax rates, sales tax rates and 
income tax rates of the forty-eight contiguous states of the US over the period 
1977−2002, this paper analyzes how states’ tax rates on one tax base respond to the same 
tax base of neighboring states as well as other tax bases of neighboring states. 
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3.3 Theoretical Framework 
Here I develop a simple framework to consider the expected cross-border effects 
of taxes when states have multiple tax instruments. As will be evident, it is difficult to 
make theoretical predictions about these cross state effects. In an even simpler framework 
focused on property tax competition among local jurisdictions, Brueckner and Saavedra 
(2003) show that even with a single tax instrument, the sign of the tax reaction functions 
are ambiguous—theoretically, increases in neighboring jurisdictions’ taxes could increase 
a jurisdiction’s tax. Then, given the ambiguity obtained when there is only a single 
instrument, multiple instruments make results even more ambiguous. Still, I believe that 
my simple model and subsequent comparative static analysis using the model provides 
insights into what might be the expected results and allows for some interpretation of the 
results. 
With multiple tax instruments, inter-jurisdictional spillovers are possible among 
all tax bases. Then, as one might expect, without prior conditions on demand 
relationships, the impact of an increase in gas tax, for example, in one state on its 
neighbor’s gas or cigarette taxes are ambiguous. Here, then, I try to outline what factors 
affect the tax reactions and, in particular, highlight the relative impacts on the different 
bases. That is, how might an increase in the gas tax in one state affect the tax on income 
relative to the tax on gas in its neighboring state? 
To make any statement about the tax reactions, I have to posit how the tax rates 
are determined. I assume that state governments choose taxes to maximize the utility of a 
representative resident, essentially following the optimal tax framework (Diamond and 
Mirrlees, 1971). To keep the analysis as simple as possible, I assume that there are two 
taxed goods, 1 and 2, and two states, a and b. Let the tax revenue used to finance a public 
service be g. Then the state’s problem can be expressed as 
  
    
jkjjkjjjjjjjj
jjjj
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XXXXgts
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  (3.1) 
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where pi i=1,2 is the net price of good i, assumed to be the same in both states and 
invariant to changes in the tax rate. The tax rate by state j on good i is ji . Purchases of 
good i by residents of state j in state j are given by jjiX  and purchases by residents of 
state k in state j, j ≠ k is jkiX . The amount of purchases of both goods, both by state 
residents and residents of the other state, are assumed to be affected by taxes on either 
good in either state. 
Then the objective of state j is to maximize utility of a resident of its state 
purchasing goods in that state subject to a budget that considers tax revenue from the 
domestic state residents and residents of the other state. Then the first order conditions 
can be stated as 
 jkjjjjjjj XXXX jj 112211 11
         (3.2a) 
 jkjjjjjjj XXXX jj 222211 22
         (3.2b) 
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 , the change in purchases of good i in state j by residents of 
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 , where yj is 
the income of the representative resident of state j. Then solving for the tax rates gives 
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2222111 12


  HXXXXXX jjkjjjjjkjjjj jj      (3.3a) 
and 
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In the absence of cross-border shopping, equations (3.3a) and (3.3b) would yield 
the solution for the standard two-good optimal tax problem as in Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1980). However, cross-border shopping complicates the problem as the revenue 
collected from residents of the other state is considered, but the impact on their utility is 
not. 
If one assume linear demand equations, that is, the slopes of the demands for X1 
and X2 with respect to taxes j1  and j2 do not change with a change in k1 , and instead 
focus on the impacts of k1  on purchases in state j ( jkjjjkjj XXXX 2211 ,,, ) and on the shadow 
price θ, one can differentiate (3.2) to obtain: 
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Solving (3.4) gives 
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I denote the expected signs of each of the terms in equations (3.5a) and (3.5b). As 
indicated, a number of terms are indeterminate. There are two primary reasons for this 
indeterminacy. As suggested by (3.3a), an increase in the tax base for good 1 in state j 
 jX1  will tend to increase j1 given θj as well as other parameters. However, the increase 
in revenue will increase the public service lowering θj 
  2,1,0 i
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. In addition, while we expect an increase in k1 to increase purchases of good 1 in state j 
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While ambiguous, the results are suggestive. If exogenous increases in tax bases are 
generally used by the state government to increase public services rather than reduce tax 
rates 

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  and increases in k1 have little effect on the purchases of good 2 in 
state j, then (5a) suggests k
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>0 with the impact of an increase in k1 on j2 depending on 
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3.4 Empirical Specification 
In this section, I examine how states engage in strategic interaction in four tax 
bases: cigarette, gas, sales, and income taxes. First, I start by estimating how a home 
state’s rates on one tax base react to neighboring states’ rates on the same tax base. 
Second, I account for the home state rates on other tax bases to analyze how home state 
rates on one tax base respond to neighboring states’ rates on the same tax base. Third, I 
examine whether the home state rates on one tax base react to neighboring states’ rates on 
the same tax base and other tax bases. Lastly, I control for home state’s rates on other tax 
bases to estimate how home state’s rates on one tax base respond to neighboring states’ 
rates on the same and other tax bases. 
3.4.1 Strategic Interaction within One Tax Base 
As discussed earlier, most previous studies have examined tax-reaction functions 
that relate a state’s tax rates on a single base to other states’ tax rates on the same base. 
Following this approach, in the first set of equations I estimate, I want to ascertain the 
impact of tax rates of other states on a state’s own tax rates for the same tax base. The 
econometric specification of this tax-reaction function is as follows: 



ji
kittikititkjtijkkit vzxYwY ,,,,      (3.6)  
where Yit,k refers to tax rates of state i at period t for tax base k, and k = 1,2,3,4 that 
represents cigarette, gas, sales and income tax rates respectively; λk is a parameter 
measuring within tax-base effects; wij is the weight assigned to state j by state i; the term 
Yjt,k refers to a tax rate of neighboring state j of state i at period t for tax base k. The term
itx  represents a vector of state i’s socio-economic, political characteristics that is 
identical for each tax base k. In contrast, the term kitz , refers to a vector of state i’s 
characteristics at period t that is specific for each tax base k. The state effects, µi, control 
for all unobserved state characteristics that remain constant over time, while the time 
80 
 
effects, αt, account for all factors that affect all states in a given year. The error term vit,k 
is a mean zero, normally distributed random error. 
3.4.2 Strategic Interaction within One Tax Base along with Interdependence among 
Tax Bases within the Same State  
In addition to strategic interaction in the same tax base, states’ rates on one tax 
base may be related to their own rates on other tax bases. For instance, Agostini (2004) 
shows that sales tax rates are negatively affected by personal income and corporate tax 
rates within the same state. Thus, conditional on home states’ rates on other taxes, a 
second set of equations examines how a home state’s rates on one tax base respond to 
neighboring states’ rates on the same tax base. The equation to be estimated is specified 
as follows: 
 
 

ji
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km
mmitkjtijkkit vzxYYwY ,,
4
,,,    (3.7) 
where the subscript m refers to cigarettes, gas, sales and income tax rates such that m 
=1,2,3,4. The term Yit,m represents rates on tax base m of state i at period t; and δm is the 
parameter that measures the relationship between tax bases m and k within states. The 
remaining other variables are the same as in (3.6). 
3.4.3 Strategic Interaction across Multiple Tax Bases  
When setting tax rates on one base, do state governments consider neighboring 
states’ rates on other tax bases in addition to rates on their identical tax base? That is, for 
instance, does Kentucky’s government determine its cigarette tax rates by looking at 
neighboring states’ not only cigarette tax rates, but also at rates on gas, sales and income 
taxes? In order to determine answer to this question, I estimate the third set of reaction 
functions, where I relate a state’s tax rate to the neighboring states’ tax rates on the same 
base as well as other bases.  
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Here, the term Yjt,l refers to a tax rate of neighboring state j of state i at period t for tax 
base l, where l represents cigarette, gas, sales and income tax rates, and l =1,2,3,4; The 
term λl is a parameter measuring across tax base effects. The other variables are the same 
as in (3.6). 
3.4.4 Strategic Interaction across Multiple Tax Bases along with Interdependence 
among Tax Bases within the Same State  
 Based on equations (3.6) through (3.8), state rates on one tax base may be 
influenced by: (i) neighboring states’ rates on an identical tax base; (ii) rates on a state’s 
own other tax bases; or (iii) neighboring states’ rates on other tax bases. To collectively 
measure the impact of all these three factors on state rates on one tax base, the following 
fourth set of equations is estimated: 
  
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(3.9) 
where the variables are defined as before. 
3.4.5 Assigning Neighbor Weights 
Before estimating equations (3.6) through (3.9), I need to define which states are 
neighbors. There are two basic approaches to defining neighbors. In the first approach, 
also referred to as contiguity weight, contiguous states are defined as neighbors. That is, 
in all the above four sets of equations, I define the spatial weight as follows: wij=1/ni if 
state i and j are contiguous and zero if they are not, where ni represents total number of 
adjacent states of state i. The matrix is row normalized so that 1
 ji
ijw . This approach 
treats neighboring states with lightly and heavily populated borders equally. However, 
the tax competition between neighboring states with lightly populated borders may not be 
the same as the tax competition between neighboring states with heavily populated 
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borders. The presence of a heavily populated border represents a large number of 
potential cross-border populations, and thus, state tax rates may show more response to 
lower tax rates of neighboring states with heavily populated borders than to the lower tax 
rates of neighboring states with lightly populated borders. Therefore, in order to place 
more weight on neighbors with heavily populated borders, I consider the second 
approach to define neighbors.  
This second approach, also referred to as population contiguity weight, defines 
spatial weight in the following way:  iJj ji
ij
ij P
Pw if states i and j are contiguous and 
zero otherwise –where Pij refers to the population of states i and j that are 25 miles away 
from their common border, and Ji is the set of states bordering state i such that 
  iJj ijP represents the total population that is 25 miles away from the common border 
between state i and its neighbors.  
3.4.6 Econometric Issues 
There are a few econometric issues to be addressed when estimating equations 
(3.6)–(3.9). First, as all states determine their tax rates simultaneously, the tax rates of 
neighboring states are endogenous, implying that the ordinary least squares method will 
produce biased and inconsistent estimates. Second, there is the possible presence of 
spatial autocorrelation in the error term. That is, in equations (3.6)–(3.9), the error term 
vit,k follows the relationship: 
kitktikit vMv ,,,    
where ε is the well-behaved normal error vector, and θ is the spatial auto-regressive 
coefficient. Such spatial correlation can arise when unobserved variables affecting tax 
rates are themselves spatially dependent. One way to address both of these econometric 
issues is by using an instrumental variable (IV) approach (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; 
Brueckner, 2003). This approach generates consistent estimates even in the presence of 
spatial error dependence. Some strategic interaction studies that have used this approach 
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are Rork (2003) and Devereux et al. (2007). Following these previous empirical papers, I 
use the weighted average of the neighbors’ exogenous variables as instruments for 
neighbors’ tax rates, where the weight used for instruments is the same as that used in the 
average neighbors’ tax rates.  
A third issue is that as rates on all tax bases are jointly determined within the 
same state, a state’s rates on other tax bases are endogenous in equations (3.7) and (3.9). 
That is, for instance, when considering cigarette tax rates as a dependent variable in 
equation (3.7), any observed correlation between the state’s cigarette and sales (or gas or 
income) tax rates may be due to reverse causation. One way to solve this simultaneity 
problem is by using instrumental variables, which is, however, a difficult task. In 
particular, I need at least one unique control variable for each tax base’s tax rates so that I 
can use this control variable(s) as instrument(s) to identify the coefficients of the 
endogenous domestic state’s tax rates in equations (3.7) and (3.9). Therefore, on the right 
hand side of equations (3.6)–(3.9), I add the term kitz , that includes control variable(s), 
which is expected to influence only specific tax rates. These control variables are used as 
instrumental variables to identify the effect of a state’s taxes on one another. The 
variables that are in kitz , are explained in more detail in the Data section.  
Similarly, a fourth issue is that as rates on all tax bases are determined at the same 
time across states, rates on other tax bases of neighboring states are endogenous in 
equations (3.8) and (3.9). This problem is solved by using an instrumental variable 
approach, where the weighted average of the neighboring states’ control variable(s), 
,,kitz  which are specific to each tax rate, are used as instruments to identify endogenous 
neighboring states’ rates on other tax bases. The weight used for instruments is same as 
that used in the weighted average of neighboring states’ tax rates. 
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3.5 Data 
3.5.1 Variable Descriptions 
In this study, I use data on the forty-eight contiguous states from 1977 to 20029. 
For measures of tax rates, I use the statutory tax rates for cigarette tax rates, gas tax rates, 
and sales tax rates. Since states impose a range of tax rates for different individual 
income tax brackets, I consider top (statutory) marginal income tax rate as a proxy for 
states’ income tax rates.  
Independent variables that characterize the demographic, political, and economic 
characteristics of the state, itx , in equations (3.6)–(3.9) include total population, the 
percentage of population over the age of sixty-five, the percentage of population under 
the age of eighteen, income per capita, the current unemployment rate, per capita federal 
grants, per capita outstanding debt, per capita gross state product, a dummy variable 
indicated by a one if the governor of a state is Democrat and a zero otherwise, a dummy 
variable indicated by a one if it is an election year for the governor position in a state and 
a zero otherwise, and the percentage of Democrats in the House.  
Also included are factors, kitz , , that are expected to influence only specific tax 
rates. For instance, when the cigarette tax rate is the dependent variable, kitz ,  includes 
states’ tobacco production values. It is predicted that the tobacco production values of a 
state will have negative influences on state cigarette tax rates. Tobacco producers are 
expected to promote demand for tobacco so that they can continue producing it. One way 
to achieve this goal is by having lower cigarette tax rates in states. A lower cigarette tax 
rate of state reduces the cost of cigarettes to cigarette consumers, which may then 
increase or at least sustain the demand for cigarettes and tobacco in the state.  
                                                            
9 Since Alaska and Hawaii do not share borders with any other state, I do not include these states in my 
panel data. 
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Similarly, when the gas tax rate is the dependent variable, kitz ,  includes states’ 
total number of motor vehicle registrations. It is expected that states’ total number of 
motor vehicle registrations would have negative impacts on gas tax rates. When a state 
has a higher number of motor vehicle registrations, it is able to collect higher amount of 
revenues from motor vehicle registration fees. If more revenues are generated from motor 
vehicle registrations, the state requires less need to increase its gas tax rates to finance its 
transportation expenditures.  
In the case of sales tax rates as the dependent variable, kitz , includes the 
percentage of gross state product from hotels and other lodging places. The percentage of 
gross state product from hotels and other lodging places is a proxy for the fraction of total 
consumption by people from other states. A state may want to export some of its sales tax 
burden to consumers from outside states, and thus, it is predicted that the state with the 
higher percentage of gross state product from hotels and other lodging places will have 
higher sales tax rates. 
 When the income tax rates is the dependent variable, kitz , includes adjustment for 
residence and a dummy variable indicating whether the state has a reciprocity agreement 
with another state. The adjustment for residence represents the net inflow of earnings of 
inter-area commuters. For example, the adjustment for residence of Alabama is the 
difference between amount that residence of Alabama earns from job in other states less 
the amount that residence of other states earn from jobs in Alabama. It is considered that 
adjustment for residence would have two opposite effects on income tax rates. If states 
are motivated to shift some of their income tax burdens to nonresident workers, then it is 
expected that states with lower amount of adjustment for residence would have higher 
income tax rates. However, if states consider that nonresident workers increase their 
individual income tax bases, then they may reduce income tax rates to attract more 
nonresident workers to work in their states. In such case, it is expected that the lower the 
value of a state’s adjustment of residence, the lower the income tax rates of the state. It is 
not a priori clear which effect will dominate income tax rates. Meanwhile, it is expected 
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that reciprocity agreement would have a negative influence on states’ income tax rates. 
Reciprocity agreement allows a person’s income to be taxed in a state of her residence 
even though it is earned in another state. Since nonresident workers no longer contribute 
to the individual income tax base of states that have reciprocity agreements with other 
states, these states are less likely to decrease their income tax rates to gain nonresident 
workers. 
3.5.2  Data Sources 
 Data for my variables came from various sources. Cigarette, gas, and sales tax 
rates data were obtained from the World Tax Database (WTD) of the University of 
Michigan. There were missing gas tax rates for some states for 1997 in the WTD website. 
Thus, I collected those missing gas tax rates data by contacting each state government 
official. Top marginal income tax rates data were obtained from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA).  
 Data for per capita outstanding debt, per capita federal grant to the state, the 
proportion of young population, and the proportion of old population were obtained from 
the U.S. Census Bureau, while data for state’s total population, gross state product, gross 
state product from hotels, adjustment for residence, and per capita income were collected 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). State motor vehicle registrations data 
were obtained from the United States Department of Transportation - Federal Highway 
Administration. Data on tobacco production value were collected from the United States 
Department of Agriculture – National Agricultural Statistics Service. Unemployment rate 
data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, while reciprocity data were 
collected from Rork and Wagner (2007). Data related to a state’s political environment 
such as the political party of the governor, the percentage of Democrats in the House, and 
the dummy variable indicating if the year of observation was an election year for the 
governor position in a state were obtained from the University of Kentucky Center for 
Poverty Research and the U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
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To construct population contiguity weights, I identify which counties of a state 
and its neighboring states are twenty five miles away from their common border 
(Holmes, 2008). Then, I obtain the population of all these counties in 1977. In this way, I 
determine a state’s and its neighboring states’ population living twenty-five miles from 
their common border. Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics. The mean cigarette tax 
rates, gas tax rates, sales tax rates, and top marginal income tax rates for forty-eight 
contiguous states from 1977 to 2002 are about twenty-four cents per package, fifteen 
cents per gallon, 4.34 percent, and six percent, respectively.  
Table 3.1—Descriptive Statistics, 1977–2002 
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Cigarette Tax State's cigarette tax rate (dollar per 
package) 
0.239 0.183 
Gas Tax State's gasoline tax rate (dollar per gallon) 0.149 0.058 
Sales Tax State's sales tax rate (percent) 4.338 1.688 
Income Tax State's top marginal Income tax rate 
(percent) 
5.990 3.81 
Population Total state population (in million)  5.191 5.463 
Elderly Percentage of state population over 65 
years old 
12.708 2.200 
Young Percentage of state population 5-17 years 
old 
19.464 1.909 
Income per capita State's income per capita (in thousands of 
dollars) 
17.867 7.276 
Unemployment State's Unemployment rate (in percent) 5.941 2.044 
Grant per capita Grant per capita (in thousands of dollars) 0.577 0.322 
Debt per capita Outstanding debt per capita (in current 
dollars) 
3.048 1.608 
Gross State Product  
per capita 
Gross state product (GSP) per capita  
(in thousands of dollars) 
21.031 8.597 
Party of Governor Party of the Governor (=1 if Democrats; 0 
= other) 
0.519  
Election Year Election year (=1 if year t was an election 
year for the state’s governor position; 0 = 
other) 
0.274  
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Table 3.1 continued 
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Democrats in the 
House 
Percentage of state House that is 
Democratic 
56.392 19.610 
Tobacco 
Production 
Tobacco production value (in billions of 
dollars) 
0.053 0.177 
Motor Vehicle 
Registration 
Motor vehicle registrations (in million) 3.865 3.985 
Hotels Percentage of state's GSP generated by 
hotels and other lodging places  
1.020 1.844 
Residence Adjustment for Residence (in billions of 
dollars) 
0.380 4.120 
Reciprocity Reciprocity Agreement (1= yes; 0= no) 0.280  
 
In addition, Table 3.2 demonstrates how cigarette tax rates, gas tax rates, sales tax 
rates, and income tax rates vary in the forty-eight contiguous states and seven U.S. census 
divisions in years 1977 and 2002. It also reports the number of times that each tax rate 
had changed across the forty-eight contiguous states and seven U.S. census divisions over 
the period 1977 to 2002.  
In the case of cigarette tax rates, table 3.2 shows that Kentucky, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina had the lowest cigarette tax rates of less than eight cents per 
package in both 1977 and 2002. Connecticut and Massachusetts had the highest cigarette 
tax rates of twenty-one cents per package in 1977, while New Jersey and New York had 
the highest cigarette tax rates of one dollar and fifty cents in 2002. Moreover, during 
these twenty-six years, while Georgia, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee had no change 
in their cigarette tax rates, Washington and Rhode Island had the highest number of 
changes in their cigarette tax rates. 
In the case of gas tax rates, Texas had the lowest gas tax rates of five cents per 
gallon in 1977, and Florida set the lowest gas tax rates of four cents per gallon in 2002. 
Connecticut had the highest gas tax rates of eleven cents per gallon in 1977, and Rhode 
Island scored the highest gas tax rates of twenty-eight cents per gallon in 2002. Over 
these twenty-six years, Nebraska changed its gas tax rates around twenty-two times, 
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while Georgia had no change in its gas tax rates. There were also forty-one states that 
changed their gas tax rates more than three times during 1977 to 2002. In addition, states 
on average changed their gas tax rates about seven times over these twenty-six periods. 
In the case of sales tax rates, there were four states that did not have sales tax rates 
between 1977 and 2002 – Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon. For the 
states that did have sales tax rates, New York, New Jersey and Oklahoma had the lowest 
sales tax rates of two percent in 1977, while Colorado imposed the lowest sales tax rates 
of 2.9 percent in 2002. Connecticut set the highest sales tax rates of seven percent in 
1977, while Mississippi and Rhode Island imposed the highest sales tax rates of seven 
percent in 2002. Five states experienced no changes in their sales tax rates over these 
twenty-six years: Maryland, Alabama, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. On 
the contrary, four states changed their sales tax rates the highest five times over the 
period 1977 to 2002. 
In the case of income tax rates, there were eight states that did not levy individual 
income tax rates during 1977 to 2002 – Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. In 1977, Vermont had the highest top 
marginal income tax rates of eighteen percent, but Montana imposed the highest top 
marginal income tax rates of eleven percent in 2002. States on average changed their 
highest top marginal income tax rates about three times between 1977 and 2002. 
Moreover, for the states that did have income tax rates, eight states did not change their 
top marginal income tax rates, while twenty states changed their top marginal income tax 
rates more than three times over these twenty-six years.  
Furthermore, Table 2 also shows that during the period 1977 to 2002, while the 
East South Central division had the lowest number of changes in cigarette and income tax 
rates, the New England division had the highest number of changes in cigarette and 
income tax rates. Similarly, the Middle Atlantic division had the lowest number of 
changes in gas and sales tax rates, but the divisions of Mountain and West North Central 
scored some of the highest number of changes in gas and sales tax rates during 1977 to 
2002.   
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Table 3.2—A Comparison of State Tax Rates 
Census Divisions 
and State 
Cigarette tax Gas tax Sales tax Income tax 
1977 2002
Number 
of tax 
changes1 1977 2002 
Number 
of tax 
changes1 1977 2002
Number 
of tax 
changes1 1977 2002
Number 
of tax 
changes1
New England 0.17 0.94 32 0.09 0.22 43 4.33 4.67 9 7.17 6.20 37 
    Connecticut 0.21 1.11 6 0.11 0.25 15 7 6 3 0 4.5 2 
    Maine 0.16 1.00 6 0.09 0.22 5 5 5 3 8 8.5 4 
    Massachusetts 0.21 0.76 3 0.085 0.21 5 5 5 0 5 5.3 4 
    New Hampshire 0.12 0.52 4 0.09 0.18 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    Rhode Island 0.18 1.32 8 0.1 0.28 7 6 7 1 12 9.65 15 
    Vermont 0.12 0.93 5 0.09 0.19 6 3 5 2 18 9.26 12 
Middle Atlantic 0.17 1.10 13 0.08 0.10 7 5.00 5.33 3 6.67 5.34 19 
    New Jersey 0.19 1.5 6 0.08 0.105 3 5 6 3 3 6.37 5 
    New York 0.15 1.5 6 0.08 0.08 2 4 4 0 15 6.85 7 
    Pennsylvania 0.18 0.31 1 0.09 0.12 2 6 6 0 2 2.8 7 
East North Central 0.12 0.72 21 0.08 0.20 41 4.00 5.45 6 5.00 4.95 35 
    Illinois 0.12 0.98 5 0.075 0.19 4 4 6.25 2 3 3 4 
    Indiana 0.06 0.56 3 0.08 0.15 5 4 5 1 2 3.4 4 
    Michigan 0.11 0.75 3 0.09 0.19 4 4 6 1 5 4.1 8 
    Ohio 0.15 0.55 4 0.07 0.22 8 4 5 1 4 7.5 13 
    Wisconsin 0.16 0.77 6 0.07 0.273 20 4 5 1 11 6.75 6 
West North Central 0.12 0.40 28 0.08 0.21 58 3.29 4.95 22 8.86 5.93 31 
   Iowa 0.13 0.36 5 0.07 0.2 7 3 5 2 13 8.98 2 
   Kansas 0.11 0.7 3 0.08 0.21 8 3 4.9 3 7 6.45 5 
   Minnesota 0.18 0.48 4 0.09 0.2 5 4 6.5 3 15 7.85 7 
Notes: 1Number of times that a tax rate had changed during 1977−2002. 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
Census Divisions 
and State 
Cigarette tax Gas tax Sales tax Income tax 
1977 2002 
Number 
of tax 
changes 1977 2002 
Number 
of tax 
changes 1977 2002 
Number 
of tax 
changes 1977 2002 
Number 
of tax 
changes 
   Missouri 0.09 0.17 2 0.07 0.17 5 3 4.23 3 6 6 0 
   Nebraska 0.13 0.34 4 0.085 0.245 22 3 5 5 11 6.68 11 
   North Dakota 0.11 0.44 6 0.07 0.21 6 3 5 4 10 5.54 6 
   South Dakota 0.12 0.33 4 0.08 0.22 5 4 4 2 0 0 0 
South Atlantic 0.10 0.25 12 0.09 0.17 48 3.13 4.19 8 6.50 5.53 21 
   Delaware 0.14 0.24 1 0.09 0.23 7 0 0 0 11 5.95 9 
   Florida 0.17 0.34 3 0.08 0.04 5 4 6 2 0 0 0 
   Georgia 0.12 0.12 0 0.075 0.075 0 3 4 1 6 6 0 
   Maryland 0.1 1 5 0.09 0.235 4 5 5 0 5 4.75 6 
   North Carolina 0.02 0.05 1 0.09 0.242 17 3 4 1 7 8.25 2 
   South Carolina 0.06 0.07 1 0.08 0.16 6 4 5 1 7 7 0 
   Virginia 0.03 0.03 0 0.09 0.175 5 3 3.5 1 6 5.75 1 
   West Virginia 0.12 0.17 1 0.085 0.205 4 3 6 2 10 6.5 3 
East South Central 0.10 0.13 3 0.08 0.17 20 4.63 5.75 5 3.75 4.00 1 
   Alabama 0.12 0.17 2 0.07 0.16 2 4 4 0 5 5 0 
   Kentucky 0.03 0.03 0 0.09 0.15 4 5 6 1 6 6 0 
   Mississippi 0.11 0.18 1 0.09 0.18 3 5 7 2 4 5 1 
   Tennessee 0.13 0.13 0 0.07 0.2 11 4.5 6 2 0 0 0 
West South Central 0.15 0.31 13 0.07 0.19 20 3.00 4.97 13 4.75 4.91 3 
   Arkansas 0.18 0.34 4 0.085 0.215 6 3 5.13 4 7 7 0 
   Louisiana 0.11 0.24 3 0.08 0.2 2 3 4 1 6 6 0 
   Oklahoma 0.13 0.23 2 0.066 0.16 9 2 4.5 4 6 6.65 3 
   Texas 0.19 0.41 4 0.05 0.2 3 4 6.25 4 0 0 0 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
Census Divisions 
and State 
Cigarette tax Gas tax Sales tax Income tax 
1977 2002 
Number 
of tax 
changes 1977 2002 
Number 
of tax 
changes 1977 2002 
Number 
of tax 
changes 1977 2002 
Number 
of tax 
changes 
Mountain 0.10 0.33 25 0.08 0.21 63 3.00 4.22 21 6.50 5.46 18 
   Arizona 0.13 0.58 3 0.08 0.18 6 4 5.6 2 8 5.04 5 
   Colorado 0.1 0.2 4 0.07 0.22 7 3 2.9 3 8 4.63 4 
   Idaho 0.09 0.28 2 0.095 0.25 9 3 5 3 8 7.8 3 
   Montana 0.12 0.18 4 0.078 0.27 8 0 0 0 11 11 0 
   Nevada 0.1 0.35 3 0.06 0.24 13 3 6.5 2 0 0 0 
   New Mexico 0.12 0.21 2 0.07 0.17 9 4 5 5 9 8.2 3 
   Utah 0.08 0.7 6 0.07 0.245 7 4 4.75 5 8 7 3 
   Wyoming 0.08 0.12 1 0.08 0.13 4 3 4 1 0 0 0 
Pacific 0.12 0.99 17 0.08 0.22 23 3.12 4.17 8 7.00 6.10 4 
   California 0.1 0.87 3 0.07 0.18 6 4.75 6 5 11 9.3 3 
   Oregon 0.09 0.68 5 0.07 0.24 11 0 0 0 10 9 1 
   Washington 0.16 1.43 9 0.09 0.23 6 4.6 6.5 3 0 0 0 
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3.6 Results 
Tables 3.3–3.6 show results from estimating equations (3.6) to (3.9) for rates on 
four tax bases I consider. Each table contains four columns, corresponding to four 
dependent variables that are cigarette tax rates, gas tax rates, sales tax rates and income 
tax rates. These results are based on population contiguity weights. Overall, I find that a 
home state’s cigarette tax rates are positively affected by neighboring states’ cigarette tax 
rates in all specifications. For rates on other tax bases, the impacts on the home state tax 
rates from neighboring states’ rates on the same tax base or other tax bases are sensitive 
to an inclusion of rates on other tax bases of neighboring states or the home state. Thus, I 
consider that the impacts of neighboring states’ tax rates on the home state tax rates to be 
noteworthy if the coefficients on the neighboring states’ tax rates are found significant in 
the last specification (3.9), which is a complete model that accounts for both home states’ 
rates on other tax bases and neighboring states’ rates on the same tax base and other tax 
bases. Thus, based on the results from the last specification, while I find that the home 
state gas tax rates respond positively to neighboring states’ gas tax rates, I find that the 
home state sales and income tax rates do not respond to neighboring states’ sales and 
income tax rates, respectively. In terms of strategic interaction across multiple tax rates, I 
find that the home state rates on one tax base respond to neighboring states’ rates on other 
tax bases for rates on all four tax bases. 
Table 3.3 shows the results from estimating equation (3.6), which relates state tax 
rates only to neighboring states’ same tax rates. Before discussing the results of this table, 
note that in each column, neighboring states’ average tax rates are instrumented with a 
selection of the weighted average of neighboring states’ exogenous variables. In each 
column, the F-statistic shows that the instruments are jointly significant in the first state 
regressions. Moreover, the test of over-identification does not reject the validity of the 
instruments in each column. Consistent with most previous studies in tax competition, the 
results from Table 3.3 demonstrate that neighboring states’ tax rates have significant 
effects on a home state tax rates for cigarette tax rates and income tax rates. The 
coefficient on the weighted average of neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates is 0.634; that 
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is, a one dollar increase in neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates would induce a sixty-
three cent increase in the home state’s cigarette tax rates. In contrast, the coefficient on 
the weighted average of neighboring states’ income tax rates is -0.36, which indicates 
that for every one percent increase in a neighboring state’s income tax rate, there is about 
a 0.36 percent reduction in the home state’s income tax rates. The coefficient on the 
weighted average of neighboring states’ gas tax rates and sales tax rates are insignificant, 
thereby suggesting that there are no tax competition among states for gas tax rates and 
sales tax rates. 
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Table 3.3—Strategic Interaction within One Tax Base considering population contiguity 
weights 
 Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.634 
(10.71)*** 
   
Neighbor Gas Tax  0.119 
(0.77) 
  
Neighbor Sales Tax   -0.149 
(-1.2) 
 
Neighbor Income Tax    -0.36 
(-3.84)*** 
F-test 65.86 19.57 23.13 28.19 
Over-identification test 0.71 0.96 0.99 0.28 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes. 
1. t-statistics appear in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes 
significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. 
2. Other variables and controls include population, elderly, young, income per capita, 
unemployment, grant per capita, party of governor, election year, House Democrats, 
years fixed effects and state fixed effects. Additional control variable(s) consists of 
tobacco production for Column (1), motor vehicle registration for Column (2), hotels for 
Column (3), and residence and reciprocity for Column (4).  
3. Instruments. Column (1): weighted average of neighbors' population, elderly, young, 
income per capita, unemployment rate, House Democrats, debt per capita, tobacco 
production; Column (2): weighted average of neighbors' elderly, unemployment rate, 
House Democrats, motor  vehicle registration, and gross state product per capita; Column 
(3): weighted average of neighbors' elderly, income per capita, grant per capita, party of 
governor, debt per capita, gross state product per capita, and hotels; Column (4): 
weighted average of neighbors' population, elderly, young, income per capita, 
unemployment rate, House Democrats, debt per capita, residence, and reciprocity.  
4. The F-statistic is the test of excluded instruments obtained from the first-stage 
equation. A standard test of over-identification is presented; the test statistic is distributed 
as χ2 (d) where d is the degrees of freedom – the table presents the p-value. 
5. Detailed estimates are reported in Table B2.1 in Appendix B. 
 
Table 3.4 presents the results from estimating equation (3.7), which includes a 
home state’s rates on other tax bases to examine the relationship between neighboring 
states’ tax rates and home state’s tax rates on the same base. Column (1) shows that 
neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates still have positive effects on the home state’s 
cigarette tax rates. In addition, gas tax rates of the home state also have positive impacts 
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on its cigarette tax, thus suggesting that cigarette tax rates and gas tax rates are 
complement taxes within the same state. Column (2) demonstrates that neighboring 
states’ gas tax rates have a positive effect on home state’s gas tax rates. An increase in 
one dollar in a neighboring state’s gas tax rates would tend to increase the home state’s 
gas tax rates by around one dollar and thirty-five cents. The cigarette tax rates of the 
home state have a positive influence on its gas tax rates, thus indicating that cigarette tax 
rates and gas tax rates are complement taxes within the same state. Similarly, income tax 
rates also have positive influences on gas tax rates within the same state. Column (3) 
reveals that sales tax rates in neighboring states’ have no significant effect on sales tax 
rates in the home state. However, within the same state, while sales tax rates are found to 
be substitute tax rates of gas tax rates, they are found to be complement tax rates of 
income tax rates. Column (4) shows that the home state’s income tax rates are negatively 
affected by neighboring states’ income tax rates. Moreover, it also indicates that income 
tax rates of the home state are negatively influenced by its cigarette tax rates. Thus, this 
suggests that income tax rates and cigarette tax rates are substitute taxes within the same 
state. 
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Table 3.4—Strategic Interaction within One Tax Base along with Interdependence among 
Tax Bases within the Same State considering population contiguity weights 
 Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.636 
(9.37)*** 
   
Neighbor Gas Tax  1.348 
(3.29)*** 
  
Neighbor Sales Tax   0.11 
(0.66) 
 
Neighbor Income Tax    -0.331 
(-2.65)*** 
Cigarette Tax  0.098 
(2.11)** 
0.847 
(1.43) 
-5.042 
(-4.17)*** 
Gas Tax 1.608 
(5.08)*** 
 -6.194 
(-3.07)*** 
5.5 
(0.84) 
Sales Tax -0.01 
(-0.49) 
-0.016 
(-1.46) 
 -0.308 
(-0.58) 
Income Tax -0.002 
(-0.26) 
0.021 
(4.11)*** 
0.084 
(2.44)** 
 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes. 
1. t-statistics appear in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes 
significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%.  
2. See notes in Table 3.3 for control variables. 
3. Instruments. Column (1): weighted average of neighbors' population, elderly, young, 
income per capita, unemployment rate, House Democrats, debt per capita, tobacco 
production, and state’s own motor vehicle registration, hotels, residence, and reciprocity; 
Column (2): weighted average of neighbors' elderly, unemployment rate, House 
Democrats, motor  vehicle registration, gross state product per capita, and state’s own 
tobacco production, hotels, residence, and reciprocity; Column (3): weighted average of 
neighbors' elderly, income per capita, grant per capita, party of governor, debt per capita, 
gross state product per capita, hotels, and state’s own tobacco production, motor  vehicle 
registration, residence, and reciprocity; Column (4): weighted average of neighbors' 
population, elderly, young, income per capita, unemployment rate, House Democrats, 
debt per capita, residence, reciprocity, and state’s own tobacco production, motor vehicle 
registration, and hotels. 
4. Detailed estimates are reported in Table B2.2 in Appendix B. 
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Table 3.5 reports the results from estimating equation (3.8) that relates a home 
state one tax rate to neighboring states’ same and different tax rates. Column (1) shows 
that cigarette tax rates in neighboring states have significant positive effects on the home 
state cigarette tax rates. However, neighboring states’ gas tax rates, sales tax rates and 
income tax rates do not have significant effects on the home state cigarette tax rates. This 
suggests that cigarette tax rates in the home state do not react to changes in neighboring 
states’ rates on other tax bases. Column (2) reveals that gas tax rates in the home state 
depend positively to neighboring states’ gas tax rates. Moreover, gas tax rates in the 
home state also depend on sales tax rates and income tax rates in neighboring states. An 
increase in one percent sales tax rates in neighboring states is expected to increase gas tax 
rates in the home state by around three cents. On the contrary, an increase in one percent 
in neighboring states’ income tax rates is predicted to decrease gas tax rates in the home 
state by about one cent. Column (3) demonstrates that neighboring states’ sales tax rates 
have significant negative impacts on the home state sales tax rates. This result is different 
from the ones that are obtained in column (3) of previous tables, which have shown that 
there is no significant effect of an increase in neighboring states’ sales tax rates on the 
home state sales tax rates. Besides, column (3) of this table also show that cigarette tax 
rates and gas tax rates in neighboring states have significant negative effects on sales tax 
rates in the home state. Column (4) illustrates that neighboring states’ income tax rates 
have negative effects on the home state’s income tax rates; however, the coefficient on 
neighboring states’ income tax rates is not significant. Furthermore, cigarette tax rates 
and gas tax rates of neighboring states have significant negative effects on the home 
state’s income tax rates, while sales tax rates of neighboring states have significant 
positive effects on the home state income tax rates. 
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Table 3.5—Strategic Interaction over Multiple Tax Bases considering population 
contiguity weights 
 Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.592 
(9.15)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.82) 
-0.992 
(-2.40)** 
-2.353 
(-2.15)** 
Neighbor Gas Tax 0.443 
(0.78) 
0.472 
(2.66)*** 
-4.999 
(-1.70)* 
-34.499 
(-3.68)*** 
Neighbor Sales Tax -0.031 
(-1.04) 
0.026 
(2.51)** 
-0.398 
(-2.65)*** 
0.852 
(1.79)* 
Neighbor Income Tax -0.005 
(-0.7) 
-0.01 
(-4.71)*** 
-0.051 
(-1.51) 
-0.057 
(-0.46) 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes. 
1. t-statistics appear in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes 
significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. 
2. See notes in Table 3.3 for control variables. 
3. Instruments. Column (1): weighted average of neighbors' population, elderly, young, 
income per capita, unemployment rate, House Democrats, debt per capita, tobacco 
production, motor vehicle registration, hotels, residence, and reciprocity; Column (2): 
weighted average of neighbors' elderly, unemployment rate, House Democrats, motor  
vehicle registration, gross state product per capita, tobacco production, hotels, residence, 
and reciprocity; Column (3): weighted average of neighbors' elderly, income per capita, 
grant per capita, party of governor, debt per capita, gross state product per capita, hotels, 
tobacco production, motor  vehicle registration, residence, and reciprocity; Column (4): 
weighted average of neighbors' population, elderly, young, income per capita, 
unemployment rate, House Democrats, debt per capita, residence, reciprocity, tobacco 
production, motor vehicle registration, and hotels. 
4. Detailed estimates are reported in Table B2.3 in Appendix B. 
 
Table 3.6 provides the regression results from estimating the complete model, 
which is equation (3.9). Column (1) presents clear evidence that cigarette tax rates in 
neighboring states still have positive effects on the home state cigarette tax rates. 
Moreover, unlike in column (1) of Table 3.5, it shows that one percent increase in 
neighboring states’ sales tax rates is expected to decrease home state’s cigarette tax rates 
by around eight cents, thereby inferring that a state cigarette tax rates react to changes in 
neighboring states’ rates on other tax bases. Column (2) demonstrates that neighboring 
states’ gas tax rates still have positive effects on home state gas tax rates. Furthermore, 
one percent increase in neighboring states’ sales tax rates is expected to increase home 
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state gas tax rates by around three cents, thereby suggesting that these two taxes are 
strategic complement taxes. Similarly, as neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates and 
income tax rates have negative effects on home state gas tax rates, cigarette tax rates and 
income tax rates are strategic substitute taxes of gas tax rates. Column (3) reveals that 
sales tax rates and income tax rates are strategic substitute taxes, thereby suggesting that 
if income tax rates of neighboring states increase by one percent, sales tax rates of the 
home state would decrease by around 0.09 percent. Column (4) indicates that one cent 
increase in neighboring states’ gas tax rates would increase home state’s income tax rates 
by around 0.3 percent, thereby suggesting that these two taxes are strategic substitute 
taxes.  
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Table 3.6—Strategic Interaction over Multiple Tax Bases along with Interdependence 
among Tax Bases within the Same State considering population contiguity weights 
 Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.514 
(7.27)*** 
-0.102 
(-3.21)*** 
-0.602 
(-1.31) 
0.352 
(0.16) 
Neighbor Gas Tax -0.244 
(-0.42) 
0.435 
(2.03)** 
1.521 
(0.48) 
-31.622 
(-3.40)*** 
Neighbor Sales Tax -0.082 
(-2.98)*** 
0.029 
(3.18)*** 
-0.108 
(-0.73) 
0.749 
(1.03) 
Neighbor Income Tax -0.0003  
(-0.03) 
-0.008 
(-2.29)** 
-0.085 
(-2.23)** 
0.034 
(0.2) 
Cigarette Tax  0.143 
(3.51)*** 
0.657 
(1.19) 
-3.855 
(-1.70)* 
Gas Tax 1.375 
(4.08)*** 
 -5.643 
(-2.96)*** 
8.051 
(0.97) 
Sales Tax -0.021 
(-0.91) 
-0.008 
(-1.08) 
 0.485 
(0.56) 
Income Tax -0.007 
(-0.8) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
0.021 
(0.49) 
 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes. 
1. t-statistics appear in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes 
significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. 
2. See notes in Table 3.3 for control variables.  
3. Instruments. Column (1): weighted average of neighbors' population, elderly, young, 
income per capita, unemployment rate, House Democrats, debt per capita, tobacco 
production, motor vehicle registration, hotels, residence, reciprocity, and state’s own 
motor vehicle registration, hotels, residence, and reciprocity; Column (2): weighted 
average of neighbors' elderly, unemployment rate, House Democrats, motor  vehicle 
registration, gross state product per capita, tobacco production, hotels, residence, 
reciprocity, and state’s own tobacco production, hotels, residence, and reciprocity; 
Column (3): weighted average of neighbors' elderly, income per capita, grant per capita, 
party of governor, debt per capita, gross state product per capita, hotels, tobacco 
production, motor  vehicle registration, residence, reciprocity and state’s own tobacco 
production, motor  vehicle registration, residence, and reciprocity; Column (4): weighted 
average of neighbors' population, elderly, young, income per capita, unemployment rate, 
House Democrats, debt per capita, residence, reciprocity, tobacco production, motor 
vehicle registration, hotels, and state’s own tobacco production, motor vehicle 
registration, and hotels. 
4. Detailed estimates are reported in Table B2.4 in Appendix B. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
Motivated by the question of how state governments compensate for the forgone 
excise tax revenues due to excise tax competition, I examine whether state governments 
engage in strategic competition in several tax bases to maintain their balanced budgets. 
Using a panel of the United States’ state-level data for the period 1977–2002, I estimate 
reaction functions not for a single tax rate but multiple tax rates. Specifically, I analyze 
how rates on one tax base respond to neighboring states’ rates on the same and other tax 
bases. The results from this analysis suggest that strategic interaction occurs not only 
within the same tax base but also across different tax bases among state governments. For 
example, in terms of strategic interaction within the same tax base among state 
governments, I find that a home state responds to neighboring states’ lower cigarette tax 
rates and gas tax rates by decreasing its own cigarette tax rates and gas tax rates, 
respectively. Hence, these findings present evidence of a “race to the bottom” in the state 
cigarette tax rates and gas tax rates, consistent with previous work such as Rork (2003). 
On the contrary, I find that the home state’s sales tax rates and income tax rates do not 
react to neighboring states’ sales tax rates and income tax rates, respectively. These 
results are not surprising because sales tax rates and income tax rates have less mobile tax 
bases than cigarette tax rates and gas tax rates, and thus, states are less inclined to adjust 
their sales and income tax rates in response to changes in neighboring states’ sales and 
income tax rates, respectively. 
In terms of strategic interaction across different tax rates among state 
governments, I find that the home state responds to neighboring states’ higher sales tax 
rates by decreasing its cigarette tax rates, and it reacts to higher income tax rates of 
neighboring states by decreasing its sales or gas tax rates. Moreover, the home state’s 
income tax rates are negatively influenced by neighboring states’ gas tax rates, thereby 
suggesting that if there is “a race to the bottom” in competitive taxes such as gas tax 
rates, states would adjust rates on less competitive taxes such as income tax rates to 
substitute for lower gas tax rates. 
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In this way, this study shows how one tax rate substitutes or complements the 
same or other tax rates of neighboring states. This finding can be helpful for state 
governments to gain better understanding of the impacts of neighboring states’ tax rates 
on their state revenues. Furthermore, this analysis not only contributes to the growing 
empirical literature on fiscal competition by showing that strategic interactions among 
state governments are not confined to only single identical tax rate, but also suggests that 
studies that ignore strategic interaction across multiple tax rates may not reveal the 
overall degree of strategic competition in tax rates among state governments. 
 For future research, since states have freedom to determine their own expenditure 
policies, we can examine whether state governments also interact strategically with each 
other in more than one expenditure policy. Previous works such as Case et al. (1993) 
confirm the presence of expenditure competition among state governments by estimating 
how home state expenditure policies respond to neighboring states’ same expenditure 
policies. However, it is possible that home state responds to changes in neighboring 
states’ one expenditure policy by not only changing the same expenditure policy but also 
changing other expenditure policies. Therefore, to gain better understanding of how 
neighboring states’ expenditure policies influence home state’s spending and balanced 
budget, future research can explore whether state governments engage in strategic 
behavior in more than a single expenditure policy. 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
This dissertation consists of two main chapters (chapters 2 and 3) that look at the 
consequences of US consumers’ cross-border shopping activities to low commodity taxed 
states. The second chapter, in particular, analyzes how consumers’ border shopping to 
low commodity taxed states influences retail activity of the US states’ counties. Most 
previous studies focus on the economic impacts of consumers’ cross-border shopping by 
estimating the effects of interstate sales or excise tax differentials on retail activity such 
as retail sales aggregated to state level. This chapter extends previous studies in two 
ways. First, it looks at the impacts of sales or excise tax rates of domestic and 
neighboring states on retail activity aggregated to county level rather than on retail 
activity aggregated to state level. Since the time and transportation costs to engage in 
cross-border shopping activities are presumably lower in counties near the state border 
than in counties far away from the state border, the impacts on retail activity from sales 
and excise tax rates of own and the nearest neighboring states may not be the same across 
states, potentially higher in states’ counties closer to the state border and lower in states’ 
counties further away from the state border. Second, instead of addressing the impacts of 
cross-border shopping on retail sales of goods, this study focuses on counties’ retail 
establishments and employment of goods subject to states’ sales or excise tax rates. The 
intuition here is that as more consumers border shop in low commodity taxed states to 
take advantage of lower-after tax retail prices, retail owners of high commodity taxed 
counties, especially those closer to low commodity taxed states, will respond by 
decreasing the number of retail establishments or/and employment. Hence, this chapter 
investigates if distance to the state border influences the impacts of sales or excise tax 
rates of domestic and the nearest neighboring states on counties’ establishments and 
employment of five retail industries. These retail industries include grocery stores, 
gasoline stations, furniture stores, clothing stores and liquor stores that are most likely to 
be affected by consumers’ cross-border shopping activities. Using a county-level data of 
the forty-eight contiguous states over the period 1998 to 2007, this study finds that the 
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distance to the state border impacts the responsiveness of counties’ retail establishments 
and employment to domestic and the nearest neighboring states’ sales and excise tax 
rates, however, the impacts tend not to be very robust.  
The third chapter investigates how consumers’ cross-border shopping activities 
influence tax competition among state governments. The theoretical literature on tax 
competition, in particular Kanbur and Keen (1993), suggests that states will compete 
against one another to choose lower commodity tax rates to deter consumers’ cross-
border shopping to low commodity taxed neighboring states. Similarly, the empirical 
analysis on commodity tax competition, especially Devereux et al. (2007) documents that 
states mutually undercut each other cigarette tax rates, and cigarette taxes are lower 
among states in which the greater share of consumers is on borders. If a “race to the 
bottom” occurs in commodity tax rates such as cigarette tax rates to avoid consumers’ 
cross- border shopping activities, states’ cigarette tax revenues will decrease due to lower 
cigarette tax rates, and thus, this may then persuade states to rely on other less mobile tax 
bases to meet their state revenue goals. Most previous studies have focused on tax 
competition among state governments by estimating how rates on states’ one tax base 
respond to changes in rates on neighboring states’ same tax base. However, they have not 
analyzed whether changes in rates on neighboring states’ one tax base also influence 
changes in home state’s rates on other tax bases. For instance, Kentucky may respond to 
lower gas tax rates of neighboring states by not only decreasing their gas tax rates but 
also increasing their individual income tax rates to maintain its state revenue goals. 
Therefore, this chapter extends the previous studies on tax competition by analyzing how 
home state rates on one tax base are affected by changes in neighboring states’ rates on 
the same tax base and other tax bases. Using a panel data on the forty-eight contiguous 
states over the period 1977–2002, this chapter finds evidence that tax competition among 
state governments do not limit within only the same tax base. For instance, a home state 
cigarette tax rates respond not only positively to neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates, 
but also negatively to neighboring states’ sales tax rates. Similarly, while home state gas 
tax rates react positively to neighboring states gas tax rates and sales tax rates, home state 
gas tax rates respond negatively to neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates and income tax 
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rates. The sales tax rates and income tax rates do not respond to changes in neighboring 
states’ sales tax rates and income tax rates, respectively. However, the home state 
increases its sales tax rates in response to lower income tax rates of neighboring states. 
Likewise, home state increases its income tax rates in response to lower gas tax rates of 
neighboring states, thereby indicating that if there is “a race to the bottom” in commodity 
tax rates such as gas tax rates to deter consumers’ cross-border shopping phenomenon, 
states would respond to lower gas tax rates of neighboring states by increasing rates on 
individual income tax rates to maintain their state revenue goals. Besides, the results in 
general suggest that ignoring strategic competition in multiple tax rates would cause 
underestimation of the overall degree of strategic interaction in tax rates among state 
governments. 
In terms of policy perspectives, the second chapter of this dissertation suggests 
policy makers that sales or excise tax rates of domestic and the nearest neighboring states 
have significant effects on counties’ establishments and employment of most retail 
industries. However, it is inconclusive whether the distance to the state border plays a 
significant role on the responsiveness of counties’ retail establishments and employment 
to own and the nearest neighboring states’ sales and excise tax rates. Besides, the third 
chapter of my dissertation suggests policy makers that states engage in tax competition in 
more than one common tax base, and thus, we need to consider tax competition in 
multiple tax rates to understand the influence of neighboring states’ tax rates on home 
state tax revenues. 
For future study, one possible extension of this study might be to examine the 
same issue again by using a county-level panel data with different time periods, 
particularly a time period that captures higher frequency of changes in states’ sales and 
excise tax rates. In my analysis, I use a county-level panel data set of a ten-year time 
period from 1998 to 2007, and during this ten-year period, states on average have 
changed their sales tax rates around one time, while gas tax rates and tobacco tax rates 
around two times. Since the average frequency in which states have changed their sales 
and excise tax rates is relatively small over the period 1998 to 2007, the time period used 
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in this analysis possibly did not have enough number of changes in state sales and excise 
tax rates to realize the robust impacts of the distance to the state border on the 
responsiveness of counties’ retail establishments and employment to sales and excise tax 
rates of own and the nearest neighboring states.  
Similarly, another possible extension of the second chapter might be to examine 
whether the findings of the second chapter also pertain to counties’ retail sales. Since the 
cost of avoiding higher sales and excise tax rates are presumably easier and less costly for 
consumers than retailers, the distance to the state border perhaps have more marked 
effects on the responsiveness of counties’ retail sales, rather than retail establishments 
and employment, to sales and excise tax rates of own and the nearest neighboring states. 
Thus, if county-level panel data is available on retail sales for forty-eight contiguous 
states’ counties, future study can investigate whether the impacts of own and the nearest 
neighboring states’ sales and excise tax rates on retail sales of counties vary with the 
distance to the state border. 
In addition, future study can also extend the finding of the third chapter by 
addressing whether state governments participate in strategic competition across several 
expenditure policies. Previous works such as Case et al. (1993) document the presence of 
expenditure competition among state governments by estimating how home state 
expenditure policies respond to neighboring states’ same expenditure policies. However, 
it is possible that home states may respond to changes in neighboring states’ one 
expenditure policy by not only changing the same expenditure policy but also adjusting 
other expenditure policies. Therefore, to gain better understanding of how neighboring 
states’ expenditure policies influence home state’s spending and balanced budget, future 
research can explore whether state governments show strategic behavior in more than one 
expenditure policy. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
Table A1—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Establishments 
of Grocery Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Grocery Storest-1    0.642 
(9.60)*** 
 
Neighboring County  
Grocery Stores 
    0.013 
(0.96) 
Sales Tax -0.029 
(3.39)*** 
-0.037 
(3.88)***
-0.025 
(6.88)*** 
-0.039 
(2.55)** 
-0.036 
(3.74)*** 
Sales Tax × Distance  0.0001 
(0.85) 
-0.0001 
(1.62) 
0.00002 
(0.08) 
0.0003 
(1.29) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.003 
(0.51) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.016 
(4.90)*** 
0.003 
(0.18) 
0.016 
(0.89) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 0.00003 
(0.33) 
0.00008 
(1.93)* 
0.0002 
(0.74) 
-0.00004 
(0.33) 
Tobacco Tax 0.012 
(0.44) 
0.062 
(1.81)* 
-0.152 
(3.61)*** 
-0.013 
(0.25) 
0.07 
(1.70)* 
Tobacco Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.001 
(1.51) 
0.001 
(1.45) 
-0.001 
(0.76) 
-0.0002 
(0.20) 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
0.127 
(5.33)*** 
0.146 
(4.58)***
0.032 
(0.89) 
0.045 
(0.98) 
0.108 
(1.94)* 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.0004 
(0.73) 
0.001 
(1.18) 
-0.0004 
(0.53) 
-0.001 
(0.85) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.055 
(6.79)*** 
-0.054 
(6.66)***
-0.056 
(14.43)***
-0.022 
(1.22) 
-0.034 
(1.51) 
Neighboring State 
 Local Sales Tax  
0.012 
(1.58) 
0.013 
(1.70)* 
-0.022 
(7.25)*** 
-0.006 
(0.48) 
0.041 
(1.34) 
Food Tax Exemption  0.008 
(0.97) 
0.008 
(1.06) 
0.003 
(0.96) 
0.023 
(1.52) 
0.021 
(1.40) 
Neighboring State 
Food Tax Exemption 
-0.008 
(1.31) 
-0.009 
(1.35) 
-0.014 
(4.22)*** 
0.00002 
(0) 
0.002 
(0.14) 
Income Tax -0.004 
(0.71) 
-0.008 
(1.06) 
-0.011 
(5.13)*** 
-0.02 
(2.00)** 
-0.037 
(1.17) 
Income Tax × Distance  0.00005 
(0.57) 
-0.00002 
(0.69) 
0.0001 
(0.90) 
0.001 
(1.03) 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax 
-0.008 
(1.36) 
-0.013 
(1.69)* 
-0.032 
(13.35)***
0.01 
(0.82) 
-0.012 
(1.22) 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax × Distance 
 0.0001 
(0.51) 
-0.00009 
(2.45)** 
-0.0002 
(1.35) 
0.00004 
(0.29) 
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Table A1 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Property Tax -0.016 
(2.23)** 
0.004 
(0.42) 
0.043 
(4.52)*** 
0.00002 
(0) 
-0.003 
(0.24) 
Property Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.001 
(2.08)** 
0.0004 
(1.64) 
0.0001 
(0.56) 
0.0003 
(0.34) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax 
-0.012 
(2.03)** 
-0.01 
(1.15) 
0.01 
(1.04) 
0.005 
(0.56) 
-0.01 
(0.82) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.0001 
(0.35) 
0.0002 
(1.05) 
-0.0003 
(1.74)* 
0.0001 
(0.36) 
Income 0.004 
(4.53)*** 
0.004 
(4.28)***
-0.001 
(2.58)*** 
0.002 
(1.32) 
0.002 
(1.66)* 
Male -0.005 
(1.26) 
-0.005 
(1.26) 
0.012 
(13.06)***
-0.026 
(3.67)*** 
-0.009 
(1.90)* 
Black 0.004 
(2.85)*** 
0.004 
(2.88)***
0.002 
(20.75)***
0.006 
(0.93) 
0.008 
(1.72)* 
Other Race 0.013 
(3.04)*** 
0.013 
(2.95)***
0.002 
(6.39)*** 
-0.014 
(1.89)* 
-0.01 
(0.40) 
Elderly -0.009 
(2.58)*** 
-0.009 
(2.47)** 
0.036 
(38.26)***
-0.017 
(2.18)** 
-0.01 
(4.06)*** 
Young -0.004 
(1.09) 
-0.004 
(1.15) 
0.018 
(11.24)***
-0.011 
(1.38) 
-0.009 
(1.57) 
Constant 0.652 
(3.05)*** 
0.666 
(3.11)***
-0.658 
(9.24)*** 
 0.576 
(2.11)** 
F-Statistic p-valuea  0 0 0.01 0 
F-Statistic p-valueb  0.89 0 0.51 0.54 
F-Statistic p-valuec  0.18 0 0.3 0.23 
F-Statistic p-valued  0 0.04 0.61 0.15 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 24616 27693 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.2   
County fixed Y Y N Y Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
aTest for the joint significance of sales tax variables. 
bTest for the joint significance of neighboring state sales tax variables. 
cTest for the joint significance of tobacco tax variables. 
dTest for the joint significance of neighboring state tobacco tax variables. 
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Table A2—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Establishments 
of Gasoline Stations per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gasoline Stationst-1    0.527 
(10.39)*** 
 
Neighboring County  
Gasoline Stations 
    -0.004 
(1.70)* 
Fuel Tax -0.113 
(4.00)***
-0.078 
(2.00)** 
0.259 
(10.93)*** 
-0.122 
(0.98) 
-0.096 
(2.30)** 
Fuel Tax × Distance  -0.001 
(1.22) 
-0.001 
(3.76)*** 
0.0004 
(0.13) 
-0.001 
(1.42) 
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax 
0.008 
(0.28) 
0.022 
(0.61) 
0.16 
(5.78)*** 
-0.072 
(0.48) 
0.02 
(0.53) 
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax × Distance 
 -0.0003 
(0.57) 
0.003 
(6.59)*** 
0.001 
(0.39) 
-0.0002 
(0.33) 
Tobacco Tax -0.065 
(1.94)* 
-0.094 
(1.99)** 
-1.079 
(21.57)*** 
1.622 
(0.83) 
-0.136 
(2.65)*** 
Tobacco Tax × 
Distance 
 0.0005 
(0.66) 
0.008 
(11.01)*** 
-0.02 
(0.80) 
0.001 
(1.23) 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
-0.216 
(6.42)***
-0.205 
(4.63)***
-0.116 
(2.27)** 
-1.115 
(0.60) 
-0.24 
(4.97)*** 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.0003 
(0.45) 
-0.001 
(0.86) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.0003 
(0.49) 
Sales Tax 0.025 
(2.89)***
-0.009 
(0.84) 
-0.001 
(0.19) 
0.033 
(0.83) 
-0.006 
(0.50) 
Sales Tax × Distance  0.001 
(4.23)***
-0.0004 
(6.50)*** 
-0.0002 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(3.73)*** 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.008 
(0.96) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
-0.012 
(2.24)** 
-0.025 
(0.93) 
0.006 
(0.67) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 0.00005 
(0.41) 
-0.0003 
(4.35)*** 
0.0004 
(0.59) 
0.00004 
(0.31) 
Local Sales Tax   0.04 
(4.31)***
0.038 
(4.03)***
0.041 
(9.28)*** 
0.038 
(1.25) 
0.046 
(3.73)*** 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.011 
(1.24) 
-0.012 
(1.32) 
0.052 
(12.82)*** 
0.021 
(0.49) 
-0.012 
(1.08) 
Income Tax 0.005 
(0.72) 
-0.008 
(0.77) 
-0.022 
(7.19)*** 
-0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.019 
(1.47) 
Income Tax × Distance  0.0003 
(2.46)** 
0.0001 
(1.59) 
0.0002 
(0.53) 
0.0004 
(2.30)** 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax 
0.014 
(2.00)** 
0.016 
(1.84)* 
-0.019 
(6.01)*** 
0.024 
(1.14) 
0.01 
(0.91) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax × Distance 
 -0.00001 
(0.05) 
-0.00002 
(0.44) 
-0.0002 
(0.31) 
0.00003 
(0.19) 
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Table A2 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Property Tax 0.01 
(1.26) 
0.014 
(1.34) 
0.108 
(11.54)*** 
-0.003 
(0.10) 
0.013 
(0.97) 
Property Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.0001 
(0.32) 
-0.002 
(13.29)*** 
0.001 
(0.57) 
0.00005 
(0.20) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax 
0.005 
(0.67) 
-0.002 
(0.18) 
0.081 
(7.44)*** 
-0.025 
(1.41) 
-0.001 
(0.05) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax × 
Distance 
 0.0001 
(1.04) 
-0.001 
(4.76)*** 
0.0002 
(0.55) 
0.0001 
(0.56) 
Income -0.001 
(0.67) 
-0.001 
(0.76) 
-0.005 
(13.62)*** 
0.006 
(3.05)*** 
-0.002 
(2.01)** 
Male 0.006 
(1.29) 
0.007 
(1.32) 
0.018 
(12.52)*** 
0.007 
(1.08) 
0.004 
(1.30) 
Black -0.011 
(5.54)***
-0.011 
(5.46)***
-0.001 
(5.82)*** 
-0.005 
(1.23) 
-0.009 
(3.93)*** 
Other Race 0.025 
(4.06)***
0.024 
(3.94)***
-0.001 
(2.74)*** 
0.009 
(1.09) 
0.021 
(4.82)*** 
Elderly 0.013 
(2.99)***
0.013 
(3.02)***
0.045 
(31.99)*** 
0.017 
(1.87)* 
0.013 
(5.18)*** 
Young -0.015 
(3.56)***
-0.014 
(3.40)***
0.033 
(13.16)*** 
0.001 
(0.17) 
-0.016 
(5.96)*** 
Constant 0.598 
(2.27)** 
0.582 
(2.20)** 
-0.99 
(9.12)*** 
 0.963 
(3.94)*** 
F-Statistic p-valuea  0 0 0.38 0 
F-Statistic p-valueb  0.13 0 0.88 0.07 
F-Statistic p-valuec  0.08 0 0.68 0.02 
F-Statistic p-valued  0 0 0.69 0 
F-Statistic p-valuee  0 0 0.38 0 
F-Statistic p-valuef  0.71 0 0.61 0.46 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 24616 27693 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.24   
County fixed Y Y N Y Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
aTest for the joint significance of fuel tax variables. 
bTest for the joint significance of neighboring state fuel tax variables. 
cTest for the joint significance of tobacco tax variables. 
dTest for the joint significance of neighboring state tobacco tax variables. 
eTest for the joint significance of sales tax variables. 
fTest for the joint significance of neighboring state sales tax variables. 
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Table A3—Impacts of Sales Tax Rates on the Total Number of Establishments of 
Furniture Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Furniture Storest-1    0.512 
(10.54)*** 
 
Neighboring County 
Furniture Stores 
    0.012 
(4.12)***
Sales Tax -0.004 
(1.49) 
0.005 
(1.22) 
0.005 
(3.03)*** 
0.005 
(0.81) 
-0.001 
(0.16) 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.0002 
(3.71)***
0.000006 
(0.28) 
-0.00003 
(0.45) 
0.0001 
(1.09) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax 
0.001 
(0.31) 
0.002 
(0.47) 
0.013 
(8.40)*** 
0.008 
(1.01) 
0.005 
(1.43) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax × Distance 
 0.000006 
(0.21) 
0.000004 
(6.58)*** 
-0.00003 
(0.58) 
-0.00001 
(0.35) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.002 
(0.55) 
-0.001 
(0.31) 
0.013 
(6.15)*** 
-0.005 
(1.00) 
0.0005 
(0.10) 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
-0.005 
(1.72)* 
-0.004 
(1.48) 
0.015 
(6.94)*** 
-0.002 
(0.47) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
Income Tax -0.001 
(0.24) 
-0.003 
(0.81) 
0.012 
(10.68)*** 
0.001 
(0.23) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
Income Tax × Distance  0.00003 
(0.73) 
0.000004 
(0.28) 
0.00006 
(1.40) 
-0.0002 
(2.45)** 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax 
-0.001 
(0.51) 
-0.001 
(0.37) 
-0.004 
(2.68)*** 
-0.005 
(0.92) 
-0.003 
(0.63) 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax × Distance 
 -0.00002 
(0.40) 
0.0002 
(7.62)*** 
0.00009 
(1.78)* 
0.00003 
(0.63) 
Property Tax -0.00011 
(0.02) 
0.006 
(1.44) 
0.03 
(6.09)*** 
0.001 
(0.15) 
-0.014 
(1.93)* 
Property Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.0002 
(2.06)** 
-0.0002 
(2.11)** 
-0.00002 
(0.21) 
0.001 
(2.81)***
Neighboring State 
Property Tax 
0.006 
(2.01)** 
0.006 
(1.38) 
0.023 
(5.00)*** 
0.003 
(0.59) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax × 
Distance 
 0.000008 
(0.13) 
0.0001 
(0.62) 
-0.00006 
(0.75) 
0.00006 
(0.61) 
Income 0.001 
(3.39)*** 
0.001 
(3.31)***
0.006 
(29.98)*** 
-0.001 
(1.85)* 
0.0001 
(0.28) 
Male -0.001 
(0.60) 
-0.001 
(0.63) 
-0.009 
(19.56)*** 
0.005 
(2.03)** 
0.002 
(1.42) 
Black 0.0004 
(0.64) 
0.0004 
(0.58) 
0.0002 
(3.23)*** 
-0.005 
(3.31)*** 
0.0004 
(0.45) 
Other Race 0.004 
(2.49)** 
0.004 
(2.37)** 
-0.001 
(5.98)*** 
0.007 
(2.35)** 
-0.0001 
(0.06) 
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Table A3 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Elderly 0.0002 
(0.19) 
0.0003 
(0.21) 
-0.008 
(15.96)*** 
0.004 
(1.76)* 
0.003 
(2.58)***
Young -0.003 
(2.26)** 
-0.003 
(2.27)** 
-0.017 
(21.44)*** 
-0.001 
(0.68) 
-0.002 
(1.79)* 
Constant 0.214 
(2.96)*** 
0.22 
(3.04)***
0.601 
(18.22)*** 
 -0.142 
(1.22) 
F-Statistic p-valuea  0 0 0.69 0.41 
F-Statistic p-valueb  0.89 0 0.59 0.25 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 24616 27693 
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.15   
County fixed Y Y N Y Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
aTest for the joint significance of sales tax variables. 
bTest for the joint significance of neighboring state sales tax variables. 
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Table A4—Impacts of Sales Tax Rates on the Total Number of Establishments of Clothing 
Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Clothing Storest-1    0.538 
(6.02)*** 
 
Neighboring County 
Clothing Stores 
    0.005 
(2.52)** 
Sales Tax 0.005 
(1.10) 
0.013 
(2.33)** 
0.017 
(3.64)*** 
0.006 
(0.50) 
0.012 
(1.88)* 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.0002 
(2.19)** 
-0.0002 
(2.70)*** 
0.00003 
(0.23) 
-
0.0000007 
(0.01) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax 
0.007 
(1.23) 
0.019 
(2.77)*** 
0.017 
(4.37)*** 
0.003 
(0.32) 
0.023 
(4.00)*** 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax × Distance 
 -0.0002 
(3.44)*** 
0.00004 
(0.95) 
0.00006 
(0.71) 
-0.0002 
(3.73)*** 
Local Sales Tax   0.015 
(2.48)** 
0.015 
(2.56)** 
0.013 
(2.11)** 
0.006 
(0.52) 
0.02 
(2.80)*** 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
0.026 
(6.28)***
0.027 
(6.52)*** 
0.048 
(8.17)*** 
0.001 
(0.24) 
0.029 
(4.30)*** 
Sales Tax Holidays -0.003 
(1.65)* 
-0.002 
(1.36) 
0.007 
(1.24) 
-0.003 
(1.16) 
-0.002 
(1.03) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax Holidays 
-0.0004 
(0.19) 
-0.001 
(0.31) 
0.006 
(1.01) 
-0.002 
(0.55) 
-0.002 
(0.91) 
Income Tax 0.021 
(5.15)***
0.028 
(5.12)*** 
0.013 
(4.86)*** 
0.023 
(2.56)** 
0.02 
(2.68)*** 
Income Tax × Distance  -0.0002 
(2.81)*** 
-0.00002 
(0.55) 
-0.00002 
(0.32) 
-0.0003 
(2.87)*** 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax 
0.007 
(1.51) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.014 
(4.32)*** 
-0.008 
(0.94) 
-0.01 
(1.30) 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax × Distance 
 0.0001 
(1.88)* 
0.0004 
(7.23)*** 
0.00006 
(0.75) 
0.0002 
(1.99)** 
Property Tax -0.01 
(2.09)** 
0.008 
(1.16) 
0.036 
(2.98)*** 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.014 
(1.19) 
Property Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.0005 
(3.51)*** 
-0.0003 
(1.72)* 
-0.0003 
(1.54) 
0.001 
(1.20) 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax 
0.005 
(1.01) 
0.013 
(1.73)* 
0.048 
(4.22)*** 
0.004 
(0.64) 
0.021 
(2.47)** 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax × 
Distance 
 -0.0002 
(1.98)** 
-0.0001 
(0.76) 
-0.00007 
(0.71) 
-0.0002 
(1.57) 
Income 0.001 
(1.46) 
0.001 
(1.32) 
0.018 
(26.38)***
0.0001 
(0.10) 
0.0002 
(0.65) 
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Table A4 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Male 0.0002 
(0.10) 
0.00008 
(0.03) 
-0.024 
(21.06)***
0.006 
(1.07) 
0.003 
(1.46) 
Black 0.000006 
(0) 
-0.0001 
(0.08) 
0.001 
(8.11)*** 
-0.003 
(1.09) 
-0.002 
(1.36) 
Other Race -0.002 
(0.66) 
-0.002 
(0.84) 
0.002 
(7.48)*** 
-0.002 
(0.40) 
-0.01 
(2.62)*** 
Elderly 0.0003 
(0.13) 
0.0003 
(0.13) 
-0.031 
(20.19)***
0.006 
(2.01)** 
0.001 
(0.66) 
Young -0.00003 
(0.01) 
-0.0002 
(0.08) 
-0.052 
(19.10)***
-0.006 
(2.12)** 
-0.001 
(0.86) 
Constant 0.163 
(1.08) 
0.171 
(1.13) 
1.791 
(17.41)***
 -0.008 
(0.05) 
F-Statistic p-valuea  0 0 0.76 0.06 
F-Statistic p-valueb  0 0 0.63 0 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 24616 27693 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.2   
County fixed Y Y N Y Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
aTest for the joint significance of sales tax variables. 
bTest for the joint significance of neighboring state sales tax variables. 
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Table A5—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Establishments 
of Liquor Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Alcohol Storest-1    0.429 
(6.07)*** 
 
Neighboring County 
Alcohol Stores 
    -0.004 
(1.42) 
Alcohol Tax 0.122 
(2.48)** 
0.087 
(1.13) 
0.049 
(1.15) 
-0.104 
(0.87) 
0.165 
(1.41) 
Alcohol Tax × Distance  0.0004 
(0.49) 
-0.00003 
(0.05) 
-0.001 
(0.69) 
-0.001 
(0.46) 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax 
-0.105 
(1.63) 
-0.041 
(0.44) 
-0.278 
(7.04)*** 
-0.004 
(0.03) 
-0.039 
(0.39) 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax × Distance 
 -0.001 
(0.63) 
0.001 
(1.51) 
-0.001 
(0.71) 
-0.001 
(0.78) 
Sales Tax -0.005 
(1.71)* 
-0.001 
(0.24) 
0.009 
(5.66)*** 
0.002 
(0.39) 
-0.001 
(0.33) 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.00007 
(1.26) 
-0.0002 
(9.51)*** 
-0.0001 
(1.65)* 
-0.0001 
(1.19) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax 
0.004 
(1.28) 
0.005 
(1.25) 
-0.004 
(2.93)*** 
0.005 
(0.66) 
0.006 
(1.77)* 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax × Distance 
 -0.00002 
(0.45) 
0.00005 
(3.11)*** 
-0.0001 
(1.30) 
-0.00002 
(0.56) 
Local Sales Tax   0.001 
(0.41) 
0.002 
(0.64) 
0.013 
(7.07)*** 
0.006 
(1.21) 
0.0004 
(0.08) 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
-0.005 
(1.97)** 
-0.005 
(2.05)** 
0.012 
(6.86)*** 
0.006 
(1.10) 
-0.008 
(1.77)* 
Income Tax -0.003 
(1.21) 
0.003 
(0.90) 
0.004 
(3.19)*** 
-0.003 
(0.73) 
0.003 
(0.63) 
Income Tax × Distance  -0.0001 
(2.62)***
-0.0000007 
(0.05) 
0.00002 
(0.52) 
-0.0001 
(1.55) 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax 
-0.001 
(0.20) 
-0.004 
(1.31) 
-0.002 
(1.44) 
-0.003 
(0.72) 
-0.002 
(0.49) 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax × Distance 
 0.00007 
(1.54) 
0.0001 
(5.90)*** 
0.0001 
(1.03) 
0.0001 
(1.20) 
Property Tax -0.011 
(2.80)***
-0.02 
(3.69)***
0.016 
(4.13)*** 
-0.019 
(4.50)*** 
-0.02 
(4.23)*** 
Property Tax × 
Distance 
 0.0002 
(1.85)* 
-0.0003 
(4.30)*** 
0.0001 
(0.71) 
0.0002 
(1.83)* 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax 
-0.006 
(1.74)* 
-0.008 
(1.78)* 
0.015 
(4.16)*** 
-0.008 
(2.42)** 
-0.008 
(1.67)* 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax × 
Distance 
 0.00005 
(0.81) 
-0.00003 
(0.51) 
0.0001 
(2.32)** 
0.0001 
(0.68) 
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Table A5 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Income 0.001 
(2.04)** 
0.001 
(2.24)** 
0.004 
(27.75)*** 
-0.001 
(2.03)** 
0.001 
(3.27)*** 
Male -0.002 
(1.15) 
-0.002 
(1.09) 
0.006 
(13.47)*** 
-0.004 
(2.02)** 
-0.001 
(1.03) 
Black 0.001 
(2.67)***
0.001 
(2.57)** 
0.0003 
(5.30)*** 
0.002 
(1.41) 
0.002 
(2.16)** 
Other Race -0.002 
(1.07) 
-0.002 
(0.93) 
0.001 
(5.73)*** 
-0.004 
(1.35) 
-0.0003 
(0.17) 
Elderly -0.001 
(0.53) 
-0.001 
(0.60) 
0.011 
(22.59)*** 
-0.001 
(0.47) 
-0.001 
(0.67) 
Young 0.002 
(1.16) 
0.002 
(1.17) 
0.01 
(13.28)*** 
0.002 
(0.53) 
0.003 
(2.20)** 
Constant 0.123 
(1.57) 
0.116 
(1.49) 
-0.588 
(16.65)*** 
 0.092 
(1.50) 
F-Statistic p-valuea  0.05 0.39 0.08 0.21 
F-Statistic p-valueb  0.34 0 0.6 0.36 
F-Statistic p-valuec  0.12 0 0.14 0.13 
F-Statistic p-valued  0.4 0 0.42 0.15 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 24616 27693 
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.08   
County fixed Y Y N Y Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
aTest for the joint significance of alcohol tax variables. 
bTest for the joint significance of neighboring state alcohol tax variables. 
cTest for the joint significance of sales tax variables. 
dTest for the joint significance of neighboring state sales tax variables. 
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Table A6—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Employees of 
Grocery Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grocery Store 
Employeest-1 
   0.464 
(10.10)*** 
Sales Tax 0.028 
(0.22) 
0.139 
(0.82) 
-0.358 
(6.40)*** 
0.259 
(0.99) 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.003 
(1.30) 
0.004 
(5.73)*** 
-0.007 
(2.60)*** 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
-0.09 
(0.84) 
0.058 
(0.40) 
0.124 
(2.40)** 
0.336 
(1.30) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 -0.002 
(1.34) 
-0.005 
(8.11)*** 
0.002 
(0.96) 
Tobacco Tax -0.851 
(1.84)* 
1.523 
(2.30)** 
0.186 
(0.27) 
1.059 
(1.16) 
Tobacco Tax × Distance  -0.053 
(4.38)*** 
0.015 
(1.38) 
-0.045 
(2.91)*** 
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax 
-0.508 
(1.15) 
-0.387 
(0.63) 
2.517 
(3.66)*** 
-0.195 
(0.23) 
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax × Distance 
 -0.003 
(0.32) 
-0.034 
(3.05)*** 
0.003 
(0.27) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.056 
(0.32) 
0.014 
(0.08) 
-0.043 
(0.64) 
1.478 
(4.14)*** 
Neighboring State Local 
Sales Tax  
-0.553 
(2.92)*** 
-0.498 
(2.63)*** 
0.09 
(1.41) 
0.473 
(2.11)** 
Food Tax Exemption  -0.203 
(1.32) 
-0.205 
(1.34) 
0.753 
(12.53)*** 
-0.051 
(0.20) 
Neighboring State  
Food Tax Exemption 
0.119 
(1.22) 
0.026 
(0.25) 
0.372 
(6.29)*** 
0.123 
(0.77) 
Income Tax 0.493 
(5.11)*** 
0.62 
(4.41)*** 
0.115 
(2.66)*** 
0.514 
(2.92)*** 
Income Tax × Distance  -0.003 
(2.00)** 
0.002 
(4.18)*** 
-0.005 
(3.53)*** 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax 
0.354 
(3.30)*** 
0.184 
(1.37) 
0.035 
(0.76) 
0.073 
(0.43) 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax × Distance 
 0.002 
(1.05) 
0.001 
(1.71)* 
-0.001 
(0.50) 
Property Tax 0.156 
(1.45) 
0.507 
(3.37)*** 
1.482 
(11.02)*** 
-0.098 
(0.47) 
Property Tax × Distance  -0.01 
(3.53)*** 
-0.017 
(6.57)*** 
-0.007 
(1.55) 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax 
0.281 
(2.91)*** 
0.288 
(1.83)* 
0.56 
(3.46)*** 
0.173 
(0.99) 
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Table A6 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax × Distance 
 -0.0005 
(0.19) 
-0.002 
(0.79) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
Income 0.048 
(2.74)*** 
0.043 
(2.42)** 
0.108 
(17.83)*** 
-0.028 
(1.84)* 
Male 0.164 
(2.84)*** 
0.161 
(2.79)*** 
-0.164 
(8.12)*** 
-0.239 
(2.60)*** 
Black -0.11 
(4.16)*** 
-0.108 
(4.07)*** 
-0.001 
(0.39) 
-0.041 
(0.71) 
Other Race 0.53 
(8.02)*** 
0.52 
(7.82)*** 
-0.002 
(0.31) 
0.098 
(0.76) 
Elderly 0.06 
(1.14) 
0.084 
(1.59) 
0.066 
(3.86)*** 
-0.058 
(0.85) 
Young -0.138 
(2.72)*** 
-0.153 
(3.01)*** 
-0.141 
(5.08)*** 
-0.142 
(1.87)* 
Constant 2.145 
(0.73) 
2.503 
(0.86) 
10.649 
(7.89)*** 
 
F-Statistic p-valuea  0.43 0 0.02 
F-Statistic p-valueb  0.33 0 0.01 
F-Statistic p-valuec  0 0.09 0.01 
F-Statistic p-valued  0.46 0 0.96 
Observations 15440 15440 15440 9886 
R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.17  
County fixed Y Y N Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
aTest for the joint significance of sales tax variables. 
bTest for the joint significance of neighboring state sales tax variables. 
cTest for the joint significance of tobacco tax variables. 
dTest for the joint significance of neighboring state tobacco tax variables. 
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Table A7—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Employees of 
Gasoline Stations per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gasoline Station Employeest-1    0.133 
(1.19) 
Fuel Tax 0.182 
(0.61) 
0.255 
(0.66) 
2.695 
(9.52)*** 
-4.453 
(1.03) 
Fuel Tax × Distance  -0.005 
(0.67) 
0.003 
(0.62) 
0.033 
(0.33) 
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax 
-0.183 
(0.68) 
-0.063 
(0.18) 
2.062 
(6.85)*** 
-9.62 
(2.23)** 
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax × Distance 
 -0.003 
(0.47) 
0.005 
(0.94) 
0.1 
(1.39) 
Tobacco Tax -0.793 
(2.64)*** 
-0.112 
(0.27) 
-7.577 
(12.87)*** 
53.959 
(1.02) 
Tobacco Tax × Distance  -0.015 
(2.68)*** 
0.073 
(8.38)*** 
-1.476 
(1.31) 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
-1.26 
(4.12)*** 
-0.83 
(2.10)** 
0.171 
(0.30) 
103.148 
(1.71)* 
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax × Distance 
 -0.011 
(1.75)* 
-0.016 
(1.58) 
-0.906 
(1.09) 
Sales Tax -0.071 
(0.78) 
-0.313 
(2.49)** 
-0.057 
(0.95) 
-0.857 
(1.02) 
Sales Tax × Distance  0.005 
(2.81)*** 
-0.002 
(2.25)** 
-0.002 
(0.08) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
-0.022 
(0.24) 
-0.018 
(0.16) 
-0.008 
(0.12) 
-0.602 
(0.76) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 0.00002 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(3.05)*** 
0.021 
(0.82) 
Local Sales Tax   0.578 
(4.30)*** 
0.562 
(4.16)*** 
0.109 
(2.12)** 
2.304 
(1.83)* 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.007 
(0.07) 
-0.003 
(0.03) 
0.281 
(6.43)*** 
1.871 
(1.89)* 
Income Tax 0.155 
(2.43)** 
0.036 
(0.38) 
-0.079 
(2.14)** 
1.248 
(2.06)** 
Income Tax × Distance  0.002 
(2.21)** 
0.001 
(1.75)* 
0.002 
(0.23) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax 
0.162 
(2.44)** 
0.23 
(2.60)*** 
0.006 
(0.17) 
1.057 
(1.35) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax × Distance 
 -0.001 
(1.06) 
-0.0005 
(0.70) 
-0.011 
(0.71) 
Property Tax 0.304 
(4.06)*** 
0.297 
(2.96)*** 
1.053 
(9.69)*** 
-0.941 
(1.07) 
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Table A7 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Property Tax × Distance  0.0002 
(0.12) 
-0.019 
(10.71)*** 
0.034 
(1.05) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax 
0.127 
(2.17)** 
0.009 
(0.10) 
0.354 
(3.35)*** 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax × Distance 
 0.003 
(1.73)* 
-0.004 
(1.95)* 
-0.005 
(0.77) 
Income -0.005 
(0.64) 
-0.006 
(0.75) 
-0.024 
(5.62)*** 
-0.038 
(1.04) 
Male -0.039 
(0.96) 
-0.036 
(0.90) 
0.268 
(14.09)*** 
-0.14 
(1.45) 
Black -0.079 
(4.77)*** 
-0.079 
(4.75)*** 
-0.018 
(11.48)*** 
-0.091 
(1.26) 
Other Race 0.149 
(2.18)** 
0.151 
(2.21)** 
0.012 
(2.14)** 
0.237 
(1.16) 
Elderly 0.063 
(1.68)* 
0.069 
(1.84)* 
0.416 
(27.47)*** 
0.071 
(0.35) 
Young -0.239 
(6.00)*** 
-0.24 
(5.95)*** 
0.501 
(20.38)*** 
-0.541 
(2.08)** 
Constant 10.643 
(4.74)*** 
10.585 
(4.72)*** 
-18.892 
(15.59)*** 
 
F-Statistic p-valuea  0.77 0 0.19 
F-Statistic p-valueb  0.63 0 0.03 
F-Statistic p-valuec  0 0 0.4 
F-Statistic p-valued  0 0.14 0.1 
F-Statistic p-valuee  0.01 0 0.1 
F-Statistic p-valuef  0.98 0 0.71 
Observations 25357 25357 25357 21508 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.14  
County fixed Y Y N Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
aTest for the joint significance of fuel tax variables. 
bTest for the joint significance of neighboring state fuel tax variables. 
cTest for the joint significance of tobacco tax variables. 
dTest for the joint significance of neighboring state tobacco tax variables. 
eTest for the joint significance of sales tax variables. 
fTest for the joint significance of neighboring state sales tax variables. 
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Table A8—Impacts of Sales Tax Rates on the Total Number of Employees of Furniture 
Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Furniture Store Employeest-1    0.526 
(8.51)*** 
Sales Tax 0.02 
(0.88) 
0.05 
(1.56) 
-0.039 
(2.54)** 
0.025 
(0.50) 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.001 
(1.48) 
0.001 
(4.68)*** 
0.00002 
(0.03) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
-0.082 
(3.46)*** 
-0.096 
(2.77)*** 
0.079 
(5.89)*** 
-0.034 
(0.67) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 0.0002 
(0.73) 
-0.001 
(7.92)*** 
-0.0001 
(0.35) 
Local Sales Tax   0.082 
(2.61)*** 
0.088 
(2.76)*** 
0.099 
(5.01)*** 
-0.012 
(0.27) 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.048 
(1.67)* 
-0.041 
(1.42) 
0.08 
(3.84)*** 
-0.118 
(1.96)* 
Income Tax 0.028 
(1.28) 
-0.014 
(0.45) 
0.107 
(10.24)*** 
-0.042 
(1.04) 
Income Tax × Distance  0.001 
(2.02)** 
0.0002 
(1.34) 
0.001 
(2.42)** 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax 
-0.026 
(1.07) 
-0.046 
(1.46) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
0.013 
(0.30) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax × Distance 
 0.0003 
(0.98) 
0.001 
(6.29)*** 
-0.00002 
(0.06) 
Property Tax 0.001 
(0.03) 
0.095 
(2.22)** 
0.185 
(4.29)*** 
0.03 
(0.39) 
Property Tax × Distance  -0.002 
(3.88)*** 
-0.002 
(3.36)*** 
-0.001 
(1.02) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax 
0.067 
(2.98)*** 
0.046 
(1.46) 
0.105 
(2.99)*** 
-0.007 
(0.16) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax × Distance 
 0.0004 
(0.69) 
0.0001 
(0.15) 
0.001 
(1.78)* 
Income 0.016 
(6.83)*** 
0.016 
(6.56)*** 
0.055 
(30.51)*** 
0 
(0.04) 
Male -0.005 
(0.40) 
-0.005 
(0.44) 
-0.127 
(27.79)*** 
0.062 
(2.06)** 
Black 0.011 
(1.72)* 
0.012 
(1.77)* 
0.005 
(7.35)*** 
-0.011 
(0.77) 
Other Race 0.038 
(3.64)*** 
0.036 
(3.42)*** 
-0.003 
(3.97)*** 
0.015 
(1.05) 
Elderly -0.017 
(2.30)** 
-0.016 
(2.13)** 
-0.147 
(35.15)*** 
0.031 
(1.64) 
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Table A8 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Young -0.023 
(3.34)*** 
-0.024 
(3.36)*** 
-0.183 
(26.15)*** 
-0.013 
(1.21) 
Constant 1.764 
(3.40)*** 
1.831 
(3.56)*** 
8.528 
(25.87)*** 
 
F-Statistic p-valuea  0.26 0 0.76 
F-Statistic p-valueb  0.001 0 0.59 
Observations 18589 18589 18589 13637 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.28  
County fixed Y Y N Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
aTest for the joint significance of sales tax variables. 
bTest for the joint significance of neighboring state sales tax variables. 
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Table A9—Impacts of Sales Tax Rates on the Total Number of Employees of Clothing 
Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Clothing Store Employeest-1    0.063 
(0.86) 
Sales Tax -0.015 
(0.37) 
0.046 
(0.72) 
0.102 
(2.33)** 
0.155 
(1.76)* 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.001 
(1.11) 
-0.0003 
(0.51) 
-0.003 
(1.75)* 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.121 
(3.13)*** 
0.174 
(2.94)*** 
0.12 
(3.32)*** 
0.125 
(1.80)* 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 -0.001 
(0.73) 
0.001 
(1.49) 
-0.001 
(0.59) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.05 
(0.59) 
-0.049 
(0.59) 
-0.041 
(0.78) 
-0.05 
(0.81) 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.035 
(0.76) 
-0.024 
(0.52) 
0.184 
(3.43)*** 
-0.027 
(0.18) 
Sales Tax Holidays -0.082 
(4.02)*** 
-0.074 
(3.53)*** 
0.275 
(4.62)*** 
-0.063 
(2.98)*** 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax Holidays 
-0.01 
(0.48) 
-0.011 
(0.51) 
0.192 
(3.12)*** 
0.005 
(0.24) 
Income Tax 0.262 
(6.33)*** 
0.234 
(3.97)*** 
0.184 
(6.58)*** 
0.068 
(1.13) 
Income Tax × Distance  0.0003 
(0.36) 
-0.001 
(2.09)** 
-0.0002 
(0.30) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax 
0.047 
(0.71) 
0.097 
(1.36) 
-0.04 
(1.22) 
0.057 
(0.58) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax × Distance 
 -0.001 
(0.54) 
0.003 
(5.22)*** 
-0.003 
(0.78) 
Property Tax -0.112 
(2.06)** 
0.081 
(1.10) 
0.349 
(2.90)*** 
0.001 
(0.02) 
Property Tax × Distance  -0.005 
(2.53)** 
-0.006 
(3.10)*** 
-0.002 
(1.24) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax 
0.062 
(1.28) 
0.101 
(1.06) 
0.288 
(2.59)*** 
0.071 
(1.01) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax × Distance 
 -0.001 
(0.77) 
0.00006 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(1.05) 
Income 0.021 
(3.11)*** 
0.02 
(2.88)*** 
0.183 
(32.46)*** 
0.013 
(1.72)* 
Male -0.067 
(4.18)*** 
-0.068 
(4.25)*** 
-0.277 
(22.52)*** 
-0.02 
(0.69) 
Black 0.094 
(5.01)*** 
0.094 
(4.99)*** 
0.017 
(10.89)*** 
0.038 
(1.83)* 
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Table A9 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Other Race 0.128 
(4.93)*** 
0.124 
(4.72)*** 
0.02 
(8.13)*** 
0.03 
(1.06) 
Elderly -0.065 
(4.16)*** 
-0.064 
(4.05)*** 
-0.38 
(34.11)*** 
-0.027 
(1.60) 
Young 0.068 
(4.88)*** 
0.067 
(4.77)*** 
-0.48 
(25.73)*** 
0.038 
(1.07) 
Constant 1.776 
(2.06)** 
1.851 
(2.13)** 
21.446 
(25.49)*** 
 
F-Statistic p-valuea  0.52 0.016 0.18 
F-Statistic p-valueb  0.001 0 0.07 
Observations 20518 20518 20518 15885 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.3  
County fixed Y Y N Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
aTest for the joint significance of sales tax variables. 
bTest for the joint significance of neighboring state sales tax variables. 
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Table A10—Impacts of Sales and Excise Tax Rates on the Total Number of Employees of 
Liquor Stores per 1,000 County Residents 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Alcohol Store Employeest-1    0.22 
(1.17) 
Alcohol Tax -0.134 
(0.54) 
0.404 
(1.06) 
-2.774 
(9.98)*** 
-1.37 
(2.39)** 
Alcohol Tax × Distance  -0.008 
(1.58) 
0.024 
(6.37)*** 
0.008 
(0.93) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax 
0.073 
(0.23) 
0.155 
(0.34) 
-1.866 
(7.24)*** 
-0.294 
(0.32) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax × Distance 
 -0.0002 
(0.05) 
0.004 
(0.85) 
-0.017 
(1.54) 
Sales Tax 0.02 
(1.82)* 
0.033 
(1.77)* 
0.062 
(4.76)*** 
0.025 
(1.00) 
Sales Tax × Distance  -0.0003 
(0.94) 
-0.0004 
(2.96)*** 
-0.0003 
(0.52) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.008 
(0.52) 
0.009 
(0.38) 
0.042 
(3.79)*** 
-0.041 
(1.08) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × Distance 
 -0.00003 
(0.16) 
-0.0003 
(2.67)*** 
0.00001 
(0.05) 
Local Sales Tax   0.017 
(1.55) 
0.022 
(1.88)* 
0.032 
(2.39)** 
0.078 
(2.19)** 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.006 
(0.78) 
-0.005 
(0.54) 
0.065 
(5.13)*** 
0.019 
(0.71) 
Income Tax 0.034 
(2.63)*** 
0.037 
(1.82)* 
0.08 
(6.85)*** 
0.014 
(0.34) 
Income Tax × Distance  -0.00006 
(0.29) 
-0.00004 
(0.29) 
0.0003 
(0.89) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax 
0.044 
(3.01)*** 
0.036 
(1.91)* 
0.048 
(4.00)*** 
0.047 
(1.36) 
Neighboring State 
 Income Tax × Distance 
 0.0001 
(0.76) 
-0.0001 
(0.61) 
0.0001 
(0.56) 
Property Tax -0.124 
(3.87)*** 
-0.143 
(3.24)*** 
0.158 
(5.60)*** 
-0.08 
(1.19) 
Property Tax × Distance  0.001 
(0.87) 
-0.003 
(5.28)*** 
-0.001 
(0.88) 
Neighboring State Property 
Tax 
0.018 
(1.08) 
0.034 
(1.07) 
0.043 
(1.35) 
-0.063 
(1.59) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax × Distance 
 0.0006 
(0.75) 
-0.001 
(1.28) 
0.001 
(1.38) 
Income 0.001 
(0.65) 
0.001 
(0.65) 
0.024 
(19.68)*** 
-0.006 
(1.92)* 
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Table A10 continued 
Variable\Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male 0.0003 
(0.05) 
0.0003 
(0.06) 
0.004 
(1.39) 
0.018 
(1.99)** 
Black -0.013 
(2.54)** 
-0.014 
(2.58)*** 
0.0002 
(0.71) 
-0.03 
(2.86)*** 
Other Race 0.014 
(1.98)** 
0.014 
(2.00)** 
0.001 
(1.04) 
-0.001 
(0.08) 
Elderly 0.003 
(0.93) 
0.004 
(1.05) 
-0.005 
(1.61) 
0.021 
(1.51) 
Young 0.013 
(3.26)*** 
0.013 
(3.17)*** 
-0.004 
(0.99) 
-0.007 
(1.19) 
Constant -0.111 
(0.47) 
-0.124 
(0.52) 
-0.387 
(1.62) 
 
F-Statistic p-valuea  0.28 0 0.03 
F-Statistic p-valueb  0.91 0 0.15 
F-Statistic p-valuec  0.15 0 0.49 
F-Statistic p-valued  0.9 0 0.31 
Observations 14560 14560 14560 10174 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.12  
County fixed Y Y N Y 
Year fixed Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
aTest for the joint significance of alcohol tax variables. 
bTest for the joint significance of neighboring state alcohol tax variables. 
cTest for the joint significance of sales tax variables. 
dTest for the joint significance of neighboring state sales tax variables. 
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Table A11—Alternative Distance Static Specification: Establishments per 1,000 County 
Residents 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline 
Stations 
Furniture
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Sales Tax -0.029 
(3.01)*** 
0.033 
(3.57)*** 
-0.005 
(1.65)* 
0.007 
(1.62) 
-0.007 
(2.58)*** 
Sales Tax × D10 -0.011 
(0.52) 
-0.065 
(3.00)*** 
0.007 
(0.87) 
-0.02 
(1.95)* 
0.016 
(2.13)** 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax 
0.007 
(0.95) 
0.009 
(1.02) 
-0.0002 
(0.07) 
0.006 
(0.98) 
0.008 
(2.46)** 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax × D10 
-0.038 
(2.53)** 
-0.011 
(0.50) 
0.013 
(1.67)* 
0.006 
(0.44) 
-0.038 
(4.83)*** 
Tobacco Tax 0.009 
(0.29) 
-0.071 
(1.94)* 
   
Tobacco Tax × D10 0.012 
(0.22) 
0.042 
(0.56) 
   
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax 
0.134 
(5.07)*** 
-0.231 
(6.27)*** 
   
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax × D10 
-0.032 
(0.62) 
0.064 
(0.83) 
   
Fuel Tax  -0.113 
(3.72)*** 
   
Fuel Tax × D10  -0.005 
(0.08) 
   
Neighboring State 
Fuel Tax 
 -0.013 
(0.39) 
   
Neighboring State 
Fuel Tax × D10 
 0.14 
(2.04)** 
   
Alcohol Tax     0.141 
(2.84)*** 
Alcohol Tax × D10     -0.192 
(1.02) 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax 
    -0.171 
(2.38)** 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax × D10 
    0.361 
(2.48)** 
Local Sales Tax   -0.054 
(6.72)*** 
0.041 
(4.38)*** 
-0.002 
(0.61) 
0.015 
(2.47)** 
0.001 
(0.54) 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
0.012 
(1.57) 
-0.011 
(1.28) 
-0.005 
(1.66)* 
0.026 
(6.28)*** 
-0.005 
(2.00)** 
Food Tax Exemption  0.008 
(1.03) 
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Table A11 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline 
Stations 
Furniture
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Neighboring State 
Food Tax Exemption 
-0.008 
(1.26) 
    
Sales Tax Holidays     -0.003 
(1.74)* 
 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax Holidays 
   -0.003 
(0.18) 
 
Income Tax -0.003 
(0.51) 
0.004 
(0.62) 
0.0003 
(0.11) 
0.022 
(5.07)*** 
-0.002 
(0.63) 
Income Tax × D10 -0.008 
(0.59) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
-0.009 
(1.31) 
-0.012 
(1.36) 
-0.008 
(1.48) 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax 
-0.009 
(1.30) 
0.019 
(2.56)** 
-0.003 
(0.99) 
0.007 
(1.26) 
0.0004 
(0.16) 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax × D10 
0.004 
(0.34) 
-0.039 
(2.56)** 
0.011 
(1.77)* 
0.004 
(0.45) 
-0.004 
(0.71) 
Property Tax -0.017 
(2.07)** 
0.007 
(0.73) 
-0.004 
(0.93) 
-0.014 
(2.21)** 
-0.008 
(1.80)* 
Property Tax × D10 0.006 
(0.44) 
0.011 
(0.72) 
0.014 
(1.91)* 
0.012 
(1.15) 
-0.011 
(1.27) 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax 
-0.012 
(1.92)* 
0.003 
(0.43) 
0.006 
(1.99)** 
0.003 
(0.77) 
-0.006 
(1.62) 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax × D10 
0.002 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
-0.005 
(0.61) 
0.009 
(0.41) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
Income 0.004 
(4.50)*** 
-0.001 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(3.38)***
0.001 
(1.44) 
0.001 
(2.08)** 
Male -0.005 
(1.24) 
0.007 
(1.34) 
-0.001 
(0.65) 
0.0002 
(0.10) 
-0.002 
(1.12) 
Black 0.004 
(2.96)*** 
-0.011 
(5.54)*** 
0.0003 
(0.55) 
-0.00004 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(2.97)*** 
Other Race 0.013 
(3.02)*** 
0.025 
(4.03)*** 
0.004 
(2.50)** 
-0.002 
(0.66) 
-0.002 
(1.06) 
Elderly -0.009 
(2.55)** 
0.013 
(3.04)*** 
0.0001 
(0.12) 
0.0003 
(0.13) 
-0.001 
(0.46) 
Young -0.004 
(1.06) 
-0.015 
(3.52)*** 
-0.003 
(2.28)** 
-0.00004 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(1.17) 
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Table A11 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline 
Stations 
Furniture
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Constant 0.651 
(3.05)*** 
0.593 
(2.25)** 
0.217 
(3.00)***
0.167 
(1.10) 
0.122 
(1.56) 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 27693 27693 
R-squared 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.005 
Notes: See Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. 
*, **, and ***, respectively, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. All regressions include county fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
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Table A12—Alternative Distance Dynamic Specification: Establishments per 1,000 
County Residents 
 Dependent variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline 
Stations 
Furniture 
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Grocery Storest-1 0.643 
(9.58)*** 
    
Gasoline Stationst-1  0.523 
(11.99)*** 
   
Furniture Storest-1   0.512 
(10.56)*** 
  
Clothing Storest-1    0.537 
(6.03)*** 
 
 Alcohol Storest-1     0.429 
(6.07)*** 
Sales Tax -0.039 
(2.93)*** 
0.019 
(1.53) 
0.007 
(1.47) 
0.01 
(0.82) 
-0.007 
(1.53) 
Sales Tax × D10 0.005 
(0.17) 
0.061 
(1.15) 
-0.022 
(1.54) 
-0.014 
(1.06) 
0.019 
(1.48) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax 
0.019 
(1.38) 
0.008 
(0.69) 
0.007 
(1.06) 
0.009 
(1.02) 
0.0004 
(0.07) 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax × D10 
-0.055 
(1.93)* 
-0.054 
(1.69)* 
-0.01 
(0.84) 
-0.025 
(1.77)* 
-0.014 
(1.31) 
Tobacco Tax -0.042 
(1.14) 
-0.02 
(0.49) 
   
Tobacco Tax × 
D10 
-0.054 
(0.68) 
-0.05 
(0.70) 
   
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax 
0.036 
(0.92) 
-0.076 
(1.81)* 
   
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax × 
D10 
-0.092 
(1.12) 
0.087 
(1.15) 
   
Fuel Tax  -0.07 
(1.44) 
   
Fuel Tax × D10  -0.102 
(1.16) 
   
Neighboring State 
Fuel Tax 
 -0.063 
(1.39) 
   
Neighboring State 
Fuel Tax × D10 
 0.198 
(1.57) 
   
Alcohol Tax     -0.201 
(2.45)** 
Alcohol Tax × D10     0.393 
(1.34) 
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Table A12 continued 
 Dependent variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline 
Stations 
Furniture 
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax 
    -0.1 
(0.91) 
Neighboring State 
Alcohol Tax × D10 
    0.248 
(1.03) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.022 
(1.26) 
0.05 
(3.16)*** 
-0.005 
(1.01) 
0.006 
(0.54) 
0.006 
(1.18) 
Neighboring State 
Local Sales Tax  
-0.006 
(0.50) 
0.008 
(0.56) 
-0.003 
(0.50) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
0.006 
(1.09) 
Food Tax 
Exemption  
0.022 
(1.51) 
    
Neighboring State 
Food Tax 
Exemption 
0.0004 
(0.04) 
    
Sales Tax Holidays     -0.003 
(1.17) 
 
Neighboring State 
Sales Tax Holidays 
   -0.002 
(0.52) 
 
Income Tax -0.015 
(2.03)** 
0.015 
(1.85)* 
0.005 
(1.52) 
0.022 
(3.23)*** 
0.001 
(0.19) 
Income Tax × D10 -0.005 
(0.27) 
-0.048 
(1.87)* 
-0.004 
(0.46) 
-0.004 
(0.45) 
-0.016 
(1.88)* 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax 
-0.006 
(0.60) 
0.009 
(0.74) 
0.00001 
(0) 
-0.006 
(0.84) 
0.001 
(0.30) 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax × D10 
0.016 
(0.91) 
0.019 
(1.04) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
0.015 
(1.29) 
-0.00005 
(0.01) 
Property Tax 0.007 
(0.88) 
0.02 
(2.29)** 
0.001 
(0.21) 
-0.008 
(1.51) 
-0.017 
(4.18)*** 
Property Tax × 
D10 
-0.01 
(0.66) 
-0.025 
(1.22) 
-0.003 
(0.27) 
-0.0003 
(0.03) 
-0.003 
(0.51) 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax 
-0.009 
(1.48) 
-0.012 
(1.74)* 
0.001 
(0.17) 
-0.001 
(0.28) 
-0.002 
(0.80) 
Neighboring State 
Property Tax × 
D10 
0.018 
(0.87) 
0.003 
(0.15) 
-0.002 
(0.22) 
0.017 
(1.27) 
-0.003 
(0.40) 
Income 0.002 
(1.34) 
0.005 
(3.56)*** 
-0.001 
(1.87)* 
0.0001 
(0.11) 
-0.001 
(2.05)** 
Male -0.026 
(3.71)*** 
0.006 
(0.92) 
0.005 
(2.05)** 
0.006 
(1.06) 
-0.004 
(2.01)** 
Black 0.006 
(0.97) 
-0.005 
(1.29) 
-0.005 
(3.30)*** 
-0.003 
(1.06) 
0.002 
(1.45) 
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Table A12 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline 
Stations 
Furniture 
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Other Race -0.014 
(1.91)* 
0.009 
(1.14) 
0.007 
(2.35)** 
-0.002 
(0.40) 
-0.004 
(1.31) 
Elderly -0.017 
(2.20)** 
0.017 
(1.92)* 
0.004 
(1.76)* 
0.005 
(1.99)** 
-0.001 
(0.45) 
Young -0.011 
(1.37) 
0.004 
(0.52) 
-0.001 
(0.64) 
-0.006 
(2.16)** 
0.002 
(0.56) 
Observations 24616 24616 24616 24616 24616 
Notes: See notes to Table A11. 
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Table A13—Alternative Distance Spatial Specification: Establishments per 1,000 County 
Residents 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline
Stations 
Furniture
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Neighboring County 
Grocery Stores 
0.013 
(1.12) 
    
Neighboring County 
Gasoline Stations 
 -0.005 
(1.81)* 
   
Neighboring County 
Furniture Stores 
  0.011 
(4.13)***
  
Neighboring County 
Clothing Stores 
   0.004 
(2.55)** 
 
Neighboring County 
Alcohol Stores 
    -0.004 
(1.50) 
Sales Tax -0.021 
(2.08)** 
0.033 
(4.04)*** 
0.003 
(0.82) 
0.013 
(2.50)** 
-0.009 
(2.73)***
Sales Tax × D10 -0.013 
(0.65) 
-0.06 
(2.76)*** 
0.004 
(0.52) 
-0.022 
(1.74)* 
0.018 
(2.25)** 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.018 
(1.52) 
0.012 
(1.62) 
0.003 
(1.07) 
0.006 
(1.56) 
0.009 
(3.27)***
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × D10 
-0.04 
(1.97)** 
-0.011 
(0.48) 
0.015 
(1.64) 
0.007 
(0.54) 
-0.039 
(4.73)***
Tobacco Tax 0.073 
(1.12) 
-0.093 
(2.55)** 
   
Tobacco Tax × D10 -0.085 
(0.76) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
   
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
0.099 
(2.25)** 
-0.267 
(6.70)*** 
   
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax × D10 
-0.057 
(0.78) 
0.056 
(0.72) 
   
Fuel Tax  -0.138 
(4.04)*** 
   
Fuel Tax × D10  0.026 
(0.34) 
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax 
 -0.006 
(0.19) 
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax × D10 
 0.128 
(1.77)* 
   
Alcohol Tax     0.151 
(2.01)** 
Alcohol Tax × D10     -0.215 
(0.91) 
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Table A13 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline
Stations 
Furniture
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax 
    -0.175 
(2.11)** 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax × D10 
    0.381 
(1.97)** 
Local Sales Tax   -0.032 
(1.40) 
0.049 
(4.02)*** 
0.0004 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(2.82)*** 
-0.0003 
(0.08) 
Neighboring State Local 
Sales Tax  
0.041 
(1.48) 
-0.012 
(1.04) 
0.002 
(0.47) 
0.029 
(4.31)*** 
-0.008 
(1.80)* 
Food Tax Exemption  0.019 
(1.57) 
    
Neighboring State  
Food Tax Exemption 
0.001 
(0.05) 
    
Sales Tax Holidays     -0.002 
(0.99) 
 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax Holidays 
   -0.002 
(1.02) 
 
Income Tax -0.003 
(0.36) 
-0.0004 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(2.47)** 
0.008 
(1.13) 
-0.001 
(0.35) 
Income Tax × D10 -0.039 
(1.18) 
-0.009 
(0.43) 
-0.001 
(0.17) 
-0.017 
(1.40) 
-0.006 
(0.85) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax 
-0.01 
(1.35) 
0.015 
(1.73)* 
-0.003 
(0.91) 
0.0002 
(0.04) 
0.002 
(0.74) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax × D10 
-0.002 
(0.09) 
-0.043 
(2.21)** 
0.01 
(1.29) 
-0.008 
(0.65) 
-0.004 
(0.58) 
Property Tax 0.015 
(0.48) 
0.01 
(0.94) 
0.007 
(1.39) 
0.003 
(0.36) 
-0.012 
(2.55)** 
Property Tax × D10 -0.017 
(0.60) 
0.011 
(0.50) 
-0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.0004 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(1.21) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax 
-0.007 
(0.78) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
0.003 
(0.79) 
0.009 
(1.53) 
-0.006 
(1.71)* 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax × D10 
0.011 
(0.43) 
0.022 
(0.82) 
0 
(0)  
0.012 
(0.76) 
0.0003 
(0.03) 
Income 0.002 
(1.61) 
-0.002 
(2.05)** 
0.00007 
(0.19) 
0.0002 
(0.50) 
0.001 
(3.14)***
Male -0.009 
(2.04)** 
0.004 
(1.31) 
0.002 
(1.20) 
0.003 
(1.39) 
-0.001 
(1.06) 
Black 0.008 
(1.99)** 
-0.009 
(4.00)*** 
0.0003 
(0.44) 
-0.002 
(1.19) 
0.002 
(2.53)** 
Other Race -0.01 
(0.49) 
0.021 
(4.86)*** 
-0.0004 
(0.20) 
-0.01 
(2.53)** 
-0.0005 
(0.27) 
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Table A13 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Stores 
Gasoline
Stations 
Furniture
Stores 
Clothing 
Stores 
Liquor 
Stores 
Elderly -0.01 
(4.23)*** 
0.013 
(5.23)*** 
0.003 
(2.53)** 
0.001 
(0.79) 
-0.001 
(0.55) 
Young -0.009 
(1.72)* 
-0.016 
(6.16)*** 
-0.002 
(1.88)* 
-0.001 
(0.71) 
0.003 
(2.27)** 
Constant 0.468 
(2.15)** 
0.921 
(3.84)*** 
-0.129 
(1.22) 
-0.043 
(0.34) 
0.099 
(1.64) 
Observations 27693 27693 27693 27693 27693 
Notes: See notes to Table A11. 
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Table A14—Alternative Distance Static Specification: Employment per 1,000 County 
Residents 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Store 
Gasoline 
Station 
Furniture 
Store 
Clothing 
Store 
Liquor 
Store 
Sales Tax 0.064 
(0.47) 
-0.047 
(0.50) 
0.031 
(1.22) 
0.008 
(0.18) 
0.024 
(1.99)** 
Sales Tax × D10 -0.244 
(0.73) 
-0.228 
(0.83) 
-0.097 
(1.60) 
-0.143 
(1.22) 
-0.044 
(1.41) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
-0.162 
(1.47) 
-0.029 
(0.30) 
-0.077 
(3.04)***
0.103 
(2.57)** 
0.019 
(1.18) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × D10 
0.756 
(2.08)** 
0.059 
(0.25) 
-0.08 
(1.14) 
0.151 
(0.96) 
-0.135 
(2.16)** 
Tobacco Tax -1.242 
(2.45)** 
-0.719 
(2.18)** 
   
Tobacco Tax × D10 2.317 
(2.14)** 
-0.176 
(0.26) 
   
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
-0.424 
(0.92) 
-1.254 
(3.77)***
   
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax × D10 
-0.743 
(0.66) 
-0.078 
(0.12) 
   
Fuel Tax  0.409 
(1.27) 
   
Fuel Tax × D10  -1.685 
(2.65)***
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax 
 -0.304 
(1.04) 
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax × D10 
 0.652 
(0.94) 
   
Alcohol Tax     -0.041 
(0.16) 
Alcohol Tax × D10     -0.946 
(1.11) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax 
    -0.014 
(0.04) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax × D10 
    0.018 
(0.02) 
Local Sales Tax   -0.069 
(0.40) 
0.573 
(4.25)***
0.084 
(2.68)***
-0.054 
(0.65) 
0.019 
(1.68)* 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
-0.553 
(2.91)*** 
-0.009 
(0.10) 
-0.046 
(1.59) 
-0.035 
(0.76) 
-0.007 
(0.79) 
Food Tax Exemption  -0.207 
(1.35) 
    
 
 138 
 
 
Table A14 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Store 
Gasoline 
Station 
Furniture 
Store 
Clothing 
Store 
Liquor 
Store 
Neighboring State  
Food Tax Exemption 
0.116 
(1.20) 
    
Sales Tax Holidays     -0.084 
(4.13)*** 
 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax Holidays 
   -0.01 
(0.47) 
 
Income Tax 0.446 
(4.42)*** 
0.145 
(2.17)** 
0.04 
(1.70)* 
0.29 
(6.58)*** 
0.037 
(2.67)***
Income Tax × D10 0.313 
(1.17) 
0.125 
(0.70) 
-0.102 
(1.85)* 
-0.229 
(2.26)** 
-0.03 
(0.90) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax 
0.372 
(3.22)*** 
0.201 
(2.78)***
-0.023 
(0.87) 
0.028 
(0.39) 
0.057 
(3.44)***
Neighboring State  
Income Tax × D10 
-0.193 
(0.76) 
-0.243 
(1.56) 
-0.015 
(0.27) 
0.123 
(0.97) 
-0.072 
(2.65)***
Property Tax 0.087 
(0.62) 
0.394 
(4.32)***
-0.047 
(0.96) 
-0.174 
(2.33)** 
-0.156 
(3.97)***
Property Tax × D10 0.265 
(1.28) 
-0.321 
(2.10)** 
0.165 
(2.31)** 
0.174 
(1.51) 
0.111 
(1.86)* 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax 
0.315 
(3.08)*** 
0.124 
(2.02)** 
0.066 
(2.76)***
0.036 
(1.04) 
0.007 
(0.43) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax × D10 
-0.399 
(1.06) 
0.06 
(0.33) 
-0.008 
(0.10) 
0.171 
(0.54) 
0.166 
(1.37) 
Income 0.047 
(2.69)*** 
-0.006 
(0.65) 
0.016 
(6.79)***
0.021 
(3.10)*** 
0.001 
(0.64) 
Male 0.163 
(2.80)*** 
-0.038 
(0.96) 
-0.004 
(0.38) 
-0.067 
(4.21)*** 
0.001 
(0.15) 
Black -0.112 
(4.21)*** 
-0.08 
(4.80)***
0.011 
(1.72)* 
0.093 
(4.93)*** 
-0.013 
(2.46)** 
Other Race 0.528 
(7.99)*** 
0.15 
(2.19)** 
0.038 
(3.69)***
0.128 
(4.96)*** 
0.014 
(2.04)** 
Elderly 0.062 
(1.18) 
0.063 
(1.70)* 
-0.017 
(2.21)** 
-0.066 
(4.18)*** 
0.004 
(1.12) 
Young -0.141 
(2.77)*** 
-0.241 
(6.03)***
-0.023 
(3.31)***
0.069 
(4.89)*** 
0.013 
(3.26)***
Constant 2.227 
(0.76) 
10.69 
(4.75)***
1.779 
(3.43)***
1.821 
(2.11)** 
-0.108 
(0.45) 
Observations 15440 25357 18589 20518 14560 
R-squared 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
 Notes: See notes to Table A11. 
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Table A15—Alternative Distance Dynamic Specification: Employment per 1,000 County 
Residents 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Store 
Gasoline 
Station 
Furniture 
Store 
Clothing  
Store 
Liquor 
Store 
Grocery Store  
Employeest-1 
0.464 
(10.04)*** 
    
Gasoline Station 
Employeest-1 
 0.217 
(2.28)** 
   
Furniture Store  
Employeest-1 
  0.527 
(8.55)***
  
Clothing Store  
Employeest-1 
   0.065 
(0.93) 
 
Alcohol Store  
Employeest-1 
    0.219 
(1.14) 
Sales Tax -0.105 
(0.50) 
-0.0004 
(0) 
0.009 
(0.23) 
-0.02 
(0.30) 
0.023 
(1.44) 
Sales Tax × D10 0.187 
(0.34) 
-0.629 
(1.69)* 
0.126 
(1.20) 
0.127 
(0.98) 
-0.113 
(1.48) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax 
0.378 
(1.92)* 
0.138 
(1.13) 
-0.041 
(0.86) 
0.068 
(1.31) 
-0.019 
(0.68) 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax × D10 
0.275 
(0.41) 
-0.261 
(1.04) 
0.012 
(0.13) 
-0.016 
(0.13) 
-0.209 
(1.30) 
Tobacco Tax -0.664 
(0.93) 
0.494 
(1.33) 
   
Tobacco Tax × D10 0.059 
(0.04) 
-1.079 
(1.76)* 
   
Neighboring State  
Tobacco Tax 
-0.098 
(0.16) 
-0.597 
(1.57) 
   
Neighboring State 
Tobacco Tax × D10 
-0.646 
(0.39) 
1.212 
(2.01)** 
   
Fuel Tax  0.458 
(0.92) 
   
Fuel Tax × D10  -1.009 
(1.36) 
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax 
 -1.056 
(1.97)** 
   
Neighboring State  
Fuel Tax × D10 
 1.039 
(1.23) 
   
Alcohol Tax     -1.179 
(2.32)** 
Alcohol Tax × D10     1.636 
(1.03) 
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Table A15 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Store 
Gasoline 
Station 
Furniture 
Store 
Clothing  
Store 
Liquor 
Store 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax 
    -0.755 
(1.10) 
Neighboring State  
Alcohol Tax × D10 
    -2.927 
(1.42) 
Local Sales Tax   1.475 
(4.12)*** 
-0.469 
(1.35) 
-0.012 
(0.28) 
-0.049 
(0.81) 
0.08 
(2.26)** 
Neighboring State  
Local Sales Tax  
0.487 
(2.18)** 
0.199 
(1.05) 
-0.118 
(1.94)* 
-0.024 
(0.16) 
0.018 
(0.68) 
Food Tax Exemption  -0.035 
(0.14) 
    
Neighboring State  
Food Tax Exemption 
0.143 
(0.90) 
    
Sales Tax Holidays     -0.071 
(3.61)*** 
 
Neighboring State  
Sales Tax Holidays 
   0.005 
(0.21) 
 
Income Tax 0.177 
(1.47) 
0.067 
(0.84) 
0.016 
(0.52) 
0.072 
(1.44) 
0.031 
(1.32) 
Income Tax × D10 -0.052 
(0.17) 
-0.042 
(0.22) 
0.011 
(0.18) 
-0.087 
(0.89) 
0.004 
(0.06) 
Neighboring State  
Income Tax 
0.072 
(0.47) 
0.035 
(0.33) 
0.016 
(0.47) 
-0.121 
(0.76) 
0.062 
(2.42)** 
Neighboring State 
Income Tax × D10 
-0.026 
(0.09) 
0.279 
(1.59) 
-0.036 
(0.44) 
0.105 
(0.61) 
-0.061 
(1.85)* 
Property Tax -0.433 
(2.86)*** 
0.004 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.36) 
-0.064 
(1.00) 
-0.132 
(1.78)* 
Property Tax × D10 0.35 
(1.10) 
-0.063 
(0.35) 
0.061 
(0.56) 
0.051 
(0.62) 
0.085 
(0.93) 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax 
0.213 
(1.49) 
-0.103 
(1.68)* 
0.052 
(2.27)** 
-0.021 
(0.49) 
-0.029 
(1.66)* 
Neighboring State  
Property Tax × D10 
0.157 
(0.44) 
0.274 
(1.56) 
-0.081 
(0.69) 
0.268 
(1.18) 
-0.149 
(0.76) 
Income -0.027 
(1.79)* 
-0.004 
(0.23) 
-0.0001 
(0.04) 
0.013 
(1.71)* 
-0.006 
(1.98)** 
Male -0.235 
(2.54)** 
-0.051 
(1.10) 
0.063 
(2.08)** 
-0.02 
(0.71) 
0.019 
(2.10)** 
Black -0.043 
(0.75) 
-0.014 
(0.44) 
-0.011 
(0.79) 
0.039 
(1.87)* 
-0.03 
(2.89)***
Other Race 0.11 
(0.86) 
0.103 
(1.00) 
0.015 
(1.06) 
0.031 
(1.10) 
-0.002 
(0.21) 
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Table A15 continued 
 Dependent Variables 
Grocery 
Store 
Gasoline 
Station 
Furniture 
Store 
Clothing  
Store 
Liquor 
Store 
Elderly -0.069 
(0.99) 
0.058 
(1.22) 
0.031 
(1.63) 
-0.026 
(1.57) 
0.022 
(1.59) 
Young -0.137 
(1.81)* 
-0.031 
(0.30) 
-0.013 
(1.24) 
0.039 
(1.10) 
-0.007 
(1.19) 
Observations 9886 21508 13637 15885 10174 
Notes: See notes to Table A11. 
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Appendix B 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
B1. The OLS Estimates for Strategic Interaction within One Tax Base 
considering population contiguity weights 
Table B1 shows the OLS estimation of equation (3.6). I find that the OLS results differ 
from the results obtained in Table 3.3 in the following ways. First, in the OLS results, I 
find that the magnitudes of the coefficients of neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates and 
income tax rates are smaller than the ones found in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3.3. 
Second, in contrast to the results found in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.3, I find that 
neighboring states’ gas tax rates and sales tax rates are significant in the OLS results. 
Therefore, as seen in Table B1, by not considering the endogeneity of neighboring states’ 
tax rates, either the magnitude or the significance of the coefficients of neighboring 
states’ tax rates changes from those observed in the instrumental variable results in Table 
3.3.  
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Table B1—OLS Results, Strategic Interaction within One Tax Base considering 
population contiguity weights 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.393 
(12.12)*** 
Neighbor Gas Tax 0.27 
(6.25)*** 
Neighbor Sales Tax -0.233 
(5.39)*** 
Neighbor Income Tax -0.086 
(2.20)** 
Population 0.018 
(4.43)*** 
-0.003 
(2.13)** 
0.079 
(4.20)*** 
0.069 
(1.12) 
Elderly -0.01 
(1.46) 
0.007 
(3.56)*** 
-0.091 
(2.84)*** 
0.275 
(2.58)** 
Under 18 0.026 
(5.42)*** 
0.0005 
(0.37) 
0.046 
(2.10)** 
-0.071 
(0.99) 
Income per capita 0.032 
(8.25)*** 
-0.003 
(2.56)** 
-0.109 
(6.08)*** 
0.227 
(3.78)*** 
Unemployment -0.004 
(1.44) 
0.003 
(3.68)*** 
0.006 
(0.48) 
0.203 
(4.88)*** 
Grant per capita 0.034 
(1.02) 
-0.021 
(2.36)** 
-0.654 
(4.21)*** 
-0.71 
(1.34) 
Party of Governor 0.002 
(0.27) 
0.004 
(2.30)** 
0.09 
(3.21)*** 
-0.233 
(2.52)** 
Election Year -0.002 
(0.24) 
-0.0002 
(0.12) 
0.018 
(0.53) 
-0.09 
(0.81) 
Democrats in the House 0.001 
(2.68)*** 
0.0002 
(1.52) 
0.003 
(1.70)* 
-0.019 
(3.01)*** 
Debt per capita 0.003 
(0.50) 
0.0002 
(0.18) 
-0.087 
(3.73)*** 
0.128 
(1.64) 
Gross State Product  
per capita 
-0.009 
(3.78)*** 
0.002 
(3.56)*** 
-0.04 
(3.71)*** 
-0.144 
(4.02)*** 
Tobacco Production 0.097 
(1.40) 
Motor Vehicle 
Registration 
-0.002 
(2.17)** 
Hotels 0.284 
(5.70)*** 
Residence 0.18 
(7.08)*** 
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Table B1 continued 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Reciprocity -0.565 
(1.39) 
Constant -0.709 
(5.24)*** 
-0.036 
(1.01) 
4.859 
(7.65)*** 
5.278 
(2.48)** 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
R-squared 0.66 0.77 0.59 0.21 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics. * denotes significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. See notes in Table 3.3 for 
control variables. 
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B2.  Population Contiguity Weights 
Table B2.1—Strategic Interaction within One Tax Base considering Population 
Contiguity Weights 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.634 
(10.71)*** 
Neighbor Gas Tax 0.119 
(0.77) 
Neighbor Sales Tax -0.149 
(1.20) 
Neighbor Income Tax -0.36 
(3.84)*** 
Population 0.023 
(5.32)*** 
-0.003 
(2.23)** 
0.079 
(4.22)*** 
0.09 
(1.42) 
Elderly -0.009 
(1.32) 
0.006 
(3.36)*** 
-0.088 
(2.70)*** 
0.236 
(2.15)** 
Under 18 0.018 
(3.42)*** 
0.001 
(0.74) 
0.038 
(1.58) 
-0.184 
(2.26)** 
Income per capita 0.027 
(6.60)*** 
-0.003 
(2.73)*** 
-0.101 
(4.82)*** 
0.176 
(2.79)*** 
Unemployment -0.004 
(1.59) 
0.003 
(3.79)*** 
0.008 
(0.63) 
0.218 
(5.10)*** 
Grant per capita 0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(2.20)** 
-0.602 
(3.51)*** 
-0.87 
(1.60) 
Party of Governor -0.002 
(0.34) 
0.004 
(2.30)** 
0.087 
(3.04)*** 
-0.215 
(2.28)** 
Election Year -0.002 
(0.26) 
-0.0003 
(0.14) 
0.018 
(0.54) 
-0.096 
(0.84) 
Democrats in the House 0.001 
(1.16) 
0.0002 
(1.80)* 
0.003 
(1.74)* 
-0.021 
(3.24)*** 
Debt per capita -0.004 
(0.85) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
-0.078 
(2.96)*** 
0.257 
(2.88)*** 
Gross State Product  
per capita 
-0.009 
(3.93)*** 
0.002 
(2.95)*** 
-0.038 
(3.47)*** 
-0.14 
(3.83)*** 
Tobacco Production 0.069 
(0.98) 
Motor Vehicle 
Registration 
-0.001 
(1.91)* 
Hotels 0.294 
(5.70)*** 
Residence 0.13 
(4.29)*** 
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Table B2.1 continued 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Reciprocity -0.231 
(0.54) 
Constant -0.482 
(3.31)*** 
-0.034 
(0.96) 
4.543 
(5.90)*** 
10.072 
(3.83)*** 
F-test 65.86 19.57 23.13 28.19 
Over-identification test 0.71 0.96 0.99 0.28 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics. * denotes significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. See notes in Table 3.3 for 
control variables. Instruments and econometric issues are dealt with as in Table 3.3. 
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Table B2.2—Strategic Interaction within One Tax Base along with Interdependence 
among Tax Bases within the Same State considering Population Contiguity Weights 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.636 
(9.37)*** 
Neighbor Gas Tax 1.348 
(3.29)*** 
Neighbor Sales Tax 0.11 
(0.66) 
Neighbor Income Tax -0.331 
(2.65)*** 
Cigarette Tax 0.098 
(2.11)** 
0.847 
(1.43) 
-5.042 
(4.17)*** 
Gas Tax 1.608 
(5.08)*** 
-6.194 
(3.07)*** 
5.5 
(0.84) 
Sales Tax -0.01 
(0.49) 
-0.016 
(1.46) 
-0.308 
(0.58) 
Income Tax -0.002 
(0.26) 
0.021 
(4.11)*** 
0.084 
(2.44)** 
Population 0.03 
(6.00)*** 
-0.001 
(0.55) 
0.045 
(1.90)* 
0.184 
(2.10)** 
Elderly -0.019 
(2.27)** 
-0.0005 
(0.12) 
-0.071 
(1.78)* 
0.142 
(1.17) 
Under 18 0.015 
(2.78)*** 
-0.007 
(2.10)** 
-0.004 
(0.10) 
0.021 
(0.21) 
Income per capita 0.032 
(5.67)*** 
-0.013 
(3.86)*** 
-0.162 
(4.87)*** 
0.384 
(3.92)*** 
Unemployment -0.009 
(2.72)*** 
-0.003 
(1.48) 
0.019 
(1.15) 
0.191 
(3.82)*** 
Grant per capita 0.024 
(0.61) 
-0.004 
(0.24) 
-0.449 
(2.25)** 
-0.58 
(0.83) 
Party of Governor -0.008 
(1.08) 
0.008 
(2.49)** 
0.106 
(3.12)*** 
-0.167 
(1.50) 
Election Year -0.001 
(0.15) 
0.002 
(0.68) 
0.027 
(0.70) 
-0.098 
(0.84) 
Democrats in the House 0.00004 
(0.09) 
0.0001 
(0.50) 
0.006 
(2.16)** 
-0.011 
(1.50) 
Debt per capita -0.007 
(1.24) 
-0.005 
(1.79)* 
-0.055 
(1.83)* 
0.287 
(2.80)*** 
Gross State Product  
per capita 
-0.013 
(4.33)*** 
0.008 
(4.18)*** 
0.002 
(0.14) 
-0.21 
(3.79)*** 
Tobacco Production 0.117 
(1.54) 
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Table B2.2 continued 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Motor Vehicle 
Registration 
-0.004 
(2.54)** 
Hotels 0.368 
(5.81)*** 
Residence 0.132 
(3.80)*** 
Reciprocity -0.677 
(0.94) 
Constant -0.384 
(2.14)** 
0.08 
(0.90) 
4.031 
(4.27)*** 
5.671 
(1.30) 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics. * denotes significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. See notes in Table 3.4 for 
control variables. Instruments and econometric issues are dealt with as in Table 3.4. 
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Table B2.3—Strategic Interaction over Multiple Tax Bases considering Population 
Contiguity Weights 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.592 
(9.15)*** 
-0.02 
(0.82) 
-0.992 
(2.40)** 
-2.353 
(2.15)** 
Neighbor Gas Tax 0.443 
(0.78) 
0.472 
(2.66)*** 
-4.999 
(1.70)* 
-34.499 
(3.68)*** 
Neighbor Sales Tax -0.031 
(1.04) 
0.026 
(2.51)** 
-0.398 
(2.65)*** 
0.852 
(1.79)* 
Neighbor Income Tax -0.005 
(0.70) 
-0.01 
(4.71)*** 
-0.051 
(1.51) 
-0.057 
(0.46) 
Population 0.022 
(5.19)*** 
-0.002 
(1.15) 
0.062 
(2.86)*** 
0.011 
(0.15) 
Elderly -0.011 
(1.56) 
0.005 
(2.37)** 
-0.124 
(3.51)*** 
0.305 
(2.49)** 
Under 18 0.018 
(2.79)*** 
-0.006 
(2.99)*** 
0.092 
(2.38)** 
0.073 
(0.66) 
Income per capita 0.024 
(4.94)*** 
-0.002 
(1.36) 
-0.13 
(5.24)*** 
0.319 
(3.88)*** 
Unemployment -0.006 
(1.88)* 
0.004 
(3.93)*** 
0.014 
(1.00) 
0.291 
(5.80)*** 
Grant per capita -0.011 
(0.28) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.558 
(3.05)*** 
-0.036 
(0.05) 
Party of Governor -0.0003 
(0.05) 
0.003 
(1.62) 
0.114 
(3.62)*** 
-0.207 
(1.90)* 
Election Year -0.002 
(0.26) 
-0.0003 
(0.13) 
0.014 
(0.41) 
-0.098 
(0.79) 
Democrats in the House 0.0004 
(0.89) 
0.0002 
(1.06) 
0.008 
(2.82)*** 
-0.001 
(0.11) 
Debt per capita -0.006 
(0.90) 
0.009 
(4.56)*** 
-0.03 
(0.98) 
0.361 
(3.45)*** 
Gross State Product  
per capita 
-0.009 
(3.42)*** 
0.004 
(4.60)*** 
-0.046 
(3.73)*** 
-0.199 
(4.52)*** 
Tobacco Production 0.072 
(1.03) 
Motor Vehicle 
Registration 
-0.002 
(2.00)** 
Hotels 0.26 
(4.32)*** 
Residence 0.134 
(3.76)*** 
Reciprocity -0.932 
(1.92)* 
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Table B2.3 continued 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Constant -0.329 
(1.48) 
0.044 
(0.63) 
5.561 
(4.68)*** 
-0.626 
(0.16) 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics. * denotes significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. See notes in Table 3.5 for 
control variables. Instruments and econometric issues are dealt with as in Table 3.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 151 
 
 
Table B2.4—Strategic Interaction over Multiple Tax Bases along with Interdependence 
among Tax Bases within the Same State considering Population Contiguity Weights 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.514 
(7.27)*** 
-0.102 
(3.21)*** 
-0.602 
(1.31) 
0.352 
(0.16) 
Neighbor Gas Tax -0.244 
(0.42) 
0.435 
(2.03)** 
1.521 
(0.48) 
-31.622 
(3.40)*** 
Neighbor Sales Tax -0.082 
(2.98)*** 
0.029 
(3.18)*** 
-0.108 
(0.73) 
0.749 
(1.03) 
Neighbor Income Tax -0.0003 
(0.03) 
-0.008 
(2.29)** 
-0.085 
(2.23)** 
0.034 
(0.20) 
Cigarette Tax 0.143 
(3.51)*** 
0.657 
(1.19) 
-3.855 
(1.70)* 
Gas Tax 1.375 
(4.08)*** 
-5.643 
(2.96)*** 
8.051 
(0.97) 
Sales Tax -0.021 
(0.91) 
-0.008 
(1.08) 
0.485 
(0.56) 
Income Tax -0.007 
(0.80) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
0.021 
(0.49) 
Population 0.028 
(5.72)*** 
-0.004 
(2.26)** 
0.046 
(1.74)* 
0.096 
(0.90) 
Elderly -0.02 
(2.48)** 
0.006 
(2.35)** 
-0.078 
(2.04)** 
0.237 
(1.58) 
Under 18 0.028 
(4.17)*** 
-0.008 
(3.65)*** 
-0.002 
(0.06) 
0.149 
(1.01) 
Income per capita 0.026 
(4.09)*** 
-0.007 
(2.75)*** 
-0.158 
(5.11)*** 
0.48 
(3.44)*** 
Unemployment -0.009 
(2.07)** 
0.004 
(2.24)** 
0.028 
(1.46) 
0.223 
(3.80)*** 
Grant per capita -0.028 
(0.65) 
-0.001 
(0.07) 
-0.577 
(2.96)*** 
0.523 
(0.44) 
Party of Governor -0.002 
(0.24) 
0.004 
(1.91)* 
0.115 
(3.52)*** 
-0.303 
(1.83)* 
Election Year -0.002 
(0.25) 
0.0003 
(0.13) 
0.019 
(0.51) 
-0.109 
(0.88) 
Democrats in the House 0.0003 
(0.68) 
0.0001 
(0.87) 
0.005 
(1.68)* 
-0.003 
(0.33) 
Debt per capita -0.012 
(1.58) 
0.008 
(2.56)** 
-0.015 
(0.43) 
0.298 
(2.25)** 
Gross State Product  
per capita 
-0.015 
(4.50)*** 
0.005 
(3.01)*** 
-0.009 
(0.50) 
-0.218 
(2.48)** 
Tobacco Production 0.124 
(1.67)* 
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Table B2.4 continued 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Motor Vehicle 
Registration 
-0.002 
(1.93)* 
Hotels 0.304 
(4.52)*** 
Residence 0.166 
(3.15)*** 
Reciprocity -0.627 
(0.59) 
Constant -0.145 
(0.50) 
0.107 
(1.11) 
5.885 
(4.49)*** 
-5.191 
(0.70) 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics. * denotes significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. See notes in Table 3.6 for 
control variables. Instruments and econometric issues are dealt with as in Table 3.6. 
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B3.  Comparison to Contiguity weights 
To check if the results obtained with contiguity weights are similar to the results obtained 
with population contiguity weights, I perform the same analysis considering contiguity 
weights. The results are presented in Tables B3.1–B3.4, where Table B3.1 reveals results 
from estimating equation (3.6), while Tables B3.2, B3.3, and B3.4 provide results from 
estimating equations (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9), respectively. In general, I find that most of the 
results obtained with contiguity weights are the same as those obtained with population 
contiguity weights. For instance, in columns (1) of respective Tables 3.6 and B3.4, I find 
that cigarette tax rates in a home state respond positively not only to cigarette tax rates in 
neighboring states, but also to sales tax rates in neighboring states. Nevertheless, some 
results that are obtained with contiguity weights are different from those obtained with 
population contiguity weights. For example, in column (4) of Table B3.4, I find that 
neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates have significant positive effects on the home state 
income tax rates. This is different from the results obtained with population contiguity 
weights, which show that neighboring states’ cigarette tax rates do not have significant 
positive effects on the home state income tax rates. One of the possible reasons why 
results using contiguity weights differ from results using population contiguity weights is 
that contiguity weights treat neighboring states with lightly and heavily bordered 
population equally.  
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Table B3.1—Strategic Interaction within One Tax Base considering contiguity weights 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.99 
(11.73)*** 
Neighbor Gas Tax 1.754 
(8.14)*** 
Neighbor Sales Tax -0.033 
(0.35) 
Neighbor Income Tax -0.612 
(4.26)*** 
Population 0.019 
(4.46)*** 
-0.002 
(1.27) 
0.08 
(4.24)*** 
0.122 
(1.89)* 
Elderly -0.026 
(3.63)*** 
0.007 
(3.20)*** 
-0.085 
(2.53)** 
0.323 
(2.95)*** 
Under 18 0.015 
(2.86)*** 
-0.007 
(3.95)*** 
0.026 
(1.20) 
-0.192 
(2.38)** 
Income per capita 0.032 
(7.98)*** 
-0.003 
(2.21)** 
-0.089 
(4.85)*** 
0.107 
(1.56) 
Unemployment -0.005 
(1.68)* 
0.0003 
(0.30) 
0.011 
(0.90) 
0.221 
(5.16)*** 
Grant per capita 0.021 
(0.60) 
-0.029 
(2.80)*** 
-0.53 
(3.21)*** 
-0.323 
(0.59) 
Party of Governor -0.0003  
(0.04) 
0.005 
(2.65)*** 
0.083 
(2.86)*** 
-0.174 
(1.82)* 
Election Year -0.003 
(0.33) 
0.0003 
(0.14) 
0.019 
(0.56) 
-0.094 
(0.83) 
Democrats in the House -0.0004  
(0.85) 
-0.0002 
(1.36) 
0.003 
(1.67)* 
-0.023 
(3.38)*** 
Debt per capita -0.008 
(1.51) 
0.0002 
(0.14) 
-0.064 
(2.71)*** 
0.252 
(2.90)*** 
Gross State Product  
per capita 
-0.015 
(6.22)*** 
0.004 
(4.95)*** 
-0.036 
(3.27)*** 
-0.11 
(2.94)*** 
Tobacco Production 0.031 
(0.43) 
Motor Vehicle 
Registration 
-0.002 
(2.07)** 
Hotels 0.308 
(6.12)*** 
Residence 0.145 
(5.23)*** 
Reciprocity -0.646 
(1.57) 
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Table B3.1 continued 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Constant -0.172 
(1.09) 
0.042 
(0.98) 
4.141 
(5.44)*** 
10.984 
(4.12)*** 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics. * denotes significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. See notes in Table 3.3 for 
control variables. Instruments and econometric issues are dealt with as in Table 3.3. 
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Table B3.2—Strategic Interaction within One Tax Base along with Interdependence 
among Tax Bases within the Same State considering contiguity weights 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.838 
(8.89)*** 
Neighbor Gas Tax 1.852 
(7.43)*** 
Neighbor Sales Tax 0.249 
(1.83)* 
Neighbor Income Tax -0.336 
(1.86)* 
Cigarette Tax 0.008 
(0.24) 
1.121 
(1.95)* 
-7.38 
(4.98)*** 
Gas Tax 0.747 
(2.14)** 
-9.78 
(5.53)*** 
13.095 
(1.87)* 
Sales Tax -0.006 
(0.33) 
-0.034 
(4.06)*** 
-0.61 
(1.56) 
Income Tax -0.011 
(2.00)** 
0.005 
(2.03)** 
0.059 
(1.70)* 
Population 0.022 
(4.70)*** 
0.001 
(0.59) 
0.03 
(1.22) 
0.267 
(3.17)*** 
Elderly -0.024 
(2.99)*** 
0.003 
(1.07) 
-0.02 
(0.45) 
0.136 
(1.06) 
Under 18 0.017 
(3.31)*** 
-0.007 
(3.16)*** 
-0.01 
(0.28) 
0.156 
(1.39) 
Income per capita 0.039 
(7.73)*** 
-0.007 
(2.94)*** 
-0.174 
(5.00)*** 
0.477 
(3.80)*** 
Unemployment -0.004 
(1.36) 
-0.001 
(0.45) 
0.037 
(2.13)** 
0.163 
(3.08)*** 
Grant per capita 0.019 
(0.48) 
-0.04 
(2.96)*** 
-0.495 
(2.46)** 
-0.143 
(0.22) 
Party of Governor -0.003 
(0.50) 
0.009 
(3.76)*** 
0.102 
(2.80)*** 
-0.13 
(1.16) 
Election Year -0.003 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.51) 
0.024 
(0.59) 
-0.092 
(0.75) 
Democrats in the House -0.001 
(1.03) 
-0.00002 
(0.12) 
0.007 
(2.53)** 
-0.007 
(2.53)** 
Debt per capita -0.006 
(2.53)** 
-0.001 
(0.77) 
-0.055 
(1.91)* 
0.222 
(2.30)** 
Gross State Product  
per capita 
-0.018 
(6.55)*** 
0.003 
(6.55)*** 
0.009 
(6.55)*** 
-0.248 
(4.60)*** 
Tobacco Production 0.054 
(0.74) 
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Table B3.2 continued 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Motor Vehicle 
Registration 
 -0.003 
(2.43)** 
  
Hotels   0.403 
(2.43)** 
 
Residence    0.159 
(5.12)*** 
Reciprocity    -1.576 
(2.51)** 
Constant -0.236 
(2.51)** 
0.193 
(2.77)*** 
3.484 
(3.53)*** 
2.831 
(0.65) 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics. * denotes significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. See notes in Table 3.3 for 
control variables. Instruments and econometric issues are dealt with as in Table 3.4. 
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Table B3.3—Strategic Interaction over Multiple Tax Bases considering contiguity 
weights 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.919 
(8.11)*** 
0.102 
(2.83)*** 
0.437 
(0.84) 
3.116 
(1.60) 
Neighbor Gas Tax -0.141 
(0.19) 
0.951 
(4.50)*** 
-15.536 
(3.23)*** 
-58.212 
(4.57)*** 
Neighbor Sales Tax -0.009 
(0.26) 
0.032 
(3.77)*** 
0.05 
(0.33) 
3.219 
(5.30)*** 
Neighbor Income Tax 0.031 
(3.04)*** 
0.003 
(0.95) 
-0.149 
(2.66)*** 
-0.049 
(0.24) 
Population 0.015 
(3.36)*** 
-0.001 
(0.77) 
0.095 
(4.04)*** 
0.095 
(1.23) 
Elderly -0.026 
(3.36)*** 
0.008 
(3.99)*** 
-0.099 
(2.47)** 
0.494 
(3.72)*** 
Under 18 0.026 
(4.25)*** 
-0.006 
(3.80)*** 
0.052 
(1.34) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
Income per capita 0.04 
(7.49)*** 
-0.001 
(0.80) 
-0.136 
(4.74)*** 
0.339 
(3.71)*** 
Unemployment -0.005 
(1.71)* 
0.002 
(1.93)* 
0.041 
(2.38)** 
0.322 
(5.90)*** 
Grant per capita -0.016 
(0.40) 
-0.015 
(1.45) 
-0.222 
(1.07) 
1.71 
(2.33)** 
Party of Governor -0.002 
(0.24) 
0.002 
(0.82) 
0.072 
(1.97)** 
-0.498 
(3.83)*** 
Election Year -0.002 
(0.28) 
0.00004 
(0.02) 
0.012 
(0.30) 
-0.108 
(0.81) 
Democrats in the House -0.0002 
(0.29) 
-0.0001 
(0.48) 
0.007 
(2.09)** 
0.007 
(0.76) 
Debt per capita -0.017 
(2.76)*** 
-0.001 
(0.42) 
-0.017 
(0.52) 
0.271 
(2.55)** 
Gross State Product  
per capita 
-0.018 
(6.25)*** 
0.002 
(2.91)*** 
-0.041 
(2.87)*** 
-0.168 
(3.50)*** 
Tobacco Production 0.053 
(0.72) 
Motor Vehicle 
Registration 
-0.002 
(2.86)*** 
Hotels 0.379 
(5.50)*** 
Residence 0.232 
(6.15)*** 
Reciprocity -0.937 
(1.90)* 
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Table B3.3 continued 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Constant -0.596 
(2.28)** 
-0.083 
(1.21) 
5.256 
(3.47)*** 
-9.652 
(2.07)** 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics.  * denotes significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. See notes in Table 3.3 for 
control variables. Instruments and econometric issues are dealt with as in Table 3.5. 
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Table B3.4—Strategic Interaction over Multiple Tax Bases along with Interdependence 
among Tax Bases within the Same State considering contiguity weights 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Neighbor Cigarette Tax 0.729 
(7.26)*** 
-0.068 
(1.20) 
1.435 
(1.93)* 
14.693 
(2.47)** 
Neighbor Gas Tax -0.919 
(1.14) 
1.266 
(5.67)*** 
0.504 
(0.09) 
-34.593 
(1.49) 
Neighbor Sales Tax -0.05 
(1.77)* 
0.021 
(1.82)* 
0.193 
(1.22) 
2.989 
(3.39)*** 
Neighbor Income Tax 0.016 
(1.48) 
-0.005 
(1.05) 
-0.06 
(0.96) 
0.57 
(1.48) 
Cigarette Tax 0.133 
(2.49)** 
0.052 
(0.08) 
-12.996 
(2.95)*** 
Gas Tax 1.052 
(2.55)** 
-10.904 
(5.01)*** 
-1.141 
(0.07) 
Sales Tax 0.015 
(0.80) 
-0.02 
(3.13)*** 
1.469 
(1.71)* 
Income Tax -0.008 
(1.29) 
0.005 
(1.85)* 
0.027 
(0.76) 
Population 0.018 
(3.77)*** 
-0.001 
(0.76) 
0.056 
(2.01)** 
0.175 
(1.44) 
Elderly -0.029 
(3.50)*** 
0.008 
(2.29)** 
-0.04 
(0.84) 
0.126 
(0.62) 
Under 18 0.03 
(4.68)*** 
-0.01 
(3.82)*** 
-0.018 
(0.38) 
0.253 
(1.43) 
Income per capita 0.043 
(6.83)*** 
-0.011 
(4.39)*** 
-0.154 
(4.12)*** 
0.951 
(3.91)*** 
Unemployment -0.006 
(1.59) 
0.001 
(0.88) 
0.042 
(2.09)** 
0.157 
(1.94)* 
Grant per capita 0.008 
(0.19) 
-0.018 
(1.29) 
-0.549 
(2.49)** 
2.861 
(2.39)** 
Party of Governor -0.004 
(0.52) 
0.006 
(2.54)** 
0.105 
(2.64)*** 
-0.68 
(3.32)*** 
Election Year -0.003 
(0.40) 
0.001 
(0.48) 
0.018 
(0.42) 
-0.154 
(0.94) 
Democrats in the House -0.0003 
(0.50) 
0.0001 
(0.57) 
0.004 
(1.30) 
-0.0004 
(0.03) 
Debt per capita -0.011 
(1.71)* 
0.002 
(0.75) 
-0.056 
(1.60) 
0.116 
(0.83) 
Gross State Product  
per capita 
-0.019 
(6.20)*** 
0.006 
(4.05)*** 
-0.01 
(0.48) 
-0.269 
(2.86)*** 
Tobacco Production 0.086 
(1.15) 
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Table B3.4 continued 
Dependent Variables 
Cigarette Gas Sales  Income 
Motor Vehicle 
Registration 
-0.002 
(2.64)*** 
Hotels 0.407 
(5.44)*** 
Residence 0.324 
(4.29)*** 
Reciprocity 1.282 
(0.76) 
Constant -0.442 
(1.57) 
0.143 
(1.69)* 
4.695 
(2.96)*** 
-24.268 
(2.44)** 
Observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 
Notes: Parentheses contain absolute values of t-statistics. * denotes significance at 10%, 
** denotes significance at 5%; *** denotes significance at 1%. See notes in Table 3.3 for 
control variables. Instruments and econometric issues are dealt with as in Table 3.6. 
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